

WORKING PAPER

#161

From: J2

1 of 38

TO: COMJTF

COMJTF

Deputy

Cover

ms Vaught,

Sir, I believe ~~we~~ we will have to execute in 7-21 days *

Listed below are a few [see pp-8] ideas for your consideration concerning forward deployment, insertion techniques, Spectre/ Command & Control presence and extraction.

E

(1) — Helo Deployment
— Make Norfolk Helo's in 2's to Dover at dusk, move into ~~hangar~~ dissemble, Tranship to ~~hangar~~ for assembly and further movement by ship and/or ~~area~~ self contained air.

-1-

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CLASSIFIED ON 12 Aug 92

DETERMINED CL BY DDCI NMCC

DECLASSIFICATION TO SECRET

REVIEW ON OADR

REMOVED FROM Multiple Sources

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

X 1524
pg. 1000

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

2 OF 78

CMSU and Support C 130 BB

E (S) - move [Spectre] to Europe
[] to support training
EXERCISE.

Great Pacom

E (S) - move [Spectre] and C 130 BB []
to [] of

J, C, E (S) - Begin irregular []
flights of []
[] And
[] with occasional
Run at both Locations.

A

(S) - Two flights before possible
execution [] selected crew
members [] Talon/Spectre fly
[]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

3 of 78

(g) - Possibly equip [REDACTED] & Charters

A - Compound [REDACTED]

(g) - Night Prior to execution

A [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] lands
at Mehrabad [REDACTED] at
Mehrabad and Ron's.

(f) - Next day [REDACTED]

A, C [REDACTED] recon the
selected evacuation Strip deposit

[REDACTED] schedules
That night charter departure
from Mehrabad approx 90 minutes

a hand of execution

window - delays depart

30-40 minutes checking

NAV. gear - finally departs (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

45-30 minutes prior to
Execution window - Decease
- goes out bound - and
30 minutes out in order
from ComInt ~~to~~ Progress
Alt - (may declare emergency)
~~and return to~~ flies to
pickup landing site -
(may re declare emergency
say they see crashing
(*) Report wrong location)
lands at P/U site after
Ground Execution has
started - prep blanket
itself out - prepares to
receive Delta + Hostages

ALTERNATIVE
on next Pages

(4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

A @

5 or 7
Halo Movement

into country

- (1) Establish Charter

Flight

arranged

(1) Establish

along

In SREU route

arranged Charter

Cargo flights - 3-5 days

prior to execution day

Night

(2) On day before

(2) Night Before Execution

the charter flight with

spare fuel for Halo -

acts as pathfinder for

Halo/Halo; land at

selected "Circusment site"

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~b of 8~~

mark landing set stops for
charter // charter lands
v-w loads fuel etc for
and resumes flight

(3) Helo - + Crews etc go
into concealment

A(4) Fixerion Night Helos

Initiate [REDACTED]

Appropriate time - Charter
homes / circles // Helo's
LIFT OFF and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] which is actually,
on this mission, [REDACTED]

~~soft target~~ acting as

[REDACTED] and airborne

[REDACTED] for ComJTF -

A(5) [REDACTED] acts as
Path Finder for Helo -
- ComJTF directs insertion
(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

offset to $\frac{1}{8}$
of Heli. from Airborne
orbit on from ground
staging area

1

- (1) (c) If multiple charter flights could be developed/patterned to deliver a few days before execution additional aircraft, [REDACTED]

A, B

relief, or ~~surface~~ ground reinforcement.

Gy

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

G WORKING PAPER FOR COL [REDACTED]

2-162

INFILTRATION OF [ADVANCE PARTY] FOR
RICE BOWL

1. PROBLEM (TS): To infiltrate advance parties of various size and composition into Tehran in support of RICE BOWL.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM (TS) (S)

a. The major means of legitimate entry into Iran are by commercial air from Europe/Asia; by road from Pakistan, Turkey, and Iraq; by rail from Turkey; and by ship from another Persian Gulf port or some more distant location.

b. [REDACTED] particularly the border areas and unpopulated eastern deserts is possible if thoroughly planned. Means of such entry include [REDACTED]

; etc.]

c. RICE BOWL has demonstrated a capability to introduce mission personnel into IRAN by both legitimate means [REDACTED] and through [REDACTED] insertion.

3. ASSUMPTIONS (TS) (S)

a. That infiltration of advance party personnel to support RICE BOWL could be by either legitimate [REDACTED] means.

b. That current Iranian entry procedures will remain relatively unchanged during the foreseeable future and that commercial airlines will continue to service Tehran and other Iranian airports.

c. That [REDACTED] will support RICE BOWL with [REDACTED] as required.

d. That any decision to infiltrate advance party personnel into Iran would not constitute a firm commitment to launch the actual mission.

e. That [REDACTED] will be available [REDACTED] if required.

EXPIRATION DATE 01 1236

REGISTERED ON 12 Apr 72

MAILED BY DDO NMCC

REL TO REGISTERED TO SECRET

TO IN 0ADR

FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES

Classified By

Declassified On 0ADR

TOP SECRET

WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING~~

f. That the political climate in Iran, while unstable, will remain such that foreigners can legitimately move about the country.

4. DISCUSSION (TS)

a. The presence of a limited number of RICE BOWL personnel in Tehran prior to the execution of the actual mission would serve to materially enhance the chances of success. These personnel could perform the following types of activity:

1) [REDACTED]

2) [REDACTED]

3) [REDACTED]

4) [REDACTED]

b. Recent experience with both [REDACTED] and legitimate infiltration techniques has demonstrated that both methods are feasible given proper detailed planning and development. [REDACTED] entry [REDACTED]

AC [REDACTED] offers the advantage of allowing both personnel and equipment to be introduced at the same time and place. Legitimate entry establishes a bonafide reason for being in Iran and consequently allows a similar means of exfiltration/departure. In either case, all advance party personnel would require [REDACTED]

c. The timeframe for insertion of advance parties is [REDACTED] prior to the actual execution of the Compound assault. Because of the unrest in the Turkish and Iraqi border areas, infiltration by overland means [truck/train] would be dangerous and time consuming. The same circumstances apply, although to a lesser degree, in the case of the Iran-Pakistan border. Insertion overland from Iraq is an even less palatable option. Commercial airlines serve Iran from points in both Europe and Asia. US military aircraft have the capability to [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

[REDACTED] With proper
individual or small group can enter Iran without undue
difficulty or risk. There are several hotels in Tehran
at which foreign travellers comprise the normal clientele.
Iranian diplomatic posts are issuing visas for travel
to Iran. Arrival and departure formalities are more
stringent for Iranians than for foreigners. While individuals
can enter and exit Iran relatively freely, the introduction
of equipment such as radios could not be accomplished
by this means.

5. CONCLUSIONS (PS)

a. Insertion of advance parties could significantly contribute to the success of the RICE BOWL mission.

b. Insertion is feasible by legitimate, [REDACTED]
or a combination of the two means.

c. Support would be required from [REDACTED]

d. Any infiltration entails risk to both the involved personnel and to operations security for the mission.
The size and nature of the advance party would dictate the location
means and timing of insertion.

e. The mission of each advance party element would dictate its activities and location once in Iran.

f. A minimum [REDACTED] would be required to develop [REDACTED] for personnel being introduced through Tehran International Airport. Advance party members inserted by [REDACTED] means would have to be prepositioned in the Middle East at least [REDACTED] prior to infiltration for rest/final briefings.

g. Phasing of the infiltration would allow decision makers to cancel or modify the operation as it proceeds.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

6. RECOMMENDATION ~~(S)~~: That COMJTF explore the idea of an advance party with the CJCS at an appropriate juncture to avoid expenditure of resources and planning time sans raison.

Appendix A: Listing of possible [REDACTED] and current JTF in-house [REDACTED] by country/language.

Appendix B: Recapitulation of operational needs which can only be satisfied by in-country advance party personnel, Notional time sequence of infiltration flow for personnel and equipment.

G

15 GC, USAF
J2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

i-163

22 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #3

This memo provides chronology of [REDACTED] insertion program.

[REDACTED]

for
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

GENERATED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECLASSIFIED TO Secret

REV'D ON OADR

REFNO PNL Multiple Sources

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301**

18 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program Update #2

1. The following is update to my memoranda of 12 and 16 April, same subject. This memorandum also requests authority to proceed with [redacted]

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

OK
25

~~SECRET~~ ~~EX-007~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~POLITICAL~~
~~REF ID: A6511~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #1 (TS)

1. (U) The following is an update to my memorandum of 12 April 1980, same subject.

(S)

[Large sections of the document from the subject line down to the end of the page are heavily redacted with black ink.]

6. (TS) The Army is working to develop several other sources capable of reporting on the situation in Tehran. I view these as longer term propositions which are still tentative in nature. If the present contacts prove to be promising, it will still require [redacted] of processing, training, and evaluation before we could logically expect to employ any of the prospects.


BC

~~TOP SECRET~~

FYI'S ONLY

C 7. (TS) Collectively, the above actions and associated travel expenses are projected to cost [REDACTED] over the next several months. None of the Service intelligence elements have budgeted funds to cover such an outlay.

8. (TS) Request CJCS advise Director, DIA, of the priority attached to the RICE BOWL observer program in order that DIA can initiate those actions required to properly obligate necessary funding.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~

FYI'S ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

(163)

12 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: Rice Bowl Observer Program

1. (TS) IAW your direction action is underway to develop/expand the DoD Rice Bowl on scene observer program.

2. (TS) As of 12 April 1980 the following actions are underway:

[REDACTED]

3. (U) Will provide update status on Wednesday 16 April.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

GAGAGAGAGAG

MSG197
281430Z APR 80

FM JTF RC [REDACTED] SGS
TO SITE ALPHA

SUBJ: STATUS OF [REDACTED]

REF: YOUR 280630Z APR 80

[REDACTED] NO STATUS ON REMAINDER. HOWEVER
MAY GET MORE WHEN [REDACTED] ARRIVES.

REVV 28 APR 10

I-180

C

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL D2L DOWNR TO Secret

REVV ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ - ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ (4-181)

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

1. Move Vehicles, Equipment and Personnel From [REDACTED] to Tehran via ROUTE:

A, E



TEHRAN

2. Move Vehicles and Equipment from [REDACTED] to Tehran, Route as Above, Rendevous with Personnel Between [REDACTED] and Tehran.

A, E

ASSUMPTION

[REDACTED] Non-Interference

PROBLEM AREAS

1. [REDACTED]-IRANIAN BORDER

A, E

Access to [REDACTED] airfield (daylight only/customs)

Access to [REDACTED]

Laager of vehicles/equipment

Snow Conditions

2. BORDER CROSSING

Clearance Rqmts [REDACTED] Iranian

Standing Time/Snow

[REDACTED] Rqmt

3. BORDER-KURD CONTROLLED AREA

Snow Conditions

[REDACTED] Rqmt

4. IRAN ARMY CONTROL AREA-TEHRAN

Standing Time

Fuel Locations

Checkpoint Methodology

Urban Transit

(Rendevous Location)

Classified By: ~~DDONMC~~
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 72

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~WORLDVIEW~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPER

COMMON PROBLEM AREAS

Control of the Operation by NCA
Flexibility
Political Embarrassment Potential
No Ready extraction/Reaction Capability
Significant Unknowns
 Weather
 Maintenance/POL
 Checkpoint Methodology
Four Weather Zones
Stationary Confinement of Personnel en route
Rqmt for Constant Truck Movement
 Sleep
 Exercise
Language
Papers
Actions on Detection/Capture

OPTION ONE

E ~~(✓)~~ VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

High Risk of Detection
No Flexibility
Poor Control by NCA
Physical Hardship/Danger for Personnel
High Political Embarrassment Potential

OPTION TWO

E ~~(✓)~~ VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [REDACTED]

NOT RECOMMENDED

A Requires [REDACTED] Approval
Poor Control by NCA
High Political Embarrassment Potential
Physical Hardship on Personnel
Minimal Flexibility
High Detection Risk in Iran

OPTION THREE

EQUIPMENT TRANSIT BY VEHICLE, PERSONNEL INFILTRATE TO TEHRAN

RECOMMENDED

High Probability of Success
Best Control Option
Most Flexible
Lowest Embarrassment Potential
Difficulty in Arranging Rendevous
Uncontrollability of Maintenance

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~OPTIONAL FORMS~~ ~~MODIFIED OPTIONS~~

E ~~SECRET~~ FOOT CROSSING OF [REDACTED] IRAN BORDER

Necessitated by high risk checkpoint(if determined)

~~(S)~~ Requires 5-8 mile cross country move
snow pack most likely
at night
navigation difficulties [REDACTED] option)
rendevous problem with [REDACTED]
detection probability 25%

RENDEVOUS PERSONNEL WITH TRUCK PRIOR TO TEHRAN

Necessitated by distance/risk

Rendevous selection
Below USSR/IRAN radar (if abn option)
outside of urban area or checkpoint visual
identifiable by driver
probable stop point for a [REDACTED]
concealment for personnel available

REQUIREMENTS

A ~~(S)~~ Immediate [REDACTED] of route]
Access to [REDACTED] and related commo
Selection of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Internal heat, including rear compartment
compartmented/ventilated
Maintenance/POL capability
drivers [REDACTED]

Cold weather clothing and equipment
Forward positioning of vehicles and equipment

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~SECRET~~

A
MSG 595
DTG 291208Z OCT 80
FM: [REDACTED]
TO: T 30%
101ST
[REDACTED]
DETAILED
A&AS

80
291208 OCT 80

~~SECRET~~

(S) THE FOLLOWING E & E CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPAL BY COMMANDER JTD. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT IS STILL OPEN FOR SUGGESTIONS, REVISIONS AND EXPANSION AS E & E WORKING GROUP IS DIRECTED BY INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS.

1. (U) SITUATION

a. ENEMY (SEE BASIC UPLAN.)

b. FRIENDLY.

c. (U) ASSUMPTIONS

(EXCLUDED) THE HOSTAGE RECOVERY OPERATION IS CONDUCTED IN SPITE OF OTHER OPTIONS/OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

(EXCLUDED) IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES WILL OPPOSE ALL POST-OPERATION EVASION ATTEMPTS.

(EXCLUDED) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WILL ENLIST ALL IRANIANS IN EVADER-LOCATION SEARCHES, COUNTRY-WIDE.

(EXCLUDED) THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ZONE SEVERELY RESTRICTS ANY MOVEMENT IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF IRAN.

(EXCLUDED) DUE TO SEVERE COLD DURING NOV-APR EXFILTRATION BY GROUND MEANS INTO TURKEY WOULD BE EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS.

d. (U) MISSION. MISSION FORCES WILL CONDUCT EVASION AND ESCAPE OPERATIONS, AS REQUIRED, TO ATTAIN REFUGE AND SUBSEQUENT FURTHERATION OF US CONTROL.

e. (U) EXECUTION:

i. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SEE BASIC UPLAN.

ii. (U) CONCEPT OF E&E OPERATIONS. MISSION SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE DETAILED PLANS WHICH WILL EVOLVE FROM THIS CONCEPT. JOINT E&E OPERATIONS WILL TYPICALLY BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BOMBING FORCES COMMANDER OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS APPROPRIATE. IN CASE OF NO CLEAR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, THE INDIVIDUAL MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE/EXPERIENCED IN E&E TACTICS SHOULD ASSUME THE COMMAND.

iii. (U) TASKS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS:

(1) ALL UNITS WILL PLAN FOR AND ACCOMPLISH TRAINING FOR THE CONDUCT OF E & E AS NOTED ABOVE. (CONCEPT OF E & E OPS)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 97

DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCR

DDCI DERIVATION TO Secret

REV'D ON 0 ADDR

DISSEMINATED FROM Multiple Sources

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY SYSTEMS. THIS SAR WILL COMPRIZE THE PRIMARY
INITIAL SAR EFFORT DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION
(ALL REFERENCES --).

- a. (C) TASKS OF FRIENDLY FORCES:
~~(C)~~ NAVAL FORCES SUPPORT E&E OPERATIONS OF THIS
MISSION DIRECTED BY CINCPAC, TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR
JAW CAPABILITY, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CAP
IS SUPPORT POST-OPERATION E&E.

~~(C)~~ EXTERNAL-BASED SAR EFFORT WILL BE UNDER THE
DIRECTION OF THE MISSION COMMANDER. THIS EXTERNAL SAR
EFFORT WILL NOT BE INITIATED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION
OF PLANNED EXFILTRATION PHASE OR CANCELLATION OF THE
MISSION OR AS DIRECTED BY THE MISSION COMMANDER.

(4) [REDACTED]

A,B,C

[REDACTED]

b. (C) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) (C) COMMON PROCEDURES:

~~(C)~~ PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY
SECOND VOICE RADIO, IF POSSIBLE. BACKUP COMMRO
WILL BE BY CREW SURVIVAL RADIOS.

~~(C)~~ HOSTAGES, REGARDLESS OF RANK, WILL NOT ACT
WITH COMMAND AUTHORITY, EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE
SPECIAL RECOVERY FORCE ELEMENT COMMANDER. IN A
CONFLICT OF OPINION ON WHERE TO GO, OR HOW TO
MOVE BETWEEN DELTA/FAINGER [REDACTED] FORCE PERSONNEL AND
OTHER PERSONNEL (AIR CREWS), THE RANKING DELTA/RAN-
GERS WILL HAVE COMMAND AUTHORITY REGARDLESS OF
RANKING. PIRATE.

~~(C)~~ PERSONNEL CONDUCTING E AND E OPERATIONS WILL
MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REMOVE WOUNDED PERSONNEL WITH
THEIR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. NO MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE
LEFT BEHIND UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO AVOID
TOTAL OPERATION/ELEMENT FAILURE. KIA'S LEFT
LIMB WILL BE CONCEALED AS MUCH POSSIBLE;
INJURIES AND COMPROMISING DOCUMENTS REMOVED,
AND THE LOCATION MARKED ON A MAP FOR FUTURE
MEDICAL AND LOGISTICS/DECEDANT AFFAIRS PURPOSES.

~~(C)~~ ONLY MEDICAL, ONLY, WILL BE MAINTAINED ON
THEIR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, TIME, AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
PRIOR TO MISSION LAUNCH. OTHER PERSONNEL WILL BE
MAINTAINED ONLY ON THE E AND E CONCEPT IN BROAD TERMS,
AS NOT PROVIDED WITH INITIAL MEDICAL POLICY/COMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY INFORMATION TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATE BY THEIR COMMANDERS.

~~(C)~~ This report is primarily based on directing personnel
to conduct initial, pre-planned SAR effort can deal with
initial primary tasks of evacuating wounded personnel
to safety, and by body-system SAR during the execution of
the mission, and by a pre-positioned, pre-planned, post-mission
SAR. Pre-positioned SAR will be the last option of the
mission, if all other SAR efforts fail.

~~(C)~~ E AND E CONCEPT WILL BE BROKEN INTO 3 PHASES: COUNTRY
EXFILTRATION, ENVIRONS OF TERRAIN PRIOR TO A HOUR, ENVIRONS
OF TERRAIN AFTER A-HOUR (PRIORITY EXFIL "E" HOUR). ENVIRONS
OF TERRAIN AFTER 1-HOUR (POST-EXFIL "E" HOUR), 72 HOURS AFTER
A-HOUR, (PROLONGED E AND E).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(1) (a) COUNTRY/INFILTRATION PHASE: PRIMARY SAN WILL BE
IMPLEMENTED BY HELO BUDDY-SYSTEM PLAN. IF THIS CANNOT
BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL GROUP TOGETHER AND
MOVE TO THE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE DOWNED PERSONNEL
ARE TO PREPARE TO CONCEAL THEMSELVES AND THEIR AIRCRAFT
FROM NIGHT OBSERVATION FOR UP TO 36 HOURS.

(b) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN PRIOR TO H-HOUR. ALL DOWNED
PERSONNEL WILL BE PICKED UP BY THE BUDDY SYSTEM. IF PICK-UP
IS NOT POSSIBLE, AND THE DOWNED PERSONNEL ARE OUTSIDE THE
TEHRAN BUILT-UP AREA, MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE CITY PROPER
IS, DEPENDING ON POSITION WHERE DOWNS, EITHER TOWARD EXFIL
POINTS AT PEGGY, PATTY OR OTHER DESIGNATED SITES.

(c) (1) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL
"E" HOUR):

(A) FROM EMBASSY:

1. PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE
EMBASSY. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM
THE EMBASSY GROUNDS, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL
BE USED (IN ORDER) TO PROVIDE EXFIL POINTS:

(A) STADIUM. IF NO PICK-UP, THEN TO
(B) CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN.

(2) IF EXTRACTION IS NOT COMPLETED AT THE
CONSTRUCTION SITE,

A,B,C

(C) FROM MFA:

PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE MFA GROUNDS.
IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE THEN PERSONNEL WILL
MOVE TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR EXTRACTION:

1. PATTY-SHARK:
IF EXTRACTION BY HELO IS NOT POSSIBLE,
MOVEMENT MUST BE MADE BY VEHICLE TO CONSTRUCTION
SITE.

2. CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN:

IF NO EXTRACTION CAN BE MADE AT THE CONSTRUCTION
SITE, MOVE TO LZ PATTY MUST BE MADE (SEE
ABOVE).

(d) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER E-HOUR:

(1) DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TOWARD SELECTED
HIDING SITES.

A,B,C

(2) DEPENDING ON POSITION IN THE CITY, PERSONNEL
WILL SILENT KICK AND ATTEMPT TO
MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE LAR VALLEY. WITHIN 48-72
HOURS A SAM WILL BE LAUNCHED (IF PERMITTING) AND
DIRECTED TO THE LAR VALLEY FOR EXTRACTION OF
STANDED PERSONNEL.

~~SECRET~~

If no pick-up is made by 72 hours after exfil, the individual must prepare for a prolonged E and E situation.

(c) ~~CO~~ ~~JOINT~~ DESIGNATION. TWO GENERAL AREAS HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION MOVEMENT, REFERRED TO AS THE EASTERN AREA AND THE WESTERN AREA. THE WESTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE SOUTH FROM TEHRAN TO ISFAHAN TO HAFSANJAN SOUTH TO BANDAR ABBAS. THE EASTERN AREA RUNS FROM SEMNAN SOUTH ALONG THE MAJOR ROAD TO KERMAN THEN S/EAST TO SABZEVARAN, THEN SOUTH TO BANDAR ABBAS.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

C. LOGISTICS:

A OTHER LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED] SHOULD SERVICE ELEMENTS BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE; I.E., COMPASSES, SIGNAL PANELS, SIGNAL MIRRORS, ETC. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVIVAL BUNDLES TO BE EQUIPPED TO EVASING ELEMENTS WILL BE CONFIGURED BY [REDACTED] UPON RECEIPT OF D-DAY/C-DAY AUTHORIZATION FROM JCS.

B. (C) ADMINISTRATION. SEE BASIC OPLAN

D. (C) COMMINT AND SIGNAL:

E. (C) SIGNAL. SEE ANNEX THIS OPLAN, AND TAB THIS ANNEX FOR COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.

A ~~CO~~ COMMINT. JOINT E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR DELTA/RANGER [REDACTED] PERSON PRESENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK. UNILATERAL E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL HOSTAGE PERSONNEL BE PLACED IN A COMMAND POSITION OF MISSION FORCES, REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGE RANK/POSITION.

G. ~~CO~~ THE ABOVE CONCEPT WILL BE EXPANDED INTO A FULL ANNEX. THERE WILL BE A CONFERENCE HELD AT JID 5-7 NOV TO COMPLETE THE DETAILS OF THIS ANNEX. PLEASE SEND NAME OF ATTENDEE BY 5 NOV 89.

AMERICAN
DI

~~SECRET~~

OPSEC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

184

This document addresses general and specific procedures that must be considered to avoid compromise of the operation and to maintain a high degree of OPSEC. Some of the measures have already been incorporated while others remain unfulfilled.

I. MOVING FORCE TO OVERSEAS STAGING BASE

A. DELTA

1. HUMINT Threat to include inadvertent disclosure by the press, through family and friends.

E a. [REDACTED] Responsibilities

(1) Continue [REDACTED]

(2) Continue personnel welfare activities such as residence checks, financial support, caring for families, etc.

(3) Monitor [REDACTED] community (especially [REDACTED] for indications through use [REDACTED], and other sources.

(4) Monitor attachments and civilian hire (cooks, KPs, guards, etc.).

(5) Divert press inquiries to HQDA PAO while otherwise refusing to talk to the media.

b. Delta Main REsponsibilities

(1) Conduct stringent OPSEC briefing to personnel.

(2) Train and live in isolation; restrict contact of personnel with others; [REDACTED]

(3) Move in isolation - no exposure when possible, [REDACTED] apply need-to-know principle stringently.

(4) Minimal exposure times on ground.

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDONMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

(5)

A,B

(6) [REDACTED] and transport
only essential cargo.

(7) Eliminate access to areas by foreign nationals
when possible.

2. PHOTINT/SIGINT Threats

a. Program [REDACTED] with movement times and
[REDACTED] S when applicable.

b. Emplace [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. Use maximum COMSEC procedures to include secure
systems, [REDACTED]
etc. [REDACTED]

B. USAF

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

2. Special attention [REDACTED]

overseas.

C. [REDACTED] RANGERS

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta

2. Move force under [REDACTED] and have [REDACTED]

D. POTENTIAL DAMAGE FACTORS IN EVENT OF COMPROMISE

1. Hostages killed.

2. Increased security/vigilance by Iranians.

3. Hostages moved.

4. Combination of above.

(6) II. MC-130 INSERT FROM STAGING BASE TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. DELTA MAIN (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Secure storage and facilities for personnel and equipment not taken forward.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B. Continue COMSEC procedures with emphasis on [REDACTED] from staging base.

C. RANGERS - same as for Delta.

D. USAF

1. Same as for Delta.

2. Minimal use [REDACTED] to avoid [REDACTED] by USSR, Iranian, and other applicable ground/air stations.

3. [REDACTED]

4. Route planning [REDACTED]

5. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft encountering in-flight emergency.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE

1. Same as I. D. above.

2. Possible decisive engagement of force by air defense guns/missiles and/or aircraft intercept.

(I) III. RH-53 INSERT TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. Develop plan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Threat is from [REDACTED]

B. Develop plan to [REDACTED] of RH-53s. Threat is same as III. A. with additional [REDACTED]

C. Route planning to [REDACTED]

D. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft having in-flight emergency.

E. Minimal use of [REDACTED] with COMSEC emphasis.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - same as II. D. above.

#3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ IV. TAKEOVER AND LAGER AT NA'IN

A. RANGERS (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Recover/dispose of air items if applicable.

2. Total elimination or capture of guarding force [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] e.g. food, water, sanitation, trash considerations; [REDACTED] etc.).

4. Develop plan to give [REDACTED]

5. Stress COMSEC procedures.

B. USAF

1. Develop landing techniques to avoid ground observation. Attention to light and noise conditions.

2. Ensure minimal ground time for aircraft with appropriate light/noise discipline - will engines be shut down; what is parking pattern, turn around, and takeoff procedures; what are refueling procedures?

3. Develop OPSEC procedures if 1 or more aircraft is unable to takeoff.

C. RH-53s

1. Same as for USAF.

2. Develop plan to [REDACTED]

D. DELTA - same as for rangers.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - Same as I. D. as well as possible decisive engagement of the force on the ground.

V. MC-130 RETURN FROM NA'IN TO STAGING BASE

Same as I and II above for USAF.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VI. RECRUITMENT / VOCALMENT OF DRIVERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Standard agent recruitment procedures must be followed but time may not be sufficient to vett personnel and to ascertain full reliability of drivers.

B. Vehicles must be procured, delivered, and stored in such a manner as to avoid suspicion/investigation.

C. Compromise may result in same potential damage as in I. D. above as well as possible intercept and decisive engagement of force.

VII. GROUND TRANSPORT MOVE FROM TEHRAN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Vehicles must be configured for concealment by trusted and reliable personnel to preclude leaks.

B. Cut-outs should be used to assemble and mate drivers to vehicles to avoid compromise.

C. Plan must be developed to prepare vehicles for movement to link-up point to include appropriate cover, documentation, and procedures for drivers. Route planning must occur for passage of check points and routing of vehicles so driver does not necessarily know true destination.

D. Vehicles must be parked near link-up point with an ostensible reason for being there or with concealment to avoid ground/air observation.

E. Consequences of compromise are the same as VI. C. above.

VIII. AIR MOVE FROM NA'IN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

~~A~~ A. RH-53s

1. Establish OPSEC procedures in event 1 or more aircraft cannot take off or have in-flight emergencies.

2. Route planning to [REDACTED]

3. COMSEC measures.

4. Landing must be in isolated area to avoid ground observation with special attention to noise and light discipline.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

A
B. DELTA/RANGERS

1. Movement plan from aircraft to vehicles without being detected.
2. Last minute concealment check after loading vehicles and prior to move out.
3. Capture or eliminate any personnel observing aircraft.

(S) IX. RH-53 GROUND TIME (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A.

B. Maintain security around aircraft, capture or eliminate ground observers or passers by.

C. Maintain radio silence.

(U) X. GROUND MOVE FROM LINK-UP TO TEHRAN (HUMINT THREAT)

- A. Develop plan to bypass checkpoints or to pass through them to include control of drivers.
- B. Noise/light discipline in vehicles.
- C. Maintain COMSEC measures.

XI. MC/AC-130 MOVE FROM STAGING BASE TO MANZARIYEH

Same considerations as for II above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) TIME

EVENT/SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

(U)

DECISION/OPTIONS

1700L

1 MC-130 with Rangers depart Egypt
Successful
Unsuccessful:
Launch Rangers in spare A/C within two hours

None

A

Go

Go, inform RH-53 KC-135s & MC-130

Unable launch within two hours

No force to secure Main, unable to arrive at hideout before sunrise

Abort, inform other forces
Delay 24 hours

1730L

5/MC-130 with fuel (3) and Delta (2) depart [REDACTED]
10 min separation

If spare is available for launch within two hours

Mission will be delayed

Go, inform other forces of delay

If no spare and a Delta A/C aborts

Lose 1/2 mission force

Abort

If no spare and a fuel A/C aborts

Fuel for helos degraded

Advise Kitty Hawk to only launch four helos

1815 L

Launch 2/air refuelable tanker (ART):

If either gets airborne

Sufficient fuel for Ranger MC-130

Go

If delayed less than 2 hours

Must orbit of Ranger MC-130

Go, advise other A/C of delay

If delayed more than 2 hours

Cannot get helos to hideout by first light

Abort, recall MC-130s and helos if launched

1830

6/RH-53 depart Kitty Hawk:

>4 get airborne

Sufficient helos to Go accomplish the mission plus one spare

<3 get airborne

Insufficient helos for mission

Abort, recall MC-130's & KC-135/ARTs

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	(U) DECISION/CIT
1845L	1/KC-135 & 3/ART's launch: <u>>2</u> get airborne <u><2</u> get airborne	Will have to share fuel from more than one tanker for one of the MC-130s Not enough fuel for MC-130s	Go, except a for refuelin at least one the MC-130's Abort, advis MC-130s and helos
1845	If a helo goes down while within the range of the SAR helos -- no injuries -- with injuries	Aircrew on the ground in Iran Will use one of mission helos to return crew to the carrier	Go, launch S for pickup If there are 4 mission he continue - If less th abort, advis KC-135 and M
1920	1/MC-130 air refuels with ARTS: Unsuccessful:	No Ranger force for security at Main - Try the se tanker, if g go, if no re possible, ab recall helos MC-130s and KC-130..	
1950	5/MC-130s air refuel		
2030	with 4/ARTS and 1/KC-135: - All successful	None	Go
	- One of the fuel A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient fuel for 6/RH-53s	- Instruct a in excess of to return to carrier
	- More than one fuel A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient fuel for the mission	Abort, advis MC-130, RH-5 ARTS/KC-135
	- One of the Delta A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient force for the mission	Abort, advis other aircraf

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECIS: 100/OPP:</u>
2215L	RH-53s reach turn around point: 4 helos operational	Sufficient helos for operation	Go, from here an abort must worked out of Main
	4 helos operational	Insufficient helos for operation	Abort
2250L	1st MC-130 with Rangers lands at Main to secure the field: - Runway blocked - MC-130 has problem on landing	Field will be ready to receive follow-on force Unable to air land Rangers Runway must be cleared for follow on force	Go - Jump rangers into target area to secure the base, clear the runway - Off load MC-130 to clear runway, aircraft will destroyed prior to departure, Abort mission
2320 0000L	Follow-on MC-130s land at Main - Field not secure when A/C arrive	Delta plus fuel will be ready to receive fuel Need to complete the security if mission is to go	Go Land Delta to assist Rangers in completing security. If warning outside Main is suspect abort, refuel helos and send them back to the carrier. Recover rest of force in MC-130s
0000-0030	2/MC-130s that brought in Delta depart	Partially clears Main for arrival of helos	If problem arises later, fuel MC-130s can carry Delta and Range out after re-fueling helos

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPT.</u>
0030	6/RH-53 land at Nain Military to refuel - RH-53s unable to find Nain Military by 0100, launch MC-130 to provide UHF/ADF homing from 7000. - RH-53s unable to arrive Nain by 0130	4 RH-53s operational force is adequate for mission Helos must arrive at Nain by 0130 or MC-130s will be short of fuel for return MC-130s must depart to reach tanker with sufficient fuel	Go If helos can arrive Nain by 0130, mission still Go If helos arrive later than 0130, - Pump fuel into one bladder; three fuel MC (gives one hour delay). When helos are pumped remaining fuel to helos get max number that can return to the ship. all helos back towards carrier and set the fuel helos down as necessary, pick up crews and proceed.
0130	The one Ranger and two Delta MC-130 depart for [REDACTED] Any MC-130 has problem and cannot depart Nain	Clears ramp. Delta will go with helos. security force will return on the fuel MC-130. Mission will be compromised	Go Abort, return helos to carrier take Rangers Delta to [REDACTED] MC-130s.
0130	6/RH-53s with Delta and the Ranger security depart Nain	All of Delta and 12 Rangers can proceed on the mission.	Go

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT/SITUATION</u>	<u>CONSEQUENCES</u>	<u>DECISION/OPTI</u>
	3 helos get airborne	Spread Delta and Rangers	Go
	3 helos get airborne	Mission badly degraded	Continue in degraded stat or abort
0310	RH-53s arrive at landing zone to drop off Delta	Delta will depart for Tehran in in vehicles	Go
	There are no vehicles at the LZ	Delta unable to move to Tehran	Leave recepti team at LZ. Move helos an rest of force hideout. Del 24 hrs, 48 hr abort
0330	RH-53s depart LZ to hideout. Delta moves to Tehran		

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OUTCOME
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide t 19 operational bladders to compl mission
	c.<4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d.>1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful <4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 HELOS Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout Insufficient fuel for Helos	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 wi Delta/1 Wi extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets) b.>5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay c.<5/Helo airborne	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft Would unacceptably de-grade equip and personnel for "Delta"	Go If there is a delay instruct MC-130s to orbit No/Go, delay 24 hr Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than

> = greater than

= less than or equal to

= greater than or equal to

(U)
TIMEEVENT/
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

2/1430Z
1515Z
(1045EST)

d.>1:00 delay

Cannot reach hideout
by daylight

No Go, delay 24

Helo goes down
over water
- Delta Helo downForce unacceptably
degradedNo Go, Recall He
advise MC-130s t
take 2nd refueli
and RTB. Scramb
SAR from Carrier
advise KC-130s/A

- Cargo Helo down

TACAN and camouflage
nets goneOption 1 - Delta
Helos continue,
launch SAR from
Carrier2/1640Z
(1145EST)MC-130 refueling:
5 successfulSufficient fuel for
6 helos

Go

4 successful

Sufficient fuel for
5 helos, can move
camouflage to hide outGo, Foldup 6th H
and leave it + T.

<4 successful

Insufficient fuel for
helos

No Go, recall He

2/1515Z
1810Z
(1015EST)Helo goes down prior
to turn around point
- Delta Helo downForce unacceptably
degraded - may lose
TACAN and camouflage
netsOther 5 helos la
and spread the 1.
Advise MC-130
to delay by no.
minutes required
recovery.- If injuries:
Option 1: 6th
lands, dumps c
if necessary, i
injured and re
to carrier.

Cargo Helo down

Crew requires recovery

Option 1: Launc
Delta Helos conti

(0) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTI
			Option 2: La of the other helo's and lo crew member camouflage reach. The T should be ab go on one of helos. Advise MC-130's to
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recal advise MC-130 RTB, call for KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z <i>(310-1416 EST)</i>	6 helo's operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: La helos and sp load. Continue refuel point Option 2: La helo and p/u plus crew.
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	NOTE: Any option can recover the cargo plus the crew. cargo helo is 2000 lbs light. Option 1: Abort, proceed to refuel point, take off fuel, return to carrier. Option 2: Proceed to refuel point. helo will rejoin carrier with Remaining 4 on mission. No camouflage can be taken at hideout)

(U) TIME	(U) EVENT/ SITUATIONS	(U) CONSEQUENCES	MISSION/CPE/OPR
2/1948Z (1448 EST)	<p>Airdrop of fuel bladder:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5 MC-130's make drop - 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4. <p><4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.</p>	<p>Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK</p> <p>Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.</p> <p>Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target</p>	<p>Go, can proceed number of helo's desired</p> <p>Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 bladders</p> <p>Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as to get 4 operational</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship</p> <p>Option 3: Delay hours to get more fuel the next night</p>
2/2248Z (1748 EST)	<p>Helos launch from refueling:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 helo's airborne 5 helo's airborne 4 helo's airborne 3 helo's airborne 	<p>Will have extra helo support for extraction</p> <p>Adequate support for extraction</p> <p>Marginal support for extraction</p> <p>Minimum helo's for extraction</p>	<p>Go, use 6th helo to carry max fuel</p> <p>Go, fold up 6th helo and leave it. Extract extra fuel from operational helos</p> <p>Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos</p> <p>Option 1: Proceed mission in degrad status</p> <p>Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.</p> <p>Option 3: Delay place 24 hrs. To fix helo's or get more fuel, as required</p>

~~TOP SECRET~~

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay hours, try to get helos or get fuel, as required. Option 2: Load personnel on strip down and to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay hours, fly personnel to Manzariyah to meet MC-130 Rangers. Option 4: Delta crews fly to vicinity of Da Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as option above except one helo from Delta from re-point to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130 when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748:00 EST)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (1818 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzariyah for extraction	JTF Commander recall the force to the carrier contact means
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748 - 2024 EST)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point: - 6 helos available cargo helo goes - 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets Delta force unacceptable degraded	2 helos land crew and nets 3 helos land, Delta or crew

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	the cargo helo, Delta board each the other two he
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	4 helos land spr load the person attempt lift off with nets, if un dump nets.
	3 helo's available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	Abort, strip dow spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideo extract on MC-13 the next night.
3/0124Z (1024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	From here on we find a recovery airfield to secu and call for the MC-130's
3/2200Z 2210Z (1700-1710 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s nex: night. Option 2: Contin ground commander's decision.
3/0124Z 2135Z (/2024 - 3/635)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	If 3 or more helo available, contin if < 3, inform Delt and abort to Manzariyeh. Move helo's at nic to RV to p/u Delt then to Manzariye for extraction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIC
3/1500Z (1000EST)	AC-130 launch		
3/1630Z (1130EST)	MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " 2 " <2 "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people) A	GO
3/1545 (1045EST)	KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK <3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	- P/U only hos + wounded - Direct [REDACTED] launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1605 (3/1105EST)	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Refuel at least MC-130, more if possible.
3/1900 (3/1400EST)	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Same as above	Same as above
3/2135Z (1635EST)	Helo lift off from hideout >3 RH-53 OK <3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) CAS - Cycle helo's f Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z (1730EST)	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paradrop Rang onto airfield - Wait for Delt helos to arri to secure field clear R/W
3/2230Z (1730EST)	Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos	- Use extra hel
	3 RH-53 OK	Min reqd helos for for extraction A	- Land helos si use other 2 for
	<2 RH-53 OK	Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Cycle helo's f extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z (1730-1800EST)			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (1745 EST)	Extraction: >3 Helo's OK ≥1 Helo OK Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	Go Cycle Helo's Use ground vehicle to drive to Manzariyeh
32300Z (1800 EST)	Helo's arrive at Manzariyeh ≤3 RH-53 OK ≤3 RH-53 OK ≤3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130 Zero helo's OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130 Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded - MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded MC-130 plus 1 or extra MC-130 - Keep all MC-130 ground till personnel arrive - Launch two MC-1 for cover relay or for departure
4/0015 (3/19/5 EST)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/19/5 EST) Movement of Delta	AC-130 refuel Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set prearranged rally points. If discovered, dis- engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, He go to Manzariyeh if no contact with Delta

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(#188)

1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of G then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA D MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehra He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHR. AVARD. HALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for me. You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel.

MAN ZAN, VA PANJ BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAN SHOMA HAM BACHCHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHMAN NAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA ! MAN KOMAK KONEED. I NEED YOUR HELP.

~~JCS
DADR~~
Classified By:
Declassified On:

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

HELP	KOMAK	کمک
COME HERE	BIYA ENJA	بیا اینجا
DON'T MOVE	TA KAN NA KHOR	کان خور
GET DOWN	BE KHAB	خواب
SIT DOWN	BEN SHEINID	نشینید
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بلند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	بلزار زمین
OPEN	BAZ	باز
CLOSE	BAS TE	بسته
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفنگ
PISTOL	HAF TEAR	صفت تیر
KNIFE	CHA GHO	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FE SHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نارنجک
MACHINE GUN	MO SAL SAL	سلسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر هستیم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HAS TAM	کجا من کجا هستم
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE KOJAST	کجا است
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JO NOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرق
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطار
BUS	AUTOBOS	اتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاكسي


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	در چرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOR CEAK LET	موتور سیکلت
TRUCK (LORRY)	MACHINE BARY	کامیون آب
WATER	AB	نام
BREAD	NAN	نان
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لباس
BLANKET	PATO	پتو
SHOES	KAFSH	کفش
SOCKS	JORAB	جوراب
HAT	KOLAH	کلاہ
COAT	COAT	کت
PANTS	SHALVAR	شلوار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پالتو

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



۱ - برادر خرازی غیر من مسلمان هستم من در همه خواه خدا
کار میکنم و مهندس ساخته ام هله بروم . با این امیدم در زمان خار میکنم
که اسلام بسط شود .

۲ - مردم از من یوں گفت که ملک خارج از کشور بیرونی هر آنکه زد و ب
تهران آورده اکارن در تهران سرگردان و بعده مذاوجا هستم .

۳ - من نیل داشتم که کوچک دپه راهدار پیر را هم که منظر من هستند . شما هم
باید دلائل پدر و مادر دارید و حال ما هم فرمید .

۴ - شایعی هادی مسلمان همان نازی و گیک درون شهر دارید بخط
خدا بمن کشک شد من - کش شایعی از دارم .

قریل شما .

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22030



REPLY TO
ATTN OF INRA

17 MAR 1981

SUBJECT Worldwide Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia (IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN), USAFINTEL 400-10 Volume I

TO JCS/J-3 SOD
Washington, DC

1. A copy of the SERE Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia with accompanying graphics, is at Attachment 1.
2. This Guide was produced by HQ AFIS/INR, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner of War Directorate of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Assistance in research and analysis is provided by selected members of the Air Force and Navy Intelligence Reserves.
3. Users are reminded that this Guide was primarily intended for use in operational evasion and escape (E&E) planning, E&E intelligence briefings, and various aspects of SERE training. Please refer to the introductory remarks and instructions contained in Section 01 for additional information on this Guide.
4. SERE Guides are furnished to designated Unified, Specified, and Major Commands and other special action agencies/offices noted in distribution list. Request that those distributees arrange for further reproduction and dissemination on a need-to-know basis to subordinate echelons or affiliated commands. Distribution for operational purposes will be determined by the primary distributees. This latter request is predicated on the limited printing and photo reproduction capabilities of the producer and a determination that the primary distributees should control distribution. Computer print tape versions of the Guide are not available.
5. SERE Guides are reviewed for currency as needed. Substantive changes will be forwarded to primary distributees as required.
6. Request that users forward comments, recommendations for improvements, and suggested additions or corrections directly to the producer, at the following address: HQ AFIS/INRA, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
7. Compendia of plants, animals, diseases, and general survival information has been distributed to elements listed in Attachment 1 of this letter. We will no

Declassified by:
DDO NMCL
12 Aug 92

[REDACTED]

longer provide details and 35mm slides in each Guide for individual plants, animals or diseases. If detailed information is needed, users should refer to the compendia.

8. Due to an anticipated six to eight weeks delay in photographic reproduction, only the Potential Evasion Locales (PEL) graphic overlays are included with this volume. 35mm slides will be forwarded with Volume II.

9. When Attachment 1 is withdrawn or not attached, this letter becomes "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".

Frank J. Capillupo

FRANK J. CAPILLUPO, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner
Of War

1 Atch
SWA SERE Guide, 31 January 1981
[REDACTED] 1 Cy.

REF ID: A65155
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 JANUARY 1981

SUBJ: ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The following Escape and Evasion plan is the final product, based on Option 12. This plan should be used in its entirety only if Option 12 is used.
2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The intent of this plan is to provide an off-the-shelf capability to support Option 12 only. However, this document will hopefully also provide the framework for any other option to be developed.

DAVID G. PREVOST
Maj., USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

COMPLETED ON 17 Aug 97DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC ~~REL BY SOURCE~~ SecretREV ON OADRREASON FOR: Multiple SourcesCONTAINS INFORMATION CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY: JCS - J3DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR () REVIEWIS: 6 JAN 2001Copy No. 10 of 10 Copies~~CONTAINS INFORMATION CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY: JCS - J3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR () REVIEW
IS: 6 JAN 2001~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
ESCAPE AND EVASION

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See Annex B, this OPLAN.

b. ~~JTF~~ Friendly. [REDACTED]

A,B,C

[REDACTED] However, there are several areas which are designated general Selected Areas For Evasion which should provide water, game, and opportunity to obtain shelter."

c. ^(U) Assumptions

(1) ^(U) ~~JTF~~ The hostage recovery operation is conducted independent of other options/operations in the Persian Gulf area.

(2) ^(U) ~~JTF~~ Iranian military forces will oppose all post-operation evasion attempts.

(3) ^(U) ~~JTF~~ The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians in evader location search, country-wide.

(4) The Iran-Iraq war zone limits any movement in the southwestern portion of Iran.

(5) Due to severe cold during Nov-Apr exfiltration by ground means other than vehicles into Turkey would be extremely hazardous.

(6) Although there are networks being used by Iranians opposed to the government to leave Iran covertly into Turkey, no penetration of their structure has yet been made. These networks are dominated by Kurds in the Tabriz and Rezayeh areas.

- 2. (S) MISSION: JTF forces will conduct evasion and escape operations; as required, to return all U.S. forces to U.S. or friendly country control.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See basic OPlan

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 5 JANUARY 2001

Copy No. 10 of 10 Copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tabs -

- A. E and E Phases
- B. SAR SOP (1-75)
- C. Evasion Aids
- D. Visual Signals/LZ Markings
- E. Communications Procedures

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ESCAPE AND EVASION

Country Infil/Exfil

1. Upon boarding any fixed wing aircraft the senior ground commander, or his designated representative, will obtain from the navigator a 1:2,000,000 map with the legs of flight route (for both ingress and egress) depicted, to include approximate flight times for each major leg. (Map will remain with the aircraft). Ground element will then use this chart to flight follow and will be responsible for knowing the approximate position of the aircraft during ingress and egress. For short, rotary-wing legs of flight, the ground forces must flight-follow on their own maps.

2. Actions to be taken on forced/unplanned landing:

a. On decision to execute a forced landing, aircraft navigator will notify ground element commander of aircraft location.

b. Immediately upon stop, all personnel will comply with the directions of aircrew to exit the aircraft.

c. After rallying a safe distance from the aircraft, (500 meters west of the aircraft, if possible) the following actions will be taken

(1) Injured/wounded cared for

(2) Establish local security

(3) Destroy classified material

(4) Inventory personal/aircraft survival and evasion aids.

(5) Senior ground element officer/NCO briefs all personnel on the evasion plan, i.e., breakup in groups and evade, stay together, stay with aircraft.

(a) The decision to take one of these options will depend on the security of the downed aircraft position. If the aircraft is not burning and the downed position is reasonably secure/remote, the first option will be to remain together and within 5 km of the aircraft. If possible, movement should be made on a cardinal heading from the aircraft position toward cover. Mark your direction of movement by placing a "T" (stem at least 15 ft in length) with the bottom of the "T" pointing south. This will be an authenticator. Any other direction of the "T" will indicate compromise. Place the "T" near the quarter of the aircraft, indicating your direction of movement.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) If the aircraft is burning or the landing is made in a populated or hostile area, a determination must be made whether to break into small groups and evade or to attempt to hide as a large group. In all probability, there would be no external SAR effort launched until the objective has been met and exfil is nearing an end. A 24 to 36 hour maximum prior to launch of a SAR effort is realistic. For the timeframe H+36 hours, all personnel should, if possible, attempt to remain in one group. Initial evasion should be attempted in the direction which will provide the most cover and security for the evaders.

(c) SAR forces should make contact within 36 hours of H-hour. In the time between downing and pick-up, a secure zone should be maintained with a safe access to an adequate helo landing area. For contact/pick-up procedures see SAR ANNEX.

J.B.C

(S)3.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

A

TAB B SAR PLAN, 101st

I. GENERAL:

A. Purpose: The purpose of this SOP is to outline the basic procedures that will be used by the 6 and 12 man SAR teams. This also outlines the basic organization, responsibilities, procedures and special equipment used by this team.

II. TEAM ORGANIZATION:

A 12-Man Team: The SAR Team should work as a 12-man team whenever possible to provide maximum coverage and security on the target. The 12-man SAR Team is broken down into two elements; the Personnel Rescue Element and the Security Element. The 12-man SAR Team breakdown to include primary and alternate duties are:

PERSONNEL RESCUE ELEMENT:

SAR Team Leader: Responsible for SAR Team; directs all actions on the objective; controls and directs all personnel on the ground; controls the use of the SAR aircraft; directs fire control and fire support.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel from the right side of downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of right side of aircraft; alternate demo team; alternate equipment destruction team; alternate aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel including navigator from the left side of the downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of left-side of aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 3: Responsible for acting as guides for all uninjured and slightly injured walking personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for engine shut-down and equipment zero; responsible for pilot removal and transportation of injured pilots to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary demolition team/primary equipment destruction team.

Counter: Responsible for accountability of all personnel being picked up according to each aircraft load. Directs flow of personnel being loaded to insure aircraft are loaded equally if possible.

Security Element: Responsible for security of target area while the Personnel Rescue Element works. If needed the Security Element may be reinforced by the Personnel Rescue Element upon direction of the SAR Team leader.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Assistant SAR Team Leader: Responsible for positioning security forces to secure SAR aircraft and personnel in the target area; keep SAR Team Leader informed on all security matters. Remain updated on all situations in order to assume command of the SAR team if necessary.

Security Personnel: Consists of 2 M-60 gunners and one assistant gunner; responsible for maintaining 100% alertness and observation; informs Security Team Leader of any approaching forces or dangers that may keep the SAR Team from completing its mission safely.

b. 6-Man Team: The capability of the 6-man SAR Team is greatly reduced in comparison to that of the 12-man SAR Team. However, there are situations when the reduced number of personnel would be favorable and still complete the mission. Such situations would include aircraft down due to maintenance where there are no injuries and the area is not populated or built-up. Aircraft down with only the flight crew on board could be handled by the 6-man team. The organization and the duties of the 6-man team follow closely those of the 12-man team:

Team Leader: Responsible for shut-down of engines; zeroing all secure equipment; security sweep of the aircraft; responsible for SAR Team and actions or objective.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Transporting all injured personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Guide for all uninjured and slightly injured personnel to appropriate aircraft; primary demo team; primary equipment destruction team.

Security Team: Consists of one M-60; protect the SAR aircraft; keep team leader informed of the security situation.

(C) III. Weapons and Equipment:

a.

A, B

b.

c.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

- d. Special Equipment:
- Pry bars: 2
 - Bolt cutters: 2
 - POW kits: 8
 - M5 bags: 2
 - Airborne litters: 2
 - 120' Rope: 2
 - Demo kits: 2
 - Fire Extinguishers: 2

IV. Chalk leads:

SAR Acft 1

SAR Acft 2:



1. Team Leader and Assistant Team Leaders should position themselves on the aircraft so that they are seated to the inside of the formation when flying staggered.
2. Teams should position themselves together on chalk loading.
3. Key personnel and teams should be positioned where they can be controlled by the Team Leader.
4. Always cross load.


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNED AIRCRAFT

V. Landing Configuration:

a.



1. When landing aircraft on the target area SAR aircraft 1 faces the downed aircraft on the right side of the downed aircraft (right side in relation to the direction of flight)
2. SAR aircraft 2 lands to the left of the downed aircraft in relation to the direction of flight, facing the downed aircraft.
3. Spare aircraft should land close by to the downed aircraft maintaining a safety watch on the downed aircraft for any signs of fire.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. If downed aircraft is in an area where a simultaneous landing by all three SAR aircraft is impossible, SAR aircraft 1 will land first, off-load SAR team and take off. Then SAR aircraft 2 will land to off-load SAR personnel and take off. The spare SAR aircraft will then land for loading of appropriate personnel and then take off. SAR aircraft 2 will land for loading followed by SAR aircraft 1. Landing will always be with the nose of the SAR aircraft pointed toward the target, if possible. Once an aircraft has cleared the PZ, that aircraft should signal clear to the next aircraft to land.

6. Should a SAR team have to off-load and move a considerable distance to secure a target, the drop-off LZ will be the primary PZ. Once a target is secure or located, an alternate PZ may be selected on the target area or enroute. This will be marked by an IR strobe light. If all three aircraft can land the IR strobe light marks aircraft 1's location. IR chemlights will mark the PZ for aircraft 2 and 3. If only one aircraft can land, the landing sequence will be aircraft 3, 2 then 1.

b. General Procedures:

(1) Once the aircraft has landed, all aid and litter teams 1 and 2 move to their respective areas on the downed aircraft and begin to remove personnel and equipment.

(2) Aid and litter team 3 move to the front of the downed aircraft, assemble all injured and mobile personnel, and guide them to the appropriate aircraft.

(3) The counter will count each individual as he loads the aircraft.

(4) A&L 1 and 2 will remove all injured personnel to appropriate aircraft from their location.

(5) A&L 3 will return and extract pilot and co-pilot.

(6) A&L 3 or 1 will then either destroy equipment or aircraft after A&L 3 or 1 zeros the equipment.

(7) Once personnel are removed, weapons and sensitive material will be removed and loaded on A&L team aircraft.

(8) SAR Team Leader will direct and supervise.

VI. Loading of Injured and Uninjured from Downed Aircraft:

a. Loading of uninjured or slightly injured:

(1). Enroute to objective, any uninjured or slightly injured mission ground team members including the pilot of the downed aircraft and who are able to continue the mission, will be loaded on the spare aircraft to continue the mission.

(2) The ground team leader will decide whether a man is able to continue his mission.

(3) The copilot, navigator and crew chief along with all injured personnel unable to continue the mission will be loaded equally on SAR aircraft 1 and 2 in order to receive medical attention.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4) Injured will be loaded to the front first with their backs against the crucible.

(5) Load priority:

- a. Mission able personnel
- b. Walking wounded
- c. Seriously injured
- d. Dead

VII. Priorities of SAR Team At The Objective Area:

- a. Security
- b. Load uninjured and mission-able injured to continue mission.
- c. Load seriously injured
- d. Zero equipment and collect sensitive material and weapons.
- e. Destruction of equipment and/or aircraft
- f. Perform first aid in flight.

VIII. Actions Of Personnel In Downed Aircraft:

- a. Shut down engines, fuel system and electrical system.
- b. Assemble all injured at the nose of the downed aircraft.
- c. Uninjured form local security in front of the aircraft.
- d. Remove all weapons and sensitive material and secure.
- e. Each individual should retain personal gear.
- f. Attempt to zero all secure equipment and leave hood up as signal to the SAR team that this has been accomplished.
- g. Maintain a fire watch to provide warning if the aircraft catches fire.
- h. Set up IR strobe to signal SAR aircraft that LZ is clear and secure.
- i. Be prepared to assist Aid and Litter Teams.
- j. Pilot is in charge of personnel until SAR arrives.

IX. Demolitions:

a. SAR team will be responsible for destruction of aircraft:

(1). No aircraft will be blown enroute to the objective.

All secure gear and control panels will be smashed.

(2) Demolitions of aircraft enroute from objective to transload point:

a. Demo will be set on command of the SAR commander.

b. Demo will be set after area is clear just prior to SAR aircraft take off.

c. 5 minute time fuze will be used.

d. Primary demo location will be the left side fuel cap.


e. Alternate demo location will be inside the aircraft, next to the auxiliary fuel tanks.

X: Target Area Security:

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

a. Security for 3 SAR aircraft:



Security for 3 SAR aircraft will be formed by placing half moon perimeters on each side. M60 #1 has front security. M60 #2 has rear security.

b. Security for additional aircraft:



For additional aircraft in the Laager area, the additional aircraft must land between SAR aircraft #1 and #2. Half moons will be to the front and rear with flank security provided by the door guns.

~~B SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

XI. Aircraft Accessories needed for SAR:

- a. Head sets for ground commander on each aircraft.
- b. All seats out except Pilot and navigator.

XII. Command and Signal:

a. Communication:

- (1) Ground to air (SAR Team Leader to flight leader)
FM (secure)
- (2) Communications between the 2 SAR elements while
in the air will be conducted through the pilots'
over-the-flight net.
- (3) SAR element communications while on the ground
will be conducted over MX-360.

b. Signals:

- (1) Downed aircraft signal, clear to land: IR strobe
light.
- (2) 100% accountability of SAR team: up and down
movement of Illum tape.

ANNEX:

1. Zeroing Secure Equipment
2. Location of Sensitive Material
3. SAR Support Plan from Objective Area

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX 1 ZEROING SECURE EQUIPMENT TO SAR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

A. General: There are a total of five pieces of equipment on a UH-60 to be zeroed to prevent compromising communications security. Four of five pieces of this equipment can be zeroed manually. The manual method will be used by the SAR element.

B. Location of equipment to be zeroed:

(1) The equipment to be zeroed is located in the nose of the aircraft.

(2) The nose hood can be lifted by releasing two latches.

(3) The nose hood may be secured with a lock. It can be easily broken by using a pry bar or axe.

(4) Once the hood is up, three of the items to be zeroed are located under a black cover which is along the back portion of the compartment. This cover can be removed by pulling the cover off. The equipment will be three gray boxes side by side. Each has a sliding type button on the front. To zero, slide each button up.

(5) Item number four is a black box located to the right, in the main compartment. It can be zeroed by pushing a button located on the front of the box.

(6) Item number five is a long gray box located in the center of the compartment. It can only be zeroed from the pilot control panel. Facing the panel, the knob to zero the equipment is to the left of the flight instruments. The knob must be turned all the way to the left to zero it.

(7) Once zeroed, all equipment will be smashed with an axe unless the aircraft is being destroyed. The instrument panel and navigational computer will also be smashed.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX 2 - LOCATION OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL TO SAR SOP

..A. General: To insure the successful recovery of sensitive papers, codes, and maps, these items should be kept in a single location when not in use. They should be in some type of binder or folder. This container should be located between the copilot's seat and the instrument console.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX 3 - SAR SUPPORT PLAN FROM OBJECTIVE AREA TO SAR SOP

SAR Flight #1

- 10: PW's
- 11: PW's
- 12: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT #2

- #6: PW's
- #7: PW's
- #13: SAR Element
- Empty Hawk

A, B *(er)* [REDACTED]

SAR FLIGHT # 3:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #2 Security Elem. (Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT # 4:

- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- Pavelow or Hawk
- #3 Security Elem (Black)
- Empty Hawk
- Empty Hawk

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"BLOOD CHIT"

1. Brother- Sister. I was an engineer in Mecca, the home of God, then I came to Iran. I was in Ahwaz when the Iraqis attacked.

BARADAR - KAHAR. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR MACCA BODAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR VAKTI KE IRAQIAN TAARUZ KARDAND MAN DAR AHVAZ BODAM.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVORD. HALA TANHA VA BE DONE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 kids, an old mother and father. They are waiting for me. You may have kids, you have father and mother and you know what I feel.

MAN ZAN, PANJ BAHCHE, MADAR VA PEDAR-E-PEER DARAM.

ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BAHCHE- MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God, help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANI HA VA MOSALMAN HA BE MEHMAN MAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK KONEED: MAN KOMAK MIKHAM.

HELP KOMAK

COME HERE BIYA ENJA

DONT MOVE TA KAN NA KHOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GET DOWN	BE KHAB	خواب
SIT DOWN	BENESHEE	نشی
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بولند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	بگزار زمین
OPEN	BAZ KON	باز کن
CLOSE	BASTE	ست
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفان
PISTOL	HAFTEAR	هفت ایر
KNIFE	CHAGHO	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FESHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نرنجک
MACHINE GUN	MOSALSAL	مسالسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر داریم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HASTAM	من کجا هستم
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE _____ KOJAST	کجا است راه
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JONOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرق
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطر
BUS	AUTOBOS	اوتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاكسي
BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	دوچرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOCYCLE	موتو سیکلت
TRUCK	KAMYUN	کامیون

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WATER	AB	اَب
BREAD	NAN	نَانْ
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لِبَاس
BLANKET	PATO	پَاٹو
SHOES	KAFSH	كَافِشْ
SOCKS	JORAB	جَرَاب
HAT	KOLAH	كُلَّاه
COAT	COAT	كُوتَه
PANTS	SHALVAR	شَلَوَار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پَالْتُو

~~TOP SECRET~~



REF ID: A65121
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

(- 194 -)

IAGPC-OP

23 May 1980

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

Special Operations Division
Room 2C840 Pentagon
ATTN: LTC [REDACTED]
Washington, DC 20310

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

GENERATED ON 12 Aug 97

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DDCI IS BOUNDING TO CONFID

REV'D ON 0 APR

REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

1. (U) Reference phonecon between LTC [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED] on 20 May 80,
subject: SAB.

2. (S/NOFORN) Per request, above reference, the following information is
provided. Operational expenses were incurred during the period
80.

a.

(1)	\$15,000
(2)	2,825
(3)	1,750
(4)	1,700
(5)	5,990
(6)	2,000
(7)	2,500

SUB TOTAL \$31,765

b. O&MA

(1) Travel, Lodging Per Diem Expenses (Europe)	\$5,000
(2) CONUS Travel/Per Diem	<u>9,000</u>

SUB TOTAL \$14,000

c. Total Expenditures

\$45,765

d. In addition to the above, additional expenditures are required due to the
fact that [REDACTED] are continuing in CONUS. [REDACTED] is being considered for

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11, ENCL 3
REVIEW 23 MAY 2000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

IAGPC-OP

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

23 May 1980

[REDACTED] Estimated expense for the remainder of [REDACTED]

3. (S/NOFORN) The following is a breakout of the total manhours committed exclusively for the coordination, control, and tasking of [REDACTED]

a. HQ INSCOM (ADCSOPS) (Approx. 5 persons) 50

b. HQ [REDACTED]

(1) Operations Section - (8 persons) 321
(2) Collection Requirements Section (3 persons) 191

SUB TOTAL (11 persons) 512

c.

(1) Command/Operations (2 persons) 376
(2) Case Officers (4 persons) 1256

SUB TOTAL (6 persons) 1632

d. Total Manhours (22 persons) 2194

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LTC, MI
Operations Officer

Copy Furnished:
ADCSOPS

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/198

1. Sovi

706⁺

~~TOR 1231706⁺~~
~~el~~

BREJKCILHEDPANRQ
TLMSC NO: 0123
DTG: 231655Z MAY 80
FM: 1 SOW/A-2
TO: JTF/J-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

REFERENCE: YOUR MSG/ DTG 221527Z MAY 80 (SAME SUBJECT)

1. THE BEST ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE MAN HOURS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. 7 NOV 79 TO DEPLOYMENT DATE: 3,600 MAN HOURS (INCLUDES JTF MISSION INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT ██████████)
B. DEPLOYMENT DATE TO 30 APR 80: 1200 MAN HOURS.
2. ALL FIGURES INCLUDE ESTIMATE OF ██████████ INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE INVOLVED.

RVW 23 MAY 80

BT

48

NNNN &
2244) .) & , , / (75 -

CLASSIFICATION REVIEWED 12356

CONDUCTED BY 1C A-92

DERIVATIVE CL BY RDO NMCC

DER BY DOWNGRADING TO CONFID

REVW ON 04018

DERIVED FROM 12355

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DISPOSITION FORM~~SECRET~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-13, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

IAFM-OPS-HU-SA

Intelligence Support
i-195to Special Operations Div (SOD) FROM ADCSOPS-HUMINT
JCS USAINSCOM
Pentagon
ATTN: LTC [REDACTED]DATE 22 May 1980 CMT 1
LTC [REDACTED] gulf/7829

- G
1. Per your request, the following data pertaining to subject is provided:
 - a. 129 intelligence reports were prepared and disseminated to your organization during the period 23 Nov 79 to 23 May 80. Approximately 1032 manhours were expended in data acquisition, transcription/assembly, and preliminary analysis of these reports
 - b. Courier distribution of the finished intelligence reports is estimated at 104 manhours.
 - c. General intelligence analysis, assembly of operational data, analyst-analyst meetings, and other operational planning activities are estimated at 160 manhours.
 - d. Total estimated manhour expenditure by this activity in support of your requirements is 1296 manhours.
 2. Other fiscal expenditures are estimated as follows:
 - a. 129 cassette tapes = \$225.75.
 - b. Incidental technical equipment = \$4.96.
 - c. Facilities rental = \$153.61.
 - d. Mileage reimbursement for mission essential POV travel = \$310.00.
 - e. Total monetary expenditure is estimated at \$694.32.
 3. INSCOM Action Officer is LTC [REDACTED] IAFM-OPS-HU-SA, AVN:923-7829/2769, CIV:(301)677-7829/2769.

G

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The three day period of intensive support from 220600 April 80 to 250230 April 80 resulted in a dedication of approximately 236 manhours, of which 160 hrs are already included in para 1d above. Again, I stress that overall figures are on the conservative side.

Regards,

~~SECRET~~
WORKING PAPER
4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 77 - 30 April 1980

MAN HOURS

Excess Costs

DIA	MIN 35,000	11	\$6,000
DMA	11,094(1)	11	\$50,000
ARMY (crew)	21,944	11	50,000
(unit)	1,032	11	700
USAF (7602)	525	11	0,000
(OSI)	19	11	0,000
(Poly)	120	—	\$128 (1,000)
	<u>49984</u>		

49984 #165,828

~~OPERATIONAL Forces~~ #165,828

- SFOD - 6,132 -

- [REDACTED] - -

- 150W - 4,800 - 3,000

JTF - 5,000 - 5,000

15,932 #165,828
126,000

Classified By:
Declassified ON: ~~DDONMC~~ OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WORKING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

(201)

Hand 22

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER			
SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept (TS) (U)		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	DELEGATION	EXECUTION	OTHER
				X	

REMARKS

- (U)
 1. (TS) The attached concepts were developed in response to verbal instructions.
 2. (TS) Three options are outlined. They are as follows:
- 2 Night Option
 - 3 Night Option
 - 4 Night Option

DDANMCC
 Classified By: ~~DDANMCC~~
 Declassified ON: ~~DDANMCC~~
 Downgraded by: OADR
 13 Aug 92

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED]	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
COL, USA SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	J P						
	EXEC						
	TM CHP						
	VOCPB						
	COPB						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
28 March 80							

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

I. SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept.

II. PURPOSE: To address the blivet drop concept.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. The helos must be refueled at some point along the ingress route.

B. Blivet drop specifics:

- The blivets are 500 gal collapsable fuel bladders of which approximately 450 gal can be pumped into the helicopters.

- If Delta and attachments were transported aboard helicopters from the carrier to a HLZ, a minimum of six helicopters would be required.

- A minimum of 28 blivets are required to refuel the helos at the selected refuel site.

- Six MC-130s can deliver 30 blivets, 3 M-274 (mules) and associated pumps.

C. Operational Concepts

OPTION 1:

- Delta is prepositioned on the carrier with helicopter crews.

- First night. 6 MC-130s insert 30 blivets and a four man (approx) refuel party by parachute at a remote refuel site. The refuel party will consist of Delta personnel so as not to overload the helos during the flight to Tehran. The refuel party will position the blivets,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- check the pumps and camouflage the equipment. If the refuel party reports breakage, the operation will be delayed one night and an additional paradrop conducted the next night to replace the required items.
- Second night. If there are no problems, 6 helos with Delta onboard will fly to the refuel site and conduct refueling operation. The refuel party will depart on the helos with the Delta force.
- Due to the decreasing hours of darkness, the helos will not be able to fly all the way to the original HLZ/hideout. The helos will stop at a new HLZ/hideout located approximately 1-1 1/2 hours from the original HLZ. The helos and Delta will hideout at this location until 1930 hrs. The helos will then fly to the original HLZ arriving at approximately 2100 hours. The Delta force will be met by trucks at this location and proceed immediately into Tehran to conduct the rescue. Extraction will be as originally planned at Manzariyeh.

~~E~~ OPTION 2:

- Delta is prepositioned on carrier.
- MC-130s prepositioned at [REDACTED]
- 1st Night - 6 MC-130s and C-130 (AWADS) deliver by parachute 35 fuel blivets and a refueling team (4-6 man) into a designated remote LZ along helicopter ingress

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- route. Team recovers, inspects, positions, and
camouflages blivets and equipment. Status report rendered.
- 2nd Night. If required, MC-130s deliver replacement blivets and equipment prior to helicopter arrival. Six helicopters with Delta aboard launch from carrier and proceed to refueling site. Helicopters refuel, recover refueling party and proceed to hide site.
- 3rd Night. Helicopters depart hide site, deliver Delta to drop site and then proceed to a temporary hide site.
- A Delta moves [REDACTED] to a holding area; conducts reconnaissance. Delta moves into position and assaults compound. Delta extracted from compound and stadium by helicopter and evacuated Manzariyeh air field. Manzariyeh evacuation would be as originally planned.

OPTION 3:

- Prepositioning same as Option 2 above.
- First Night. Same as Option 2 above.
- 2nd Night. Same as Option 2 above.
- 3rd Night. Helicopters depart initial hide site, proceed to Delta drop off point and then enter a new hide site.
- A Delta moves [REDACTED] to ware~~house~~. Conducts coordination with in-country assets and prepares for leaders recon.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 4th Night. Delta moves from hide site and assaults compound as envisioned in current plan. Compound extraction and Manzariyeh evacuation would also be as originally planned.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

JCS/J-3	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER 1 - 203			
SUBJECT: Request for MC-130 Flight Across [REDACTED]		ACTION			
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		X	X		

REMARKS

(U) (PS) The attached message requests RADM Packer to task one EUCOM C-130 to fly a survey route across [REDACTED]. The purpose of the flight is to attempt to [REDACTED] Routing will approximate what to be flown during the rescue mission.

(U) (PS) Full requirements for mission to include routing, timing, altitudes, etc. have been passed telephonically to [REDACTED] at OTFE.

(U) Request signature on attached message. SOD will deliver to SSO Privacy Communication Office upon approval.

Point Paper on MC-130 Signature [REDACTED] E

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
 Declassified ON: 04/09
 Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
 12 Aug 92

ACTION OFFICER [REDACTED] OD, J-3 XT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME
J P					<i>Vayholt</i>	55077
EXEC						
TM CAF						
VOCPG						
COPG						
DATE OF PREPARATION 4 March 80					<i>T. J. [REDACTED]</i>	
					<i>[REDACTED]</i>	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY	
0100		ACT INFO		TT		DATE-TIME	MONTH YR
BOOK	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS						

FROM: JCS
 TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN EYES ONLY~~

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] {TS}

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. {TS} REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN

AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM

TO [REDACTED]

2. {TS} REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA
 NORMAL AIRWAYS TO [REDACTED] PROPOSE THAT, IF POSSIBLE
 WITHIN NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, AUTHORITY BE REQUESTED FOR THE
 FLIGHT TO DEVIATE FROM STANDARD AIRWAYS TO CONDUCT LOW LEVEL
 TRAINING DURING THE RETURN FLIGHT. FULL PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES,
 ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3.

REVW 25 MAR 00

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS

DISTR:

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE		SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE		
RELEASER	SIGNATURE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
		DATE TIME GROUP

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY		
11 OF BOOK		00		TT		DATE-TIME	MONTH YR	
						MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS		

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [REDACTED] ~~(TSF)~~

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. ~~(TSF)~~ REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN

AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM

TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [REDACTED] VIA

NORMAL AIRWAYS TO AND FROM [REDACTED] FULL

PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION

HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [REDACTED] OF SOTFE/J3.

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

DISTR:

RELEASER		TYPE OR STAMP DATE	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
J-3, EXT 55078			
TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE			
SIGNATURE		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DATE TIME GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-204

FROM SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

TO AMEMB [REDACTED]

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR [REDACTED]

SUBJ: C-130 USE OF [REDACTED] (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ TO FACILITATE SHIFT FROM [REDACTED] OF FLEET SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AS AGREED DURING RECENT NEGOTIATIONS ON ACCESS, AND TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH AND SUPPORT OF TF-70, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO FORMALLY APPROACH GOVERNMENT OF [REDACTED] FOR USE OF [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL. THIS ACTIVITY IS OF AN URGENT NATURE AND MUST BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ORDER TO MESH WITH TF 70 CHANGEOVER SCHEDULE.

2. ~~(S)~~ SEA SURVEILLANCE TRAINING EXERCISES/SUPPORT MISSIONS WOULD BEGIN ABOUT 18 APRIL. APPROXIMATE SCHEDULE IS FOR ONE MC-130 TO ARRIVE FROM [REDACTED] ON 18 APRIL, TWO MC-130S FROM [REDACTED] ON 20 APRIL AND THREE C-130S/ONE MC-130 FROM [REDACTED] ON 22 APRIL. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD EXPECT TO OPERATE C-130 MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] PROVIDING SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ON 18, 22 AND 24 APRIL, AND ONE OR TWO C-141 SUPPORT MISSIONS FROM [REDACTED] ON 24 APRIL. WE ANTICIPATE NO MORE THAN EIGHT AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT ANY ONE TIME. THIS EXERCISE IS PLANNED AT THIS TIME TO LAST ONLY A FEW DAYS. A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 100-125 PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE, AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN FOOD AND BILLETING.

3. (S) FUEL REQUIREMENTS (JET A-1) FOR THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE A TOTAL OF 175,000 U.S. GALLONS. COMPENSATION FOR FUEL WILL BE PROVIDED BY AF FORM 15 WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED THROUGH THE DAO.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

25B21

Classified By: ~~305~~ DDON MCC
Declassified On: ~~1440~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4. ~~(S)~~ FOR PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION WE DESIRE BLANKET DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR OPERATIONS AT [REDACTED] 18-26 APRIL WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC NOTES SUBMITTED AS PRESENTLY REQUIRED ON EACH AIRCRAFT IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, FLIGHT DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY ICAO FLIGHT PLANS.

G 5. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED], PLUS TWO, WILL BE IN COUNTRY MISSION COORDINATOR. THEY WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] ON 15 OR 16 APRIL AND CONTACT EMBASSY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO TRAVEL TO [REDACTED]

E 6. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST YOU APPROACH [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND OBTAIN APPROVAL AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BUT NOT LATER THAN APRIL 16. ABOVE INFORMATION CAN BE RELEASED ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL.

DECL 14 APR 86

CONFIDENTIAL

25R22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

OO 201400Z APR 68
FM CO JTF, SITE ALFA
TO REPOCOM JTF, WASH DC

0011

~~SECRET~~

E JUST LEARNED FROM LOCAL USAF BASE COMMANDER THAT THE LOCAL [REDACTED] SECURITY FORCE COMMANDER, A FIRST LIEUTENANT, MAY ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE EACH OF OUR ARRIVING AIRCRAFT LOADS WHICH ARE DUE IN TONIGHT. HE TAKES ORDERS ONLY FROM [REDACTED]. HENCE HE CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY THE LOCAL COMMANDER. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE GEN [REDACTED] IN [REDACTED] TO ASK HIS HELP. HAVE LOW CONFIDENCE THAT HE CAN WORK THIS PROBLEM SATISFACTORY FROM HERE. PLEASE ASK HIGHEST LEVELS THERE TO HELP. MEANWHILE WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN FROM HERE.

263

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

12 APR 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GT 0310
58

DTG 152322Z APR 80
FM: JTF/LTC [REDACTED]
TO: SITE ALPHA/LT COL [REDACTED]

E, G ~~SECRET~~
PASS TO JCSE NMCC.
LT CCL [REDACTED] IS NOW SAC TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER. EFFECTIVE
25 APR 80 LT CCL [REDACTED] WILL BECOME TTFC.
BT

C-#
C-262

NNNNOT

Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: 04 DR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT
VC

202023E

0015

i i

✓ 259

DTOD201900Z APR 83
FM : JTF
TO: JCS/ RC

SUBJ: JTF SITREP NO 1 (AS OF 2100Z)

1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. JTF STAFF AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL (41 TOTAL) ARRIVED [REDACTED] 200832Z APR

B. HELO FORCES AND CARRIER LIAISON GROUP (63 PERSONNEL) ARRIVED [REDACTED] 200832Z APR NIMITZ 200815Z.

C. TWO MC-130 ARRIVED [REDACTED] FROM [REDACTED] 200810Z/200815Z.

D. TWO KC-135 TANKERS ARRIVED [REDACTED] 201405/1410Z.
2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT [REDACTED]

B. THREE MC-130S AT [REDACTED]

C. EIGHT HELOS AND CROWS ON NIMITZ

E. THREE KC-135 TANKERS AT [REDACTED]

F. FOUR KC-135 TANKERS AT [REDACTED].

(U) 3. OPERATION PREPARATIONS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY.

4. COMMUNICATIONS:

A. [REDACTED] SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING NOISE BURST DURING PERIODS WHEN INSUFFICIENT POWER IS TRANSMITTED TO THIS LOCATION. THESE BURSTS ARE DISRUPTIVE TO SECURE VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS. ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM YOUR HQ. F. ALL CIRCUITS UP AT THIS TIME.

XXXXXVOLUNTARY CORRECTION: PART 1. PARAGRAPH "B" CHANCE TO READ 63 PERSONNEL IN 63 PERSONNEL VICE 60 PERSONNEL.
BT

NNNN

Classified By ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified DND OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT | 202005Z
B2W |

9/9/16

258

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)

E TO: JTF [REDACTED] VAUGHT)

G JCC (JCS) [REDACTED]

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATIC ~~LAT~~(U)

- (U) 1. [REDACTED] PERSONAL RECON INDICATED HELO LAUNCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL) BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL OCCUR ABOUT 30 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.
- (U) 2. [REDACTED] NON-RFI PINS, SERIALS 107 AND 111, RETAINED TO [REDACTED] TODAY VIA MAC C-12A. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH APP AS FINAL DESTINATION.

FDSCTCUP XFX

Classified by: DDO NMCC
Declassify on: DADR

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: DADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BB25
0210745Z APR 80
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: TGT PRIORITIES

(C) 1. COMJTF HAS REQUESTED A J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH OF THE TARGETS ALREADY NOMINATED SHOULD BE ATTACKED BY [REDACTED] PROTECT/ENHANCE MSN.
CHOICES INCLUDE: [REDACTED]

TOT / 0905

RC

A

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

- (C) 2. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER:
AL MAJ [REDACTED] IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION,
INDICATED F-4S, ESPECIALLY AT [REDACTED]
WOULD POSE A THREAT TO [REDACTED] AND OTHER
AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA, USING THEIR OWN ON-BOARD RADAR.
HE ALSO INDICATED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THAT DO OTHER AGENCIES SAY ABOUT WHERE
ALERT A/C ARE KEPT?

X-248

A, B, C

- (C) 3. WITH SOME OF THE ABOVE IN MIND, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE AN
RC/J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH [REDACTED] AND
IN WHAT ORDER (WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO FIGHTER
THREAT ASSESSMENT AND HOW BEST TO NEUTRALIZE.)

A

BT

08325

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DETERMINATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECLASSIFICATION TO CONFID
REVIEW ON OADR
DECLASSIFIED FROM Multiple Sources
JS, [REDACTED]

NNNNAAAA

Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 09582
RA



SSN 8827
0 210905Z APR 88
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

E ~~(C)~~ SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHTS
DURING EXECUTION PHASE.

~~(C)~~ REQUEST J2 UPDATE ON PROBABLE [REDACTED]
REACTION IF KC-135'S OR OTHER RSN A/C
ARE DETECTED OVER [REDACTED] IF
THEY SCRAMBLE FIGHTERS AND IDENTIFY
A/C AS U.S. WILL THE [REDACTED]
A. ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE US A/C TO LAND.
B. ESCORT US A/C OUT OF [REDACTED] AIRSPACE
C. ENGAGE IF US A/C DO NOT COMPLY WITH

E ~~(C)~~ INSTRUCTIONS
IF [REDACTED] FIGHTERS CANNOT IDENTIFY OUR
A/C, WILL THEY ENGAGE THEM?

BT
8827

NOCON
AAK

DDO NMCC
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

103052
A

fr JTF
NIMITZ
SIX RH-53'S
COMING OUT OF DESERT
FM 100F /
TO 1000 NMCC/100

1. HELO LOADS AT DESERT
DELTA HAS 37 MEN (LESS DRIVERS AND MONITORS)
270 LBS PER-MAN. 37 DELTA PLUS 2
DELTA RTDS ABOARD SHIP, 3 MONITORS, PLUS
2 RED EYE-GUNNERS (FOUR WEAPONS), 5
DRIVERS, 7 [REDACTED] FOR A TOTAL OF
116 PERS. WITH THE NUMBER OF PAX
WEAPONS, AND AMMO, DELTA WILL WEIGH 5200
LBS PER HELO (6 HELOS). RECOGNIZE
THAT THIS IS 400 LBS OVER YOUR MAX.
REQUEST THAT YOU REDUCE
TO ONE 50 CAL AND ONE GUNNER.

PUT ALL SECOND 50 CALS AND SECOND GUNNERS
ON SEVENTH RH-53. IF ONLY SIX A/C MAKE REFUEL SITE
THEN SECOND 50 CALS AND GUNNERS PLUS CREW FROM SEVENTH A/C
WILL COME BACK VIA C-130. IF SEVEN
AIRCRAFT DEPART DESERT AND ONE GOES DOWN INROUTE THEN SECOND
50 CALS WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT AT P/U SITE. IF SEVEN AIRCRAFT
MAKE IT TO HIDE OUT THEN SECOND 50 CAL AND GUNNER WILL BE PUT
BACK ON 6 RH-53'S
2. REQUEST THAT YOU PERSONALLY INSPECT ALL HELOS TO ENSURE NO
EXTRA WEIGHT IS TAKEN.
3. DETAILED WT. AND COMPOSITION OF EACH LOAD FOR SIX RH-53'S
WILL BE SENT IN APPROX 9 HOURS.

4. IF EIGHT RH-53 IS OP READY FLY IT, EMPTY LOAD, AS FAR INTO
MISSION AS POSSIBLE. COL KYLE HAS ASSURED ME THAT SUFFICIENT
FUEL IS ON HAND TO FUEL EIGHT HELOS DETAILS ON REFUEL FOR EIGHT
HELOS WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEP MSG. UNDERSTAND PROBABILITY
OF 8 HELOS LAUNCHING IS NOT GOOD BUT TRY YOUR BEST.

5. GEN VAUGHT SENDS

BT

NNNN

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified On: 04DR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

219172
TOI

SSN 8040
DTG 211800Z APR 89
FM JTF
TOI JCS / RC

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: JTF SITREP NO 2 (AS OF 211800Z)
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THREE EC-130 ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202020Z, 202030Z, AND 202110Z.

E B. TWO MC-130S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 202100Z AND 210145Z.

C. THREE C-141S W/DELTA FORCES ARRIVED [REDACTED] 210535Z, 210630Z,
AND 211150Z.

D. THREE KC-135S ARRIVED [REDACTED] 211517Z, 211523Z, AND 211633Z

(U) 2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT [REDACTED]

E B. THREE MC-130S AT [REDACTED]

C. TWO MC-130S AT [REDACTED] ONE TO MOVE TO [REDACTED] ON 22 APR.

E D. THREE EC-130'S AT [REDACTED] UNTIL 22 APR.

E E. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS ON NIMITZ

F. SIX KC-135S AT [REDACTED]

G. FOUR KC-135S AT [REDACTED]

(U) 3. COMMUNICATIONS: THE SHF SYSTEM TO FT DETRICK WAS ONLY APPROX 50 PERCENT USEABLE DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS. IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IS REQUIRED TO INSURE A POSITIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH WASHINGTON.

BT

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CJF 12/26/92
RSC

OSL 2300Z

MSG 845

DTG 212210Z APR 86

FM SITE ALPHA/J2

TO: JCS/RC-J2

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Q SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

(U) 1. REF MSG 212010Z APR 86 FM HELO DET. SAB.

2. REQUEST UR VIEWS ON SOVIET VESSELS [REDACTED]

A. HOW OFTEN HAVE THEY DONE THIS IN THE PAST?

B. HOW LONG AGO WAS THE LAST INCIDENCE?

4 C. SIGNIFICANCE TO [REDACTED] PLANNING IF RE-POSITIONING OFFORCES IS TAKING PLACE?

D. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE?

- (U) 3. CONCERNING HEADNET RADAR: HOW CLOSE TO THE [REDACTED] - CIP FLIGHT ROUTE MUST THE KRIVAK BE IN ORDER TO DETECT THE A/L FLYING AT 500' AGL AND BELOW?

(U) 4. PERHAPS WE CAN ADD THIS TO THE "CRY WOLF" LIST.

(U) 5. NO OFFENSE INTENDED ON SITREP COVERAGE FONECON. JUST ANTICIPATING AS YOU RECOMMENDED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ET

Classified By: ~~ADR~~
Declassified On: ~~12 Aug 92~~
Downgraded by: ~~DDO NMCC~~
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DCL DOWNGRAD TO CME

REV'D ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVED FROM multiple sources

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* 228

TOT /0713

(P) 199 061
1200Z 20 APR 92
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: NMITEK HELD RET

E,G

E KC

RELAY TO NM

C (P) ①. SOVIET NAVAL SIGHTING
1. RPT FM UFS NMITEK TOT K20 1200Z LAST LOG CI BMN/062 1JE
ON COURSE 190 DEC AT 17 MINUTE 15 SEC 20

C, E ②. MAINTAIN COUNTS HEAT LT 01-01
TO [REDACTED] AND COULD POSE THREAT
TO [REDACTED] FLT CRNS.

(U) ③. FURTHER DETAILS ON LOG WILL BE
ADDITIONAL INFO ON CRNT SIGHTING APES
[REDACTED] NMITEK.
ET

Classified By: ~~JED~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: 0ADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN
MESSAGE END RECEIVER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

M
MSG J67
DTG 221245Z
FM: CDRJTF SITE ALPHA
TO: JTF/RC SOD

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SENITIVE LETTERS

(U) 1. REFERENCE HY 220915Z APR 80

E,G
[REDACTED] ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR [REDACTED] FOLLOW. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED [REDACTED] IS TDY EUCOM FOR A SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING. ESTIMATED TO RETURN [REDACTED] LATE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY.

E,G
[REDACTED] COL [REDACTED] IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO [REDACTED] EVENING OF 23 APR. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT AWARE OF [REDACTED] SCHEDULE.

E,G
[REDACTED] THIS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, HE SHOULD CONSIDER TASKING [REDACTED] TO BRIEF A TRUSTED AGENT WHO WOULD BE AT [REDACTED]. MAC CREWS SHOULD HAVE A CONTACT FOR BRIEFINGS AND ASSISTANCE. SECOND CONSIDERATION: IF [REDACTED] TRAVELS TO [REDACTED] WE WOULD NOT HAVE SECURE VOICE INTO [REDACTED] NOR WOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFORM [REDACTED] MILITARY THAT AN EXERCISE IS ABOUT TO KICK OFF OR UNTERWAY.

E
[REDACTED] GAST PROVIDED GEN SHUTLER WITH THOUGHTS ON ADVISING [REDACTED] YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THEM.

E,G
[REDACTED] THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS. RECOMMEND THAT [REDACTED] BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT ENOUGH ON IMPORTANCE OF DELIVERY OF LETTER TO [REDACTED] ONLY. [REDACTED] REMAINS AT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] RETURNS ON 24 APR. I VALUE [REDACTED] MATURITY BUT WOULD BE COMFORTABLE WITH [REDACTED] ON SCENE. IF IT IS TOO TOUGH TO GET [REDACTED] BACK, BURNETT SHOULD BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT AT [REDACTED] ALL TRUSTED AGENTS SHOULD BE MILITARY.
GAST SENDS

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified On: 04DR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOTC

18046

GRK



SSN 866
0 221330Z APR 89
FM CHDR JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JTF/HQ SOD
ET

~~TOP SECRET~~

- E,G
- SUBJECT: [REDACTED] DEFENSE RADARS
1. ON 28 APR 89 COL [REDACTED] AF SECTION
APRISED LT COLS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
OF USAF AIR DEFENSE STUDY FOR [REDACTED]
 2. [REDACTED] PLANNED TO REVIEW STUDY AND FORWARD
RECOMMENDATIONS IF APPROPRIATE. PLEASE
ADVISE SOONEST.

ET
0826G

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: 04DR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Classified By:
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by :

Downgraded by :
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

DDO NREC
2 Aug 93

12 AV 1 72

12 Aug 42

CONFIDENTIAL

MSJ 653
DTG 222200Z APR 90
FM: SITE ALPHA/JEP CDR JTF
TO: NMU/T
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)
REF: TELECON PITTMAN AND GAST



125

- (U) 1. OVER THE WALL TIME IS PLANNED FOR 2100Z.
2. **DELTA** PLANS TO CALL AT 2020Z. THIS CALL WILL PROVIDE LATEST ESTIMATE FOR OVER THE WALL TIME. (ASSUMING MISSION IS A GO).
- (U) 3. HELOS SHOULD BE IN POSITION FOR PICKUP PLUS 15 MINUTES AFTER ESTIMATED OVER THE WALL TIME.
4. IF HELOS DO NOT HEAR A CALL FROM **DELTA**, ASSUME RADIO PROBLEMS AND PLANNED OVER THE WALL TIME OF 2100Z. HELOS SHOULD LAUNCH IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO BE IN POSITION FOR FIRST PICKUP AT 2115Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

KRIN

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified On *01 APR*

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0135

201

SSN 0101
DTG 222355Z APR 80
FM: JTF MAIN: COL [REDACTED]
TO: USS NIMITZ/COL [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (S)

REF 1^(U) ~~1ST~~ USS NIMITZ 221425Z APR 80
REF 2^(U) ~~1ST~~ CINCPAC SUBJ TACAIR CAP SUPPORT ~~101~~(U)

1. ~~1ST~~ REF 1 NIGHT ONE REFUELING SUPPORT REQUEST FOR AIR CAP SUPPORT, A KC-135 AIR REFUELABLE TANKER (ART) REFUELED BY TWO (2) KC135A AIRCRAFT CAN PROVIDE A FOUR (4) HOUR LOITER PERIOD OVER 2420N 58E OFFLOADING 52K LBS. REF 2 LIST 1930-2300Z AS THE MOST CRITICAL TIME PERIOD. ANY POSITION NORTH OF THE ARCP NEAR THE END OF THE LOITER PERIOD WOULD REDUCE OFFLOAD/LOITER.

E THIS SUPPORT PLUS PREVIOUS JTF MISSION TASKING UTILIZES ALL TANKER ASSETS AT [REDACTED] AND DOES NOT ALLOW FOR MECHANICAL FAILURES.

2^(U) FYI: FOUR KC-135'S WILL TRANSIT YOUR AREA ENROUTE TO ARCP AT 2300N 5830E.

FOR C-130 REFUELING SUPPORT. TWO KC-135'S WILL BE ON STATION 2215-2315Z WITH TWO MORE 2315-0020. AIR REFUELING FREQUENCY IS 321.6 SECURE.

3. ^(U) ~~1ST~~ NIGHT 2 REF MSG PARA 6 ADDRESSED BY SEPARATE MSG.
BT:

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOC~~ | 230555Z
~~POL~~ | ~~QSC~~
QSC 230555Z

X-205

Copy 16
J-2

HSG 103
UTC 230515Z APR 87
FM: TITF ALPHA/J2
TO: JCS/J2
PT

~~SECRET~~

SUEJI: TEHRAN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

RPTS HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL SINCE THE WEEKEND ON AND AROUND CAMPUS OF TEHRAN UNIV. THIS PROVIDE UP TO DATE EFFECTIVE DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE, IF ANY, ON PLANS TO APPROACH MSA/I MCA AND EMBASSY.

~~SECRET~~

NUNN

Classified By: ~~JCS~~
Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CLASSIFIED~~

R E V I E W E D 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

TEL COMM 10

REVIEW ON OADR

REF ID: Multiple Sources

8-268

TOR/230138
CS

MCN -
101

COPY JF
Z

MSG #72
DTG 222325Z APR 89
FM: JCS/RCS
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2
INFO: SFOD/S2
1 SOW/A2

~~CLASSIFIED~~ TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: THREAT REVIEW
SITE ALPHA/J2 PASS TO COMJTF

1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 22 APR 89.
2. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES THE JTF J-2 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO RICE BOWL POSED BY SOVIET, IRANIAN, AND OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS' RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES. THE ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED BY COUNTRY AND COLLECTION MEANS.
3. SOVIET CAPABILITIES.
 - A. PHOTO
 - i. SATELLITE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE:

2. AIRCRAFT PHOTO/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE: THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY HAVE FOUR IL-38 MAY RECON AIRCRAFT IN PROXIMITY TO THE RICE BOWL AREA OF OPERATIONS. TWO OF THESE ARE AT SAUDEN AND TWO ARE AT ASMARA. THE IL-38'S PRIMARY MISSION IS MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND ASW.

THE MAY HAS AN OPERATING RADIUS OF 1400 NM.

3. SOVIET COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] AND THE HELO HIDE SITE WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVIDED BY SATELLITE. COVERAGE OF [REDACTED] COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EITHER SATELLITE OR AIRCRAFT. WE PROJECT [REDACTED] REACTION TIME FOR SUCH COVERAGE IF THE SOVIETS RECEIVE INDICATIONS OF IMMINENT

CLASSIFIED

IRANIAN DETECTION/SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES.

A. IRANIAN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: IRAN HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VISUALLY RECONOITER US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN F-4S AND C-130S HAVE SOME VISUAL RECOM CAPACITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY THREAT TO SECURITY OF RICE BOWL FROM ANY OF THESE PLATFORMS IS NEGLIGIBLE.

B. AURAL DETECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER OF DETECTION FOR BOTH THE HELICOPTER AND FIXED-WING ELEMENTS OPERATING IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE ON NIGHT #1 IS COMPOSED BY GENDARMERIE POSTS. THESE POSTS (USUALLY CONSISTING OF 6-10 MEN) ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ALONG MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MISSION PLANNING HAS TAKEN THEIR LOCATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND FLIGHT ROUTES ARE DESIGNED TO AVOID ALL KNOWN POSTS.

C. VISUAL DETECTION: DESPITE FLIGHT ROUTES WHICH AVOID POPULATED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE SEEN BY MOTORISTS OR NOMADS. THE LATTER, LACKING COMMUNICATIONS, CAN BE DISCOUNTED AS A WARNING SOURCE. CRITICAL AREAS FOR VISUAL DETECTION ARE THE GULF COASTAL REGION, THE REFUELING SITE, AND THE TRANSFER POINT/HELO SHIDE AREA. WE ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION AT ANY OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOW-MODERATE. WHETHER A TRUCK DRIVER WOULD BOTHER TO REPORT SIGHTING AIRCRAFT TO SOME OFFICIAL ENTITY OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROBLEMATICAL.

D. SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL GENERIC LOW LEVEL ROUTES INDICATED LOW PROBABILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON ALL THE INBOUND LEGS AND ONLY A SLIGHTLY HIGHLY POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON THE EGRESS ROUES. SAC TEAM PREPARED STUDY FOR MC130 AT 500 FEET, AND STATED PROBABILITIES WOULD INCREASE IF C141 OPERATING AT HIGHER ALTITUDES (1,500-2,000 FEET) WAS USED. HOWEVER THE PROBABILITIES WOULD STILL BE ON THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM IF ROUTE PLANNING TOOL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE TERRAIN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK WAS NOT ON HIGH/ACTIVE ALERT POSTURE.

4. REVIEW OF INCOUNTRY TACTICAL PHASES IS UNDER PREPARATION WILL FORWARD UPON COMPLETION.

BT

(286)

TOR 22
JB 2130Z
mcn 0809
1305 2231

D 222345Z APR 88

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 222345Z APR 88
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR SUR WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...

REVW: 21 APR 88

EE

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10RJ2325
5B) mng 2

(U) 0 221745Z APR 80

FM [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SOC
JTF/ LTG GAST

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUJ: SITREP #6

(U) 1. [REDACTED] COMMANDER,

E, G [REDACTED] WILL ARRIVE [REDACTED] 23 0745Z APR. 80
HE HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH LT/ COL. [REDACTED] AND
AND WILL PRESUMABLY ASK TO VISIT CAMP SITE AND
TOUR AN AIRCRAFT.

i-280

(U) 2. (S) WE PLAN TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST
SUPPORT FOR DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTER
TO U.S. AMBASSADOR IN [REDACTED] UP COMING
MUSLIM WEEKEND. [REDACTED] ALLEGED STANDOFF, [REDACTED]
WEEKEND STANDOFF, AND LACK OF SECURE COMM.
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] MAKE
IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH [REDACTED].

(U) 3. (S) WE PROPOSE TO INFORM [REDACTED]
E, G THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO
[REDACTED] ON 25 APR. TO PROVIDE U.S. AMBASSADOR
WITH A DETAILED INTERIM REPORT ON SEA SURVEILLANCE
ACTIVITIES TO DATE AND THAT [REDACTED] SUPPORT IS
REQUESTED.

(U) 4. (S) WILL INFORM YOU OF RESULTS OF MEETING WITH
BENNETT AS SOON AS COMPLETED.

(U) 5. (S) REMAINING EC-130 AND MU-130 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED BET-
WEEN 1145Z AND 1230Z. ALL AIRCRAFT NOW IN PLACE.
BT

NNNN

JDRFHGFYIHRY

S-

Classified By [REDACTED] DDONMC
Declassified On OADR
Downgraded by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A68176
DTG: 230015Z APR 89

FNU: JCS/RC-J2
STN: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: C-130 ACTIVITY TAPES

1. COLONEL [REDACTED] USAF, WILL DEPART CONUS 23 APRIL FOR ALPHA VIA RAMSTEIN. COLONEL [REDACTED] HAS IN HIS POSSESSION: MAGNETIC TAPES CONTAINING VOICE, C-130 AIR COMMUNICATIONS; A TAPE RECORDER; AND COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CARDS REQUESTED BY YOUR SITE.

2. HIS ITINERARY:

ETD DOVER - 230500Z

ETA RAMSTEIN - 231330Z

ETD RAMSTEIN - 240515Z

ETA ALPHA - 241045Z.

3. COLONEL [REDACTED] IS TOP SECRET SI/TK CLEARED AND HAS EXTENSIVE SIGINT EXPERIENCE.
BT.

RS

MCN 099

Copy to

5-2

#274

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~Classified BY: ICS~~
~~Declassified ON: Q ADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

1. -
- CDR DIA/INTL 4 APR 82
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF COR/SITE ALPHA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

F.R.

0301

MCN 098

TAD [REDACTED]
SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS
REF: YOUT 222345Z APR 82

E,G (U) 1. UNDERSTAND YOUR NEED TO HAVE AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF LETTERS ASAF. GEN PUSTAY INFORMED FIRST CHANCE YOU HAVE TO GIVE GEN. [REDACTED] LETTER IS 230730Z.

Copy to

G Col [REDACTED]

(U) 2. AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO RELEASE LETTERS TO DESIGNATED US MILITARY OFFICERS HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN OBTAINED YET.

E,G (U) 3. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR GEN. [REDACTED] AND COL. [REDACTED] EXPECTED AT 231600Z AFTER AN SCC MEETING. CURRENT PLAN IS TO SEND THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUR LOCATION AT THE TIME AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE IS APPROVED. AT THAT SAME TIME, [REDACTED] COMMUNICATIONS SITES WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FACILITATE NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED MILITARY OFFICERS SO THEY CAN ACCOMPLISH FINAL RELEASE OF LETTERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS. WHEN THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED.
BT

MANNN

MESSAGE 82 RECEIVED.

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: 010R
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

4-272

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DATA AS AVAILABLE

18
Soviet propaganda claims that Moscow has already begun efforts to circumvent a possible US blockade of Iran. An article in the English-language "Moscow News Weekly" said cargo from West Europe is pouring into Iran, and that transit of Iranian imports via Soviet territory is of "vital importance" to Iran because it will lessen US economic blockade.

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS
CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

D.
DEVALAR

15. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z FRIDAY (18APRIL)

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: OADR

NAMN

TOP SECRET

FM NIMITZ/COL
TQ JTF/J3

L-303

REF JTF/J3 201455Z APR 68

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OR OPERATIONS

1. ~~(U)~~ REF REQUESTED TX-TG KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
 2. ~~(U)~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 11 WHEN ALLEI FOR BY COTF PI RECONCILE TF-70 CAN PROVIDE ~~AT LEAST ONE~~ OVER RIDGE BUT (NOT) SOON ARRIVING AT 1 PMZG SD FOR 2 PMZG 45 MIN FLIGHT AT 11KZ 2 ROLLING 2 AIM-9s 10000 HOD DOWN (OR AIRCRAFT) USING ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND ~~30000~~ 10000 TGT AT EXISTING TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COMBAT ALERT POSITION. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE ARE MOST EC SUPPORTED BY KC-135s IN PREVIOUS FOLLOWING DOPPLER IF ONLY 5 KC-135s ARE AVAILABLE.

INTER WOR

"JETSONS"

[REDACTED] C ARTOS, 2 ALFA (TRIP ALLEGANTLY) SACKETT
ARTOS/C ALPHA (C/3 ARTOS) STRIKE ALLEGANTLY FAULT
POOR COORDINATE POSITION OF C-12 AIRFIELD IN DAYLIGHT ZONE. JTF
WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BAGNET SIGHTED ARTOS AND COMPANION
ALPHA TANKER FOR STABBY RECALL FROM [REDACTED] T-1000 FT TO
24-4000 FT. [REDACTED] C/3 BAGNETS AVAILABLE
AT LONG TANKER STANCE PLANE TO PLANE. JTF WILL IMMEDIATELY
COLLECT AT TANKER AND LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROXIMATE TIME AND
TF-3. JTF THEY MAINTAIN AIR ALERT TO OVER EMERGENCY
INFILTRATION AS SOUTHERN TANKERS DRAWS ALSO ON THE AREA OF
POSSIBLE IN-TARGET COUNTRY AND AT LATE HOUR MOUNTAIN IN POSITION
VISIBILITY OF 20-30% CLOUDS. TANKER SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED BY T-1000.
TANKER SUPPORT COULD ALSO BE PROVIDED BY T-1000 BY LAUNCHING
INTO KM-132'S FROM [REDACTED] T-1000 TANKERS COULD BE POSITIONED
NEARBY ONE PERIOD. THIS MAINTAINS THE CAPABILITY OF PROVIDING
TANKER SUPPORT.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO TF-14 WILL PROVIDE FORT-14
TO CRAFT TO CAP PLATOON EXPIRATION ROUTE FROM AN
AN HCR POINT IN VICINITY OF 206.1-65-08-106, K-100 TAH LAU VILL.
LAUNCH NATIONALLY (INTERVAL DEPENDS ON ANT/ALERTA 4000) FROM
[REDACTED] 15 MINUTE OVER TF-14 AT PLATOON ASSAULT TIME. IF
ANT/ALERTA 3 HOURS INTO PERIOD CLOUDY INPUT THE VILL. AND LAUNCH
ARMS 1-3 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUG IN, THE L-3 AFTS & FLEAS
CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14's REQUIRE AN 1800 LOG FOR 3 HOURS LENGTH).
TF-14-150001 ARRIVE VICINITY OF BATTALION F-14 VILL LASTING 10 MIN
AND CONDUIT THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TAH LAU 01-01-01
CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED].

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOW-UP COMMON DEFENSES FOR PARENTS
TODAY AND PARENTS WHO ARE PREGNANT TOMORROW

ALL SIGNIFICANT AIRCRAFT WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO TAKEOFF.

5. COMPUTE IF RADIUS OF ACTUAL IS 1000 METERS, THEN IT IS

GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES PTO.

OFFLOAD POSITIONAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED ALL WITH ACTUAL POSITION.

SIGNATURE AND DATE AT THE PLACE (1 MARCH 1947)

AND CAN BE USED AS LONG AS SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION REMAINS AT ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VOLUNTARY FLIGHT. NECESSARY FLIGHT RECORD ASSETS (ACFT-4, ACFT-5) REMAIN DESIGNATED FOR USE. ALL TEFERI TAKAFIR PILOTS ARE WITH QUALIFIED INSTRUCTORS ALFRED AND

→ INED WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDE OF APPROXIMATELY -141' / ALSO THE-161' FROM
TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO. WHILE DAY ONE IS A CONTINUATION OF THIS, BY
THIS T-14 CAP L CONSIDERED A PRUDENT DOWNGRADING FOR THOSE AIR
SQUADS.

SENT RESPECTFULLY

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: 0ADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 72

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE #1 SELECTED.

SSN 0052
O 220600Z APR 86
FM ALPHA/P
TO [REDACTED]
BT

EG) ~~TOT FOL~~
SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION
FOLL IS ANTICIPATED RECON/SURV COVERAGE
DURING PERIOD 200400/080001 TO 240400/240000
FOR UR LOG:
A.S. [REDACTED]

TOT / 07102

KCL

i-#313

0052

1000M

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified Date: ~~10 APR~~
Downgraded by: ~~DDO NMCC~~
12 AUG 92

CLASSIFIED UNTIL 10 AUG 1996

10 AUG

REF ID: A6510000000000000000000000000000

REF ID: A6510000000000000000000000000000

REF ID: A6510000000000000000000000000000

REF ID: A6510000000000000000000000000000

~~SECRET~~

FNU JCS/RCA/JS
TO: SITH ALPHA/J3
1. SON/A2
SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION

11

317

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED INTELLIGENCE/SURVEILLANCE
COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 24 APR/1972 TO 05 MAY/1972.

A:

~~SECRET~~

Classified By:
Declassified On: 0 ADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 72

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 1228
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 72
INFORMATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 RECL SD REVIEW TO Secret
REVIEW BY DADR
RECD FROM Directorate
SAC/NSC

TO 280301Z APR 92
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ G
ET

351

SUMMARY STREP NUMBER 1

COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

2 GENERATOR GREEN

1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FULL EQUIPMENT.

1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.

1 UGC-12G GREEN

1 WSC-3 GREEN

1 KW-7 GREEN

2 TH-22'S GREEN

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

1 TT-76 KEYBOARD

1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES

3 PARTITIONS FOR THREE TENTS TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS NEEDED

SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND SOME JUNK FOOD.

MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "T"

NNNN

Classified BY *JCS*
Declassified ON *QADR*

Declassified by:

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

Col. Kyle 1200Z
TOM ROLL V
CONFIDENTIAL

E 11 2100Z APR 92
TO JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
10 JTF [REDACTED] (VAUGHT)
BT

E [REDACTED] T/JOKINT DO NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST

(U) ARRIVAL REPORT AT&T (U)

E [REDACTED] PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 2200Z AND NIMITZ
2215Z.

E, G [REDACTED] AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING
SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED
HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. [REDACTED] THE
HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY.
OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO LEVY SPECIAL DELIVERING LIGHT CARGO TO HIS
SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE
HE WORE HIS GOGGLES FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D BEEN.
[REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAPTURED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING
HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO VISUAL REACTION EXPECTED
WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.

(U) 3. [REDACTED] REQUEST LATEST DATA ON LC-130 FUEL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY
USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 307 GALLONS
UNUSABLE. -

(U) 3. [REDACTED] CURRENT HELD STATUS SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE
(HM-16 REPORT).

(U) 3. [REDACTED] REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST
FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND HUMIDITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE
SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE
AND CITY.

(U) 3. [REDACTED] REQUEST FULL LOAD BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX,
THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.

(U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAS DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER
RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT
(F-14, EA-6B) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT, EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT.
ALL TRANSMIT 301 PAUL SILENT ON SECURE VOICE.

BT

Classified By: *[REDACTED] DDO NMCC*
Declassified On: *OADR*

Downgraded by:

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(#-348)

00083801241, 10, 74033) 16511R-727

TOR | 1451 Z
KCL |

Relay to [REDACTED]

P 201225Z
FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF

JCS/SOD/LETGEN GASTX
ET [REDACTED]

MCN

017 | 1530Z

TOT |

RC |

SUEJN [REDACTED] SITREP #2

1. SECURITY ON AND AROUND THE AIRFIELD IS NO PROBLEM. HOWEVER OUR PRESENCE HAS BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE ON THE [REDACTED]

2. SCULP 52 AND GORL 53 (HU-130'S) ARRIVED ON 26 APRIL AT 2030Z AND 0810Z RESPECTIVELY. JUST 12 GROUND ABORTED ITS MORNING MISSION FOR IGNITION EXCITER AND INS PROBLEMS. EXPECT TO HAVE IT FIXED TODAY. FLEW ONE SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION TAKEOFF 201200Z APR 80 AND ETR 201500Z APR 80.

3. FUEL COSTS TRANSMITTED IN SITREP #1 SHOULD READ APPROXIMATELY ONE DOLLAR AND FIFTY CENTS PER GALLON.

4. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO ORDER AN ADDITIONAL 30 AIR MATTRESSES SINCE MOST COMING OUT OF PACAF HAD HOLES IN THEM. IN ADDITION, REQUESTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO EUCOM VIA THE JTF FOR ADDITIONAL STORES: ELECTRICAL CORDS, TOILET CHEMICALS, TRASH BAGS, PORTABLE SHOWERS ETC..

NNNN

Classified By: *[Signature]* DDD NMC
Declassified On: 04/08/92

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21
0500

TOT 0500
VCT 0500
0500

c-338

E [REDACTED]
11 DEC 1968
TO JTF
300/300 (CIG DASH)

E [REDACTED]
SUBJ: [REDACTED] TREP # [REDACTED]
1. BE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE GROUP WILL BE DESEALED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [REDACTED] WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [REDACTED] REPORTERS.

E [REDACTED] WE WERE COVERED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF [REDACTED] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT SINCE IT MIGHT TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FURNED C-141 MEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130 DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKE-OFF AND LANDING AND THE HARDBACK DIRT ROAD FOR TAXI AND OFFLOAD. THE DIRT RUNWAY IS COMPOSED OF A TOP LAYER OF TWO INCHES OF COMPACTED SAND AND GRAVEL OVER A PLACED DIRT. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [REDACTED] AIRFIELD, OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [REDACTED] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY 19, 62, REFERENCE IN REPORT TO DIRT RUNWAY BEING C-141 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LAUNCH AND TAKEOFFS OF C-141 AIRCRAFT.

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified On 1 OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE IS APPROVED.

EDDLYKSELQXIAINSEJUHM RS 310

* 0001 7:25 1/246/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 0758Z
KCL |
1

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MCN
036

0758Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

DAE
L-337

O 210511Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/SZ
TO SITE ALFA/JTF J-2
BT

(con)

~~NO TIME NO PLACE CANCELLED BROADCAST~~

- SUBJ: PRDG REP 01
1. HELO INTEL NODE OPERATIONAL AS OF 20 APR 80. MSN PLANNING
PROCEEDING IN DEDICATED SPACES.
2. YOUR AIR SUMMARY IN ASSREViated FORMAT IS SAT FOR OUR
PURPOSES.
3. WE ARE WAITING FIRST WX. REQ EXPEDITE TRANSMISSION.
4. ANY POSSIBILITY OF GETTING US DMA MFA GRID?

REVN: 21APR80
BT

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 1136 ZV
PCL |

MCN

038

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

i # -334

E [REDACTED] CTP 211117Z APR 82
TH [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SCD (LTG GAST)
ET

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED] SITREP #4

REF SITREP #3 DTG 210550Z APR 82

E 1. RLF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

Classified By [REDACTED] DDD NMCC
Declassified ON [REDACTED] OADR

Downgraded by:
DDD NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

#332

TOR

RC

12382

MCN

Ø41

O 211145Z APR 82
FM CTF 70
TO JCS
BT

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPTINETE SUBNETS.
SUBJ: RH-530 SITREP 211145Z APR (U)
1. SEVEN ACFT IN FULL UP STATUS. EIGHTH ACFT UP
FOR POST MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT.

~~REVIEW 20 APR 82~~
cT

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MSG #27
LTC 211423Z APR 89
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
SFOC/S2
1-SOW/S2

(#328)

(OR) 1754
JPT C MCN
046-

SUJI SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTIPLICATED RECONNAISSANCE
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 202400Z/280001Z
TO 243400Z/240001Z



CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256
CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92
REINSTATE CL BY DDON MCC
 DECLASSIFICATION TO SECRET
NEW IN OADR
REMOVED FROM [REDACTED]

Classified BY JCS
Declassified ON OADR
Downgraded by DDO
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 034
DTG 212815Z APO CC
FM: JTF RCM [REDACTED]
TO ALPHA/ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

C#
L-325

TDR / 212452Z
CT mCN51
Copy to
G [REDACTED]

REF: A. YOUR MSG DTG 211836Z AP 88 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT UPDATE

B. MSG (KYLE) DTG 211835Z AP 88 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT

C. MSG. THIS HQ DTG 211245Z AP 88 SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.

E REF A ESTABLISHED MOVEMENT PRIORITIES FOR REMAINING GEAR IN EUCOM ACKNOWLEDGED AND SAID THAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD ARRIVE YOUR LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 221300Z AP. PER PARA 2 YOUS. WE CONSIDER YOUR MA-3 AC RONT IS FILLED.

A (u) 2. DEF B ROSTO ADDITIONAL PARTS FOR [REDACTED] RECEIVED BET C AND B AND IS WORKING TO FILL. NOTIFICATIONS ARE THAT PARTS WILL DEPART COMIS [REDACTED] TOMORROW.

A (u) 3. RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART [REDACTED] 220400L AP 88.

(u) C. THIS HQ INFORMED YOU THAT ENGINE BEEF [REDACTED] ALONG WITH THE TURBO ENGINE LINES CLOSED THE ENGINE BEEF [REDACTED] PLEASE REPORT IF THIS IS NOT SO.

(u) D. MAINTAIN A SENSE OF HUMOR.
BT

NNNN

Classified by DDONMC
Declassify m:ADP

Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassified ADP

Downgraded by:
DDONMC
17APR92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

012010Z
FM: HELD SET/S-2
53 51/J-2
SUEJB INTREP 22

C I. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY INDICATIONS OF
BY ARASTAN SEA PLATFORMS.

KRIVAK
1 FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 73 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST
LOCATED VLG 21 53N 362 13E ON COURSE 194 + 10 KTS AT
131900Z.

C II AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE
OF AMPHIB READY GROUP. [PGR] CONFINES PATROL IN STRAIT OF

C III [REDACTED]
RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25. IN 857 46E AT 3650Z.

C IV E. NIMITZ JS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT IN KRIVAK 693.
MEANWHILE

IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VIC AL MASIRAH.
IF 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

S. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 88.
FATHER BOE

Classified BY ~~JCS~~
Declassified ON ~~101~~ CDR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY JCS

INITIALIZE BY DDO-FW

DDCI CLOMBSER T

REV BY CDR

COVER PAGE

NANT ASLONI AND I NEED ZDR OF YOUR LAST R

CDR OF JSA

2839/78

11 XHPIMKD

YANTHCCUOPCLL

~~SECRET~~

TOR 1211
JB MCN

NO TAPE

S-2 nos
coll

EB324

RSG642
CTC: 220030Z APR 88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FH: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOR | 220310
VC | 057 V

COPY TO
J-2 +
MAC

E SUBJECT: C-141 ACFT FROM [REDACTED]
REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J-2 MSG 202130Z APR 88

A, E 1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST IN REFERENCE, WE SUGEST THAT MAC C-141 ACFT FILE [REDACTED] FLIGHT PLAN FROM [REDACTED] FOLLOWING TAKE-OFF. ACFT SHOULD ATTAIN NOMINAL ALTITUDE (ABOUT 3000FT) FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE A-1 AND BEGIN [REDACTED] BEGIN SLOW DESCENT [REDACTED] AT CAPE CHECK POINT [REDACTED]. UPON REACHING [REDACTED] TURN NORTH TO INTERSECT COAST LINE AT CP [REDACTED]

A 2. FROM COASTAL CHECK POINT, FLY BY DIRECT ROUTE CLIMBING TO ATTAIN [REDACTED] TO CHECK POINT AT [REDACTED] FROM THIS POINT, TURN NW TO INTERSECT NEXT CHECK POINT [REDACTED] MAINTAIN NOMINAL ALT OF 6000 FT AGL FOR THIS LEG TAKING CARE NOT TO DIRECTLY OVERFLY [REDACTED] THIS ROUTE SHOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF DETECTION BY [REDACTED]

A 3. FROM CHECK POINT [REDACTED] FOLLOW ROUTE SIMILAR TO THAT ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR MC-130 ACFT AT [REDACTED] AGL ALONG RIDGELINE TO CHECK POINT [REDACTED] REMAINDER OF C-141 ROUTE IS THE SAME AS MC-130 ROUTE MAINTAINING [REDACTED] FT AGL ALTITUDE. BT

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified On: ~~0ADR~~

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

NRNDRK

AND MAE THAT IS ALL FOR N 12 AUG 72

L ~~318~~ 318

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AER 10

FNU JII

TG: SECDEF

1. SOU

SITE ALPHA

~~REF ID: A~~

~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT IRAN

TOR/16497

RC

#361

1. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THESE FURTHER SANCTIONS:

-- NO FINANCIAL TRANSFERS BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION EXCEPT IN NEWS GATHERING OR TO HOSTAGES OR THEIR FAMILIES;

-- AN ON IRANIAN IMPORTS TO THE U.S.;

-- NO TRAVEL BY U.S. CITIZENS TO IRAN EXCEPT FOR NEWS GATHERING.

2. IN ADDITION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPROUNDED AFTER PURCHASE BY IRAN IS TO BE USED BY THE U.S. OR SOLD. THE PRESIDENT TELL CONGRESS FOR AUTHORITY TO PAY REPARATIONS OUT OF IRANIAN IRANIAN ASSETS; THESE ASSETS WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS.

3. IF A CONSTITUTIVE IRANIAN ESCAPEE IS NOT FORTHCOMING SOON, A FUTURE DICTATE WILL PLEDGE - AMONG U.S. OFFICIALS OF GOV. - TO IRAN AND CONSULTATION WITH IRANIAN REBELS ON THE IRANIAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, IF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AND ACTIONS BY OUR ALLIES IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, "THEN THE ONLY NEXT STEP AVAILABLE THAT I CAN SEE IS SOME SORT OF MILITARY ACTION." THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID "I CANNOT EXCLUDE" THE OPTION OF INTERCEPTING IRANIAN SHIPS.

5. IRAN - THE FOREIGN MINISTER ACCORDING TO NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY THAT UNITES IRAN TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRUEL OPINION THAT IT CHEERGOES CANNOT ESCAPE FROM IRAN. HERSELF, ARE AT THE DECISION POINT. THE MEASURES WHICH SHE INTENDS TO BE "MOST APPROPRIATE" ARE UNKNOWN.

6. IRAN - THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN A PRESS CONFERENCE IN TOKYO DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. HE DO NOT APPROVE OF THE (HOSTAGE-TAKING) AS IT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONVENTIONS MUST BE RESPECTED."

7. IRAN - THE ECONOMIC MINISTER IN THE FUNDESTAD EVEN IF THE U.S. DOES NOT TAKE A COMMON STAND, THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE WILL REACT ON BOYCOTT MEASURES. THE FATHERS MUST ENSURE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. THROUGH "ACTIONS AND WORDS".

8. IRANIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY - UNICA PRESIDENT SAID IN TOKYO THE POLICY OF THE HOSTAGES IS "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE," CONTRARY TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. "GIVEN THE POSITION OF ALL CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND ON THE OTHER HAND SATISFY TO EXPORT SOME IRANIAN CRISES".

9. IRAN REFERS IRANIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT THE SECOND ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2, MAY BE DELAYED FOR TWO WEEKS BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF IRAN IN THE FIRST ROUND.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE BY DDO NMCC

DDI DERIVED TO

REF ID: OAPR

DDN LS: Multiple Sources


Secret

~~TOP SECRET~~


1. A PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED BY AFP ANNOUNCED APRIL 17 THAT PORTUGAL HAS DECIDED TO BREAK OFF ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

2. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

3. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUP AND AMBULITOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA.



4. SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF PREVIOUS REPORTING, WITH INCREASED ANTI-US TALKS IN SOVIET MEDIA AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY CALLS FOR A TIME TABLE OF POSSIBLE US MILITARY INTERVENTION.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A
P TO 142205Z APR 92
FM JTF 732
TO [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

TOR /16402
RC

i #363

1. ON 16 APRIL 1992 DOS/ING RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MLMC: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE
2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.
3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLTC.

REVR 1. APR 18

CASSIFICATION LEVEL ED 12256

DISSEMINATED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DRL DSWING TO CONF

REF ID: OAPR

ROUTED BY JS

NNNNX

MESSAGE #1 RECEIVED.

~~TOP SECRET~~ TOR / 1415Z

RC

BTG 171430Z APR 80
FROM JTF/J2
TO 150R/42

SG 01/82
SITF 4LHW [REDACTED]

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 17 APRIL 1980

#367

1. YESTERDAY, THE RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED IT IS CONSIDERING YET ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PARLEY~~TAEG2K3)3:500..~~ THE SECOND ROUND, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 2 MAY, WILL BE POSTPONED FOR AN ADDITIONAL WEEK IF APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL. NO REASON FOR THE DELAY WAS PROVIDED. FOLLOWING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, LEADER OF THE KHOMEINI FACTION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, SAID THE FUTURE PARLIAMENT MIGHT NOT DECIDE WHAT TO DO WITH THE HOSTAGES UNTIL JULY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION OF THE HOSTAGES. IN FACT HE CLAIMED THAT "THEIR PERSONAL SITUATION WILL BE BETTER DEALING WITH THEM." HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO PARDON THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT A TRIAL IF THE "POLITICAL BACKGROUND WAS RESOLVED." HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT.

2. HEALTH OFFICIALS WHO VISITED THE HOSTAGES CONFINED IN A PRESS INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT SEVEN OR EIGHT HOSTAGES WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF HAVING CHIPS ARE BEING KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

3. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL ANNOUNCE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY AN EMBARGO ON FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAN AND ASK THE UNITED STATES ALLIES TO FOLLOW SUIT. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN EMBARGO WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT EFFECT AS FAR AS AMERICAN SHIPMENTS ARE CONCERNED, THE ADMINISTRATION REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT A FOOD EMBARGO BY U.S. ALLIES WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO IRAN. JODY POWELL DENIED THE REPORT WHILE DEFENDING THE REBELLION AND COMMUNICATED IT TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM LONDON, BRITISH AMEMBASSOR TO IRAN, SIR JOHN GRAHAM, HAS TO RETURN TO HIS POST THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16. THE EC-3 NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR AMEMBASSIES FROM TEHRAN.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE BY DDO NMCC

DECL OWNER TO _____

REV ON OADR

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

~~TOP SECRET~~

... IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THE U.S. HAS BEEN TRYING TO GET THEM TO COME OFF IT. ALSO, IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN TRYING TO PRESENT THEM AS AN ACCORD WITH THE U.S. ON THE PERTICULAR ISSUE OF THE IRANIAN CRIMINALS.

C. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S. ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

D. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME EASING IN IRAN'S MILITARY POLICY.

~~SECRET~~

100 PLATINUM LTD 100%
C-17 C-18

30. CULTURAL INTERACTION (U)

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 170400Z/120000Z
TO 0100Z 172400Z

369

FOR 036002
VC

X

REVN 18 APR 12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

372

25 JANUARY 1980

G From: Maintenance Officer, HELMINERON SIXTEEN
TO: [REDACTED] USMC

- SUBJ: Inventory and custody of special mission items.
ENCL: (1) Serial numbers of items "a." through "x."

1. Inventory of subject items is as follows:

a.	pilot's oxygen masks.....	8	
b.	sleeping bag straps.....	44	
c.	ammo pouch (old style).....	19	
d.	canteen covers.....	80	
e.	canteen (plastic).....	80	
f.	cartridge belts.....	40	
g.	first aid packs.....	41	
h.	belt suspenders.....	40	
i.	aviation body armor.....	38.21	(3 short; 10 reg; 14 long)
j.	ponchos.....	40	
k.	poncho liners.....	32.32	
l.	aviation gas masks.....	65	
m.	watch caps (wool knit).....	40	
n.	sleeping bags.....	40.36	
o.	scarf material.....	1	(bolt of material)
p.	compass (magnetic).....	40	
q.	SVRB aviation survival vests....	40	
r.	rations, "C" TYPE.....	119	
s.	water cans (5 gal, plastic).....	14	
t.	M16A1 rifles.....	40	(serial numbers attached)
u.	Caliber .38 pistols.....	40	(serial numbers attached)
v.	Caliber .50 MG,M2.....	16	(serial numbers attached)
w.	Pyrotechnic pistol MK8.....	20	(serial numbers attached)
x.	Night vision goggles.....	20	(serial numbers attached)
y.	flight jackets,nomex.....	39	(16 small; 17 med; 6 large)
z.	thermal underwear (bottoms).....	41	(21 large; 20 medium)
aa.	thermal underwear (tops).....	38	(19 large; 19 medium)
bb.	desert boots.....	35	(1-7D;1-7½D;3-8D;1-8E;5-8½D;3-9D; 7-9½D;4-10½D;3-11D;1-11½D;3-11½E; 1-12D;212½E)
cc.	canteen cups.....	40	
dd.	duffelbags.....	40	
ee.	camouflage netting.....	—	
ff.	netting support braces.....	—	
gg.	<u>H-5 EN. N.M: (X12)</u>	8	<u>T-17</u>
hh.	<u>C.N. 2N. 20 M42S</u>	16	<u>T-17</u>
ii.	<u>C.N. 2.32 H-222S</u>	41	<u>T-17</u>
jj.	<u>EX-2020 P-125</u>	24	<u>T-17</u>

KK. MIL POWERS ... 80
LL. MIL MAGAZES ... 240

2. The above items are on board USS NIMITZ (CV-68) and secured in storage area 5-138-20. Access to this space is restricted to five officers. The following officer has assumed control and custody by affixing his signature to this memorandum and initialing all changes or additions.

G [REDACTED] Lieutenant Commander, USN, [REDACTED]

G Declassified by:
DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1) to basic memorandum on inventory and custody of special mission items dtd 25 JANUARY 1980.

1. Serial numbers of Pyrotechnic Pistols (MK8): (20 count)

E77890; 265923; 282175; 275394; E109697; 268983; 290353; . . . ; 276333;
268503; 276057; E139217; 283007; 268105; E226573; 281709; 265808; 268964;
287906; 268523; 276035

2. Serial numbers of night vision goggles: (20 count)

2015C; 1985C; 1978C; 1979C; 1975C; 1992C; 1972C; 1999C; 2242C; 1974C; 1977C;
1965C; 2264C; 1983C; 2240C; 1981C; 2026C; 1967C; (+ 29 Batteries); 2000C; 2257C

3. Serial numbers of M16A1 Rifles: (40 count)

747034; 643585; 638298; 688264; 746488; 643182; 992581; 774466; 580823; 665754
746116; 616322; 685230; 668738; 688329; 1078311; 1625732; 1093105; 1062406;
1793826; 1624267; 1628398; 622392; 740840; 690440; 1659076; 1630348; 769924;
778020; 1629502; 770571; 1898229; 745897; 778236; 689001; 1193976; 675030;
1630554; 857857; 703802.

4. Serial numbers of Caliber .50 MG,M2s: (16 count)

1170273; 1170879; 1164568; 1141547; 1143410; 1169450; 1612714; 1142323;
458473; 1146842; 1143737; 1251051; 1169711; 1142381; 1164578; 2023125.

5. Serial numbers of Caliber .38 pistols: (40 count)

4D13332; 4D17794; 4D17908; 4D17489; 4D17481; 4D12074; 4D13095; 4D13384;
4D13364; 4D13024; 4D17499; 4D13376; 4D17572; 4D17362; 4D13437; 4D13487;
4D13743; 4D13930; 4D17326; 4D13740; 4D11822; 4D13594; 4D13677; 4D13485;
4D17793; 4D13161; 4D13018; 4D16316; 4D13117; 4D17866; 4D16895; 4D13509;
4D13822; 4D17457; 4D17857; 4D13449; 4D12380; 4D13483; D156285; 153-57582.

G

LCDR, USN

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pr. 1.1.1.

{[#]-370}

TF - Formed mid-November

- Mil options discussed with you on 8 Dec - ability then too low.
- Since then capability has been strengthened significantly.

~~(C)~~ INTEL - Much better in all respects. (Big [REDACTED])

~~PLANNING~~ - A sound mechanically achievable plan has been devised.

~~TRAINING~~ - Four full scale rehearsals have been conducted in the US.

~~EQUIPMENT~~ - Night vision devices, precise navigation aids, air landed rapid refueling system, satellite como, silent, [REDACTED]

~~SUPPORT~~ - Eight RH-53's on Nimitz; [REDACTED]

In sum, the Joint Chiefs agree that we have a sound achievable plan.

Next, I'd like to outline briefly the current situation and then follow with the plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 17 Aug 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

DECL DOWNGR TO SECRET

REVW BY OADR

DERIVATION Multiple Sources

~~Downgraded to SECRET
for accuracy
DDO (NMCC)
N40X
11/20/90~~

Classified By: DISA Date Classified On: 10/20/92

Classified By: DISA Date Classified On: 10/20/92

~~(S)~~ CURRENT SITUATION~~SECRET~~HOSTAGES

50 at Emb

3 at FM

- Reasonably sure we know where they are.
- Kept by 125-150 persons at least a third armed with rifles and pis
- Embassy is 27 acres - with fence 10 - 12 ft high.

~~(S)~~ LIKELY REINFORCEMENTS

- Up to 100 + persons from nearby stations could arrive within 10-15 minutes after the rescue has begun.
- 200 + more in the next 15 minutes.
- Several hundred could be expected within 45 minutes.
- Organized elements of the regular armed forces are not expected during the first hour.
- There is a low probability that the regular armed forces will discover or interfere.

~~(S)~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

~~SECRET~~

E The operation would be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, KC-135 tankers, C-141 airlifters, and one C-5A will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be from [REDACTED]

- The operation in Iran takes approximately 38 hours (two nights and one day). It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.

A, E Upon last light of the insertion day, SOFD-Delta (90 Delta personnel plus [REDACTED] monitors) and Rangers (46 personnel) will be airlifted by 3 MC-130s from [REDACTED] to Nain Military Airfield, Iran.

-- The first MC-130, equipped with FLIR, will overfly the airfield and indicate clearance for the Ranger MC-130 to land. Upon landing, the Rangers will secure the field and prepare for reception of the two Delta MC-130s.

-- These 3 A/C will soon be followed by 3 MC-130s w/fuel bladders.

-- In the meantime, 6 RH-53s will have departed the USS Nimitz to marry up with the force at Nain. While at Nain, the helos will refuel from the MC-130 bladder birds and load the Delta personnel. (The refuel and load evolutions should take approximately 40 minutes.)

-- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.

A, E -- The MC-130s at Nain will return to [REDACTED] leaving a force of 22 Rangers and two friendly [REDACTED] to maintain control and insure that the operation is not compromised.

-- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

A, C -- The Delta force will [REDACTED] from the hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [REDACTED]

-- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- A) That night, Delta will be moved into Tehran [REDACTED] enter the compound during the early morning hours.
- The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.
- Two AC-130s will fly from [REDACTED] compound and provide on-call gunfire support if required.
- In the meantime, 5 MC-130s w/Rangers (75 personnel) will capture ManzariyeH and prepare for arrival of a C-141 [REDACTED] and the helos from Tehran.
- A third AC-130 will be available to provide on call gunfire support at Manzariyeh.
- Once Delta has initiated the hostage release by entering the Embassy compound, the helos will be called in for extraction and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzariyeh.
- A separate fully coordinated plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.
- At Manzariyeh the former hostages will be loaded on the C-141 which is staffed with an emergency medical team. The C-141 will fly to the nearest US military hospital, [REDACTED] on to Germany.
- All other personnel will board the MC-130s and depart for [REDACTED]
- A sixth MC-130 from [REDACTED] will extract the main force once the Manzariyeh extraction has been completed.
- All [REDACTED] flights from [REDACTED] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [REDACTED]

E) TO SUM UP -

- The mission can be done.
- It is highly dependent upon surprise.
- The next best time is 27-29 March followed by 3-5 Apr.
- After 5 April, shorter nights drive us to (3-day plan with increased risk).
- Sir, we await your orders.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TDB SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I-373

~~REF ID: A6578~~

WORKING PAPER

A (b) Subject: Concept for use of [REDACTED] in Hostage Recovery Option

(b) 1. CONCEPT.

- Based on force capability, weather and environment, the [REDACTED] is best munitions to achieve desired results.

B (b) [REDACTED] along the south wall, as required, prior to at the [REDACTED]

- Specific employment techniques and crew training will be accomplished prior to operation.

(b) 2. MUNITION DESCRIPTION. (See attached photo)

- The [REDACTED] includes a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] each containing [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] permits [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] from various between [REDACTED]

- When the [REDACTED] functions, the [REDACTED] over the target area.

- After [REDACTED] desired [REDACTED] should [REDACTED] for approximately [REDACTED]

(b) 3. AVAILABILITY.

- Army has 1964 at [REDACTED] Depot.

- Shipping weight is [REDACTED]

B (b) 4. Delta Force will also have [REDACTED] munitions for use, as required.

(b) 5. No [REDACTED] should result from use of [REDACTED] are [REDACTED] but should pose no greater hazard than [REDACTED] if employed in buildings or urban areas.

1 Enclosure
A/S

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified By
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
SOD SUMMARY SHEET (314)

TO: CJCS	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET	SOD CONTROL NUMBER		
SUBJECT: Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)		ACTION		
		APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION
		X		X

REMARKS

- B 1 (U) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in Iran.
- 2 (U) The JTF was previously authorized* to plan for use and train in the use of [REDACTED]. However, final approval to use [REDACTED] was deferred.
3. (U) Recommend the attached memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of defense.

* Summary Sheet/Memo, Subject Use of [REDACTED] in
Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DER 125-DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON 04DR
REVW FROM JS

ACTION OFFICER SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J-3 P						
	EXEC						
	TM CMF						
	VCOPIE						
COPIE							
DATE OF PREPARATION 13 April 80							

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE

TO:
CJCS✓THRU:
DJS~~SECRET~~

ODJS SUSPENSE DATE

DJSM NO.

DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:

Use of
Tehran Hostage Rescue (PS)

ACTION

APPROVAL

SIGNATURE

INFORMATION

OTHER

X X

REMARKS

1. (PS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in [Tehran].

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

In view of the [REDACTED] of this final operational plan, it is suggested that the Team be authorized to plan for use and train in the use of [REDACTED] Requested but the final authority to use the operation not be issued until the deployment is approved.

Philip D. Shultz

CLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR () REVIEW
IS () NOVEMBER
EXTENDED BY [REDACTED]
REASON: [REDACTED]

~~EYES ONLY~~

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE

NAME

EXTENSION

OFFICE

NAME

J-3

Philip D. Shultz

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
AND RELATED UNITS~~TOP SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A65114~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A
Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage
Rescue (TS) (S)X,B
1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to discriminately use [REDACTED]. The intention is to use an [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] characteristics and minimum [REDACTED] at the Embassy Compound to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

3. (TS) As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare to use [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

OK-

But not approved.
How this level.
Each approach will
be evaluated.22
Nov
79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS

DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION

OR (X) REVIEW

IS: 22 November 2009

EXTENDED BY:

REASON:

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Iran Hostage
Rescue ~~(TS)~~

A,B 1. ~~(TS)~~ Current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from Iran has established a requirement for authority to [REDACTED]. An [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] characteristics and [REDACTED] would be used to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

A 2. ~~(TS)~~ The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED] and risk to the hostages and Iranians.

A 3. ~~(TS)~~ As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

A 4. ~~(TS)~~ It is requested that approval be granted to use [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

David C. Jones

4/14

*Approved.
Harold Brown*

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 April 2010
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

BUCCAL MUCOSAL SHEET

~~#375~~

CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING OFFICER								
REF ID: A656125 SOS	DISK NO. 00000000000000000000000000000000								
SOS	DISM DATE								
REF ID: A656126 SOS	ACTION								
Use of [REDACTED] in Refugee Assistance Message (RA) (S)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>APPROVAL</th> <th>SIGNATURE</th> <th>INFORMATION</th> <th>DATE</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>X</td> <td>X</td> <td></td> <td>01/07</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	DATE	X	X		01/07
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	DATE						
X	X		01/07						

REMARKS

~~(S)~~ The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of [REDACTED] during the hostage rescue in Tehran.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

CLASSIFIED BY: DDO NMCC
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION OADR.
OR () REVIEW.
IS: 12 Aug 52
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage Rescue (S)


1. (S) The [REDACTED] by the rescue force is considered a necessity to [REDACTED] levels. Minimum force is being employed, both inside and outside the Embassy, while maintaining a capability to affect a successful egress from the Embassy [REDACTED]

2. (S) An evaluation of the following [REDACTED] is being conducted by the rescue force; [REDACTED] The desire is to employ an [REDACTED] reasonable period of [REDACTED]

3. (S) The members of the rescue force are familiar with both employment of [REDACTED] conduct of operations while [REDACTED]

4. (S) The primary advantages of limiting the [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while greatly enhancing the probability of mission success, far outweigh the [REDACTED]

5. (U) Strongly recommend approval and that the attached proposed memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.


JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
CJTF - RICE BOWL

Attachment
a/s

APPROVED _____
DISAPPROVED _____

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3
DATE FOR () DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 21 November 2009

EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

*Downgraded to Secret
by DDO N MCC
12 Aug 2009*

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [REDACTED] in Tehran Hostage
Rescue (TS) (S)

1. (TS) The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to [REDACTED]
The intention is to use [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at the Embassy Compound to [REDACTED] predictable enemy reaction.

2. (TS) The advantages of limiting [REDACTED] by exercising [REDACTED] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [REDACTED]

3. (TS) As a point of information, [REDACTED] have been used [REDACTED]

A, B 4. (TS) It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare [REDACTED] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From
CJCS

22
Nov
79

OK-

But not approve
now for use.
Such approval will
be addressed later

~~EYES ONLY~~

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR (X) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
JULY 1986

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTION

535 2005

1/MC-130 w/ 50
DELTA Dep [REDACTED]
- MC-130 Aborts

Lead DELTA Team
late or unavailable

- Abort
- Have spare MC-130 ready; translate DELTA continue

555 2025

1/MC(50DELTA)

& 1/EC(FUEL)

T/O from [REDACTED]

- MC-130 ABORT

OK,

DELTA unavailable

- ABORT advise 1/MC-130
- Transload DELTA spare - continue
- USE 3rd EC-130 AS FUEL A/C

- EC-130 ABORT

- REQUIRE 2/EC-130 AT
REFUEL POINT.

E
NOTE: Any delay of
these A/C beyond 10
min requires notification
to Helos for
possible delay

556 2026

7/Helos dep carrier
6 airborne
5 airborne

OK

Allows only one
spare for entire
mission

>5 airborne

Insufficient helos for
mission

Continue
Depending on
execute ... abort

ABORT

602/3/4

1/MC-130 (21/
DELTA)
2/EC-130 (FUEL)
T/O from [REDACTED]
- 1/MC-130 Abort

Equip & parts of DELTA
unavailable

Transload to spare
MC-130, if unavailable .. ABC
and recall all forces

- 1/EC-130 ABORT

Still sufficient fuel
at refuel point for
helos

Continue

2/EC-130 ABORT

Insufficient fuel
for helos

- If no refueling available for
MC-130 ... ABORT
- If refueling available, continue
give 5000# from
of 3/MC-130s to
helos, plan a
5 helo launch out
of refueling

DDON MCC 92
~~DDON MCC 92~~ Downgraded,
Classified By: OADR Declassified On: DDO NMCC

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
JU 1EAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONSEQUENCES

~~(c)~~
DECISION/OPTIONS

35

1/MC-130 (DELTA
lands at refuel
point

OK

Continue

Blind landing

[REDACTED] gui
pilot to landing
the road

- A/C damaged or
~~or~~ breaks through
crust on landing

A/C will have to
be destroyed in
place

- ABORT: Land t
helos at the ref
point, on load f
from the MC-130,
split the 60
personnel betwee
helos and return
the carrier

OR

Make damaged A/C

Continue

and burn it

39

Helos pass turn
around
5 helos OK

Sufficient force to
to support extraction
Insufficient helos

Continue

< 5 helos OK

ABORT

55

2nd/MC-130
lands at refuel
point
- A/C damaged
or breaks through
crust

OK

Our presence will be
discovered the next day

Continue

ABORT - Land helo
take fuel out of
damaged MC-130 f
helos, load 60
people on 1st MC-
return to [REDACTED]
destory MC-130 i
place, helos ret
to carrier.

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 August

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
LU IPAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

058

1st/EC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

If we are allowed to
use a security force
to prevent word of our
presence from getting
out fro 24 hours
OR
Make A/C [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] burn it

Continue as plan
bring an MC-130
back in the 2nd
night to destroy
damaged aircraft
and remove the
security force
[REDACTED] Continue

002

A
3rd MC-130 lands
- A/C damaged

If we have security
force [REDACTED]
MAKES A/C [REDACTED] BURN IT
OK
Presence will be
discovered

Continue, bring
crew out on MC-1
CONTINUE
Continue
ABORT ... all
personnel return
initial departur
point. Destroy
A/C in place

005

2nd/EC-130
lands
- A/C damaged

With security force
OR
Make A/C [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], burn
it [REDACTED]

Continue
Continue

006

3rd EC-130 enters
orbit over landing
site

Provide terminal
guidance for helos

Continue

020

Helos arrive
at landing site

OK

Continue

- If helos are more
than min late

Not enough
darkness to reach
hideout

Helos refuel and
move north to
desert hide
location -- noti
reception party
of delay

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(ME)
IRANEVENT/
SITUATIONCONSEQUENCESDECISION/OPTION

100

(S)
Helos depart refuel
point with DELTA
5 OK

Sufficient helos
for operation*(S)*
Continue

<5 OK

Insufficient helos for
operationGood helos return
to carrier, rest
of force return
on C-130

NOTE: If there is a
problem with any A/C
departing the refuel point,
it will be destroyed
in place and

[REDACTED]

320

A
Helos arrive
at dropoff with
DELTA
- No reception
party

OK

Continue

DELTA unable to
move to city

- DELTA moves to
hideout with helo
- DELTA remains
dropoff to wait
trucks

- Helo breaks
at dropoff

Possibility of
discovery

- Leave *[REDACTED]*
[REDACTED] at Helo

- Force discovered
at dropoff

- Mission blown

- Load force on
and return to
desert track
- If possible,
capture discover
keep with helos
hideout, release
when helos leave
continue

350

Helos depart
dropoff

OK

Continue

005

Helos arrive
hideout

OK

Continue

Helos must be in the
hideout by 0016Z to
arrive in total
darkness

TIME
TO IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

07/9

2/MC-130 depart

-1/MC-130
aborts

- 2/MC-130s
abort..Launch
spare

- 3/MC-130s abort

OK

Rangers/CCT not
available at
Manzariyeh

Reduced force to
secure Manzariyeh

No security force

- 1/EC-130 aborts

3/AC-130 depart

- 1 Depart

No extra fuel, reduced b/u
extraction capability

OK

Minimum support

1 Depart

support

20

1/MC&2/EC-130
Depart [REDACTED]
for Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue .

39

1/KC-135 depart

OK

- Continue

- KC-135 aborts,
launch spare

OK

- Continue

- No KC-135

No Refuel

- MC-130s continue, get
fuel at Manzariyeh

51

3/KC-135's depart

OK

- Continue

- 1/KC-135 Abort

Insufficient fuel
for A/C 130

Launch spare

NOTE: If this
launch requires the
use of ~~more than two~~
spares we will affect
the return refuel-
ings.

35 2/MC-130s refuel

OK

- Continue

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME
W IRANEVENT/
SITUATION

CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

- 1/MC-130 unable to receive fuel

Reduced security force for Manzariyeh

- Continue
The MC-130 that cannot refuel will continue to Manzariyeh to get fuel

- KC-135 unable to pass fuel or both MC-130s unable to receive

MC-130s will require fuel from EC-130 at Manzariyeh

- Continue rest of mission schedule, land both MC-130s at Manzariyeh, take fuel from EC-130.

53

~~AC-130~~'s refuel

OK

- Continue

≥ 1 A/C 130 unable to refuel

Minimum AC-130 available to support DELTA

- Continue

No AC-130s able to refuel

No gunship support for DELTA

ABORT, recall all forces

11

2/C-141 depart [REDACTED] for Manzariyeh
1/C-141 OK

Sufficient airlift to carry out 307 personnel
Max load departing Manzariyeh using MC-130 support

- Continue

[REDACTED] will not let C-141s launch

Insufficient airlift to extract personnel

- Continue

- Utilize alternate rescue party from [REDACTED] (MC/EC-130)

40

AC-130 arv at Embassy
NOTE: AC-130s will have 2+00 station time available.

OK

- Continue

NOTE: If EC-130s with fuel are at Manzariyeh and the other forces (MC-130s) have sufficient fuel, an AC-130 can land and take on fuel at Manzariyeh to extend station time.

45

2/MC-130s land at Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- Find R/W blocked

Unable to airland

Jump in Rangers to clear runway then land.

TIME
DU IRAN

EVENT/
SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

DECISIONS/OPTIONS

56

2/C-141 arrive
Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- 1st/C-141
crashes on
R/W

R/W particully
blocked if 2nd C-141
cannot land,
insufficient airlift to
evacuate all forces.

- Land the 2nd/C-141 and
use him to extract
hostages, use MC/EC-
130s to extract combat
force.

- Send 2nd/C-141 back, u-
MC/EC-130s to extract
entire force.

NOTE: C-141s will require
at least 5000' to operate
at moderate loads.

Call

Helos start up

00

DELTA execute
at Embassy (approx
time)

OK

- Continue

Call

Helos arrive at
Embassy

- 5 OK

Sufficient helos for
extraction

- Continue

≤ 4

Will require helos to
shuttle to Manzariyeh

- Conside fuel for AC-130
to provide extra static
time.

Zero helos

Unable to extract by
helos

Will have to reach
Manzariyeh by ground
vehicle

10

2/C-141s depart
Manzariyeh

OK

- Continue

- Only 1/C-141
able to depart

Some of force will
have to come out on
MC/EC-130

Transload force to MC/EC-
130 for extraction.

- Zero C-141s
depart Manzariyeh

Entire force must
come out on MC/EC-130

Transload force to MC/EC-
130s

15

MC/EC-130s depart
Manzariyeh

OK

Continue

≥ 3 MC/EC-130
depart

OK

Continue

< 3 MC/EC-130
depart

Insufficient lift for
entire force

Force transition to E&E
plan, make pickup at
predetermined location ne-
night.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C-379

G SEE: [REDACTED] for details o
questions on info provi
below.

E

SUPPORT AVAILABLE

E

15 Jan 80:

ITEM	ON-SITE	REQUIREMENT	SHORTFALL	IN-THEATER ?
COTS	200	800	600	Harvest Eagle
MATTRESSES	50 (not good)	800		Recommend Sleeping Bags per man
BILLETS (US assigned)	280	800	600	Requires [REDACTED] Govt turnover for US use.
LATRINES	19	24	5	Being constructed
SHOWERS	11 (HEADS)	19	8	Harvest Eagle
WATER	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	6 Buffalos 20 Lister Bags	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	Harvest Eagle
Water Storage w/demin	4x500gal	8x500gal	4x500gal	Harvest Eagle
A-2 Water Trucks	1	2	1	Not in theater (SA)
Water Kits for KC135	0	as req	as req	KC-135 deploy with them.
MOBILE CLINIC	1	1	0	n/a
INSECT REPELLANT	1 per pers	1 per pers		each pers deploy insect repellant
LAUNDRY	3 washers	6	3	In Theater Quart
CLASS VI	BEER 330 cases as required Soda 100 cases "	"	get from AAFES, EUR	Yes
RUNWAY LIGHTS	MINIMAL	VACI	VACI	Not in Theater (TA)
R-14 Berms	1	2	1-2	[REDACTED] will construct with 24 hrs notice.
ELECT POWER	175 KW, 380V, 50Cycle (220V) 2x6hr periods	Present + 2x200KW	2x200KW Convertible to 220, 60Cy	[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ E

LIGHTING	ALL Shelters and Buildings	Same	Wire/Pigtails	
MHE	1 All Terrain Forklift w/ long forks	2 of same	1 All terrain w/long forks	ALCE?
PALLET LOADER	NONE	?	?	ALCE?
POL	240,000gal on base ? +100,000gal avail w/24hrs notice		?	need 48 hr notice to assure no shortfall

TIME	SITUATIONS	DECISION/OPTIONS	
		TOP SECRET	TOP SECRET
2/0800Z (0300 Fst)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Fst)	Launch MC-130: a. 5/MC-130 Airborne b. 4/MC-130 "	None Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go Go, will provide t 19 operational bladders to compl mission
	c.<4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d.>1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helos in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Fst)	KC-135 launch: 3 KC-135 Airborne <3 KC-135 Airborne	None Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	Go No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch, <2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None Unable to accomplish. MC-130 refueling	Go No go
2/1240Z (0840 Est)	KC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camoufage to hideout	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch a. 6/Helo airborne (5 wi Delta/1 Wi extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets)	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target	Go
	b.<5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay	Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft	If there is a del instruct MC-130s orbit
	c.<5/Helo airborne	Would unacceptably de- grade equip and personnel for "Delta"	No/Go, delay 24 h Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than

> = greater than

= less than or equal to

>= greater than or equal to

3

TS

I-378

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by:

DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~EVENT/
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

	d.>1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24 h
2/1430Z 1515Z <i>(0300Z)</i>	Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Helo advise MC-130s to take 2nd refueling and RTB. Scramble SAR from Carrier, advise KC-130s/AR
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - Delta Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier
			Option 2 - Recall Helo's advise MC-1 to refuel and RTB launch SAR
2/1640Z <i>(0400Z)</i>	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful 4 successful 4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out Insufficient fuel for helos	Go Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA No Go, recall Helo
2/1515Z 1810Z <i>(0130Z)</i>	Helo goes down prior to turn around point - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos land and spread the load. Advise MC-130 to delay by no. of minutes required for recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th He lands, dumps cargo if necessary, picks up injured and retires to carrier. Option 2: Abort, recall helos, advise MC-130's RTB, advise KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch Delta Helos contin

4

75

~~TOP SECRET~~

EVENT/
SITUATIONS

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

			Option 2: Land car of the other 5 helos and load 1 crew member and 1 camouflage net on each. The TACAN should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise the MC-130's to delay
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recall helo advise MC-130's to RTB, call for early KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z <i>(1310-1418 IST)</i>	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: Land all helos and spread load. Continue to refuel point Option 2: Land car helo and p/u Delta plus crew. NOTE: Any one helo can recover Delta plus the crew. The cargo helo is 2000 lbs lighter
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	Option 1: Abort, proceed to refuel point, take max fuel, return to carrier. Option 2: Proceed to refuel point, one helo will return to carrier with injury. Remaining 4 helos on mission. (NOTE: No camouflage nets can be taken to hideout)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2/1948Z

(144515Z)

Airdrop of fuel bladder:

- 5 MC-130's make drop
- 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.

<4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.

Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK
 Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available.
 Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.

Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target

Go, can proceed w/ number of helos desired
 Can go with 4 helos if we get 19 bladders

Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as get 4 operational

Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to ship

Option 3: Delay 24 hours to get more fuel the next night

2/2248Z

(174815Z)

Helos launch from refueling:
 6 helos airborne

Will have extra helo support for extraction

Go, use 6th helo to carry max fuel

5 helos airborne

Adequate support for extraction

Go, fold up 6th helo and leave it. Extract extra fuel for operational helos

4 helos airborne

Marginal support for extraction

Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos.

3 helos airborne

Minimum helos for extraction

Option 1: Proceed mission in degraded status

Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier.

Option 3: Delay 24 hrs. Try to fix helos or get more fuel, as req

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EVENT/ SITUATIONS		CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay 2 hours, try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required Option 2: Load all personnel on 2 helos strip down and fly to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay 2 hours, fly person to Manzariyah in t to meet MC-130s a Rangers. Option 4: Delta crews fly to vicinity of Darband Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land and extract. Same as option 4 above except cly the one helo w/ Delta from refuel point to vicinity of Darband
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130 when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748-1818Z)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318 (1818-1848Z)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzariyah for extraction	JTF Commander call recall the force to the carrier, contact means Go
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748-1848Z)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point: - 6 helos available cargo helo goes - 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets Delta force unacceptable degraded	2 helos land air crew and nets 3 helos land, 13 Delta or crew bc

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~LIVE/
SITUATIONS

CONSEQUENCES

DECISION/OPTIONS

5 helos available,
Delta helo goes

Same as above

The cargo helo, 5
Delta board each o
the other two helo4 helos available,
Delta helo goes
down

Same as above

4 helos land spread
load the personnel
attempt lift off
with nets, if unable
dump nets.3 helos available
Delta helo goes
down.

Same as above

Abort, strip down,
spread personnel
among 3 helos,
proceed to hideout
extract on MC-130
the next night.3/0124Z
(2024Z EST)Any major problem
at the dropoff
pointMission could be
blown and/or force
degradedFrom here on we will
find a recovery
airfield to secure
and call for the
MC-130'sOption 1: Abort,
move to hideout,
meet MC-130s next
night.Option 2: Continue
ground commander's
decision.3/2200Z
2210Z
(1720-1710Z EST)Helo goes down
enroute to hideoutWill affect ability
to perform extractionIf 3 or more helos
available, continue
if < 3, inform Delta
and abort to
~~Manzariyah~~.3/0124Z
2135Z
(/2024 - 3/035)Delta is discovered
enroute while helos
are at hideoutWith the force split
Delta must be able to
call the helos to a
predetermined RVMove helos at night
to RV to p/u Delta
then to ~~Manzariyah~~
for extraction.~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

A	TYPE MISSION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
V	3/1500Z (1630Z) AC-130 launch MC-130 Launch 5 MC-130 OK 4 MC-130 OK 3 " 2 " <2 "	Personnel jammed on AC-130 Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	GO GO - P/U only hostage + wounded [REDACTED] - Direct [REDACTED] launch and P/U some leftovers
	3/1545 (1645Z) KC-135 launch for MC-130 3 KC-135 OK <3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least 2 MC-130, more if possible.
	3/1605 (1655Z) KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Go Same as above
A	3/1900 (1700Z) AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel >2 MC-130 OK <2 MC-130 OK Helo lift off from hideout >3 RH-53 OK <3 RH-53 OK	Same as above	Same as above -
	3/2135Z (1635Z) MC-130's arrive at Manzariych find R/W blocked	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	Use extras (>3) f CAS - Cycle helo's fro Manzariych to Embassy - Paradrop Rangers onto airfield - Wait for Delta helos to arrive to secure field a clear R/W
	3/2230Z (1730Z) Helos land at Embassy 5 RH-53 OK	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Use extra helos provide [REDACTED]
	3 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos	- Land helo's sing use other 2 for [REDACTED] if need - Cycle helo's for extraction
	<2 RH-53 OK	Min reqd helos for for extraction	
	3/2230Z 2300Z (1730Z)	Not sufficient helos for extraction	

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME	EVENT/SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
32245Z (1717z)	Extraction: ->3 Helo's OK >1 Helo OK Zero Helo's OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel Unable to extract by Helo	<i>G</i> Go Cycle Helo's Use [redacted] Manzariyeh
3300Z (1817z)	Helo's arrive at Manzariyeh. >3 RH-53 OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded
	<3 RH-53 OK	Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle	- MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded
	<3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130	Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground	MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130
	Zero helo's OK	MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	- Keep all MC-130's ground till personnel arrive - Launch two MC-13 for [redacted] or for departure
4/0015 (3/19/85 Esi)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/19/85 Esi)	AC-130 refuel		
Movement of Delta	Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have Delta set up prearranged rally points. If discovered, disengage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, Hel go to Manzariyeh if no contact with Delta

10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SR 661607Z

#458

SSN 3143
0231505Z APR 82
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF
TG: JTF/R/C
BT

E SUBJ: [REDACTED] OVERFLIGHTS
REF: COMJTF MSG 230950Z APR, SAME SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

E 1. SUBJECT MISSION HAD SOME OMISSIONS PLEASE CHANGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

E 2. THE COMMANDER THOUGHT THAT THE SUGGESTED APPROACH COULD BE USED BY
[REDACTED] IF THE FORCE WERE DISCOVERED IN [REDACTED] AIRSPACE
ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE AREA.

T O P S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

Classified By: DDONMC 12 Aug 92
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDONMC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4457

REF ID: A651234567890

1. THE ELEMENTS OF AN/PPI-10
CIRCUITS, EXCEPT THE READING CIRCUIT, HAVE
AN/PPI-1 FREQUENCY POSITION OF:

- ONE AN/PPI-10 WILL BE WITH HELIOS,
THE OTHER TWO WILL BE WITH UNIVERSAL TRANSMITTER.
- THE FOLLOWING CODE/CODES WILL BE USED BY THESE ELEMENTS:

ELEMENT	AN/PPI-10'S CODE
HELOS	
DELTA	
ALPHA	

- FORWARD AIR CONTROL WILL BE ON UNIFORM FREQUENCIES (PRIMARY) IN
PROGRAMMED WITH CECI.

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: OADR

Declassified by
DDINCE
2009

1000
2000 00 APR 74
102

EG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12 APR 74 BY SPK
THIS INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT AS NOTED

TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	FLT NR.	ORIGIN	DEST	DATE/TYPE
JET	JR 1703	TEHRAN	FRANKFURT	230905Z
YUGOSLAV	JP 1950	TEHRAN	LJUBLJANA	230905Z/230905
SYRIAN	YKAFC(VIP)	DAMASCUS	TEHRAN	231400Z/231215
A307131				

010/0112
1141236
2122
DT
#013:

Classified By DDONMC 12-19-93
Declassified On OADR
Transferred by SPONMC 12-19-93

CONFIDENTIAL

142

E.G.

SUBJ: DELTA SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT

1. ROUFEAGE-NETS FOR HELOS WILL ARRIVE HOUR 100 VIA C-130
2. 0438Z APR 80. ADDITIONALLY LOAD WILL CONSIST OF TWO (2)
MOTORCYCLES ONE (1), 1/4 TON JEEP AND SIX (6) MEMBERS FROM DELTA SECURITY FORCE.

2. REQUEST YOU HAVE ~~REFUEL~~ DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY ON THE THREE EC-130'S
TO EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF DELTA FORCE AT ~~REFUEL~~. ALSO BRIEF EC-130
CREWS TO KICK OUT ~~REFUEL~~ AT REFUEL SITE.

3. THE ~~1/4~~ TON JEEP AND MOTOR CYCLES AND PAK MUST BE
MANIFESTED ON THE FIRST MC-130 FLYING TO REFUEL SITE.

MUNN

Damaged by
DDO NMCC to const
May 92

Classified By: ██████████ Declassified ON: 6 APR 2015 BY: ██████████
DDO N MCC

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECURITY INFORMATION

REF ID: A6512

NONEXEMPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[REDACTED] SHOULD CONTAIN A LETTER

E,G

[REDACTED] SHOULD CONTAIN A LETTER

(u) 1. EXECUTE AGENT RELEASE AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE TIME.

E,G

2. FINAL RELEASE: COL [REDACTED] AND LTC [REDACTED] ARE DIRECTED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER RESPECTIVE LETTERS TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]. U.S. AMBASSOIRS WILL BE ADVISED OF LETTER CONTENT AND SUBSEQUENT TO SOURCE AUTHORITY FOR FINAL RELEASE.

E,G

3. A COPY OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR COL [REDACTED] IS BEING FORWARDED TO YOU. REQUEST COLONEL [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS BE PLACED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND BE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] FOR DELIVERY.

[REDACTED] SHOULD BE ADVISED TO DELIVER BOTH THE RESIDENTIAL LETTER AND THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL [REDACTED]

(u) 4. LTC GAST IS RECEIVING SEPARATE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR COORDINATION WITH LTC [REDACTED]

NNNN

DDONMCC
12 Aug 9
Classified By:
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDONMCC
12 Aug 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. JTF ARRIVED
2. JTF
3. JCS/RC

1. JTF STAFF: JTF STAFF ARRIVED IN A 400 OF 231400Z
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS AS FOLLOWS:
1. TWO C-141 ARR [REDACTED] PAX: 231701Z AND 230845Z
1. ONE C-141 ARR [REDACTED] LOCAL: 231120Z
1. ONE MC-130 ARR [REDACTED] 231402Z
1. TWO AC-130 ARR [REDACTED] 231402Z AND 231415Z
1. FIVE KC-135 ARR [REDACTED] 231605ZU 231627Z, 231416Z, 231417Z, AND
231520Z

1. JTF FORCE NOW ON STATION:

- (1) JTF STAFF
(2) THREE MC-130. 567 NMIC PARTS. 572 NMIC #4 PROP VALVE HOUSING
CHANGE. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
(3) FOUR AC-130. 569 NMIC MINOR ENG. PROBLEM. 672
NMIC INERTIAL NAV. ETIC 240410 LOCAL.
(4) ELEVEN KC-135. ALL FMC
(5) DELTA. MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW.
(6) [REDACTED] MOVES TO [REDACTED] TOMORROW
(7) [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]
(1) THREE EC-130. ALL FMC
(2) FOUR MC-130. ALL JMC
C. NIMITZ. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS. ALL HELOS CAMFLAGE PAINTED
AND FMC.

- C. [REDACTED] FOUR KC-135. ALL FMC.

1. OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS CONDUCTED BY
DELTA AND CCTS LAST NIGHT. REHEARSALS

1. NO RANGER TRAINING TO BE CONDUCTED TO NITE.

(u) 1. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. AFTER EXTENSIVE SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION AND REALIGNMENT
THE JHF SYSTEMS LOOK THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.
C. C141 WITH WSC-3 ARRIVED TODAY. IT CHECKED GOOD IN SATCOM
MODE WHILE ON THE GROUND THIS LOCATION.
C. AS OF THIS TIME ADEQUATE COMMS ARE AVAILABLE
TO SUPPORT MISSION.

ET

Classified By: ~~JSD~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On: 0ADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded to CONF
by DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN

QSL QLL QSL QSL AT 1830 KKKKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[REDACTED]

1. LIST FIRST TWO HELICOPTERS WHICH TWO
C-130S WILL REFUEL AND FUELING POINT REQUIRED.
2. HELICOPTERS WILL RECEIVE APPROX 950 GALS
WICH UP MIXED AMMO FOR WEAPONS. CREW CHIEFS
WILL HAVE TO ASSIST [REDACTED] IN LOADING
WEAPONS. FIRST TWO HELICOPTERS WILL RETURN TO
DEPARTURE POINT MIDWAY TO TANAN AS EQUIP.
REFUEL/ARM POINT WILL BE AT THIS POINT
TANAN WAY. REQUIRE THREE HELICOPTERS TO REFUEL
AND POSITION AT POINT TANGO AND REMAIN
ACROSS TRUNKING UNTIL ALL BUT LAST C-130
HAS DEPARTED. SHUTDOWN WILL BE ON
COMMAND.

G (U) 1. C-130'S LOADING SIX BLITZES. X O [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILL BE AT FUEL POINT WITH GUNS AND AMMO.

[REDACTED] WILL BE AT DESERT TRACK + [REDACTED] WILL BE
INSTRUCTED TO PUT HIM ON HELICOPTER WITH PATHMAN.

3. REGRET LAST MIN CHANGES BUT WANT YOU TO RECEIVE THIS INFO.
SEN VAUGHT SENDS.

BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified by NMIC
DD 8 NMC 12 Aug 92

Declassified by
DD 8 NMC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100 RT
10T
10C
2308

NO EOM.

SSN 136

(C) NY TTTTT

0 1320Z

FM JTF ALPHA

TO JC SNHITZ

E,G [REDACTED] KPLET

JCS/RC

ET

[REDACTED]

SUEJI CTF 78 CAP SUPPORT

1. CTF 78 WILL SUPPLY CAP SUPPORT TO GROUND/AIR UNITS REQUIRING ASSISTANCE. UNITS MUST HAVE UHF COMM ON 341.4 MHZ (PRI) AND 240.5MHZ (SEC) BEFORE CAP UNITS CAN COMMIT. USE UNIT CALL SIGNS LISTED IN CEOI AND GIVE POSITION USING ECAP POINT CODE WORD. GROUND UNITS USE SMOKE TO ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.

ECAP POINT DISCIPTION

ALPHA REFUEL AREA

BRAVO HELO 1110E

CHARLIE WAREHOUSE

DELTA EMBASSY

ECHO MANZARIYCH

FOXTROT [REDACTED]

GOLF [REDACTED]

HOTEL [REDACTED]

INFO ROAD RAILROAD JUNCTION 35-15-00N/52-45-00E

2. CAP A/C WILL MONITOR TACAN, CHAN 9. GIVE POSIT IN RANGE AND BEARING FROM NEAREST ECAP POINT. IF NOT POSSIBLE PROVIDE LAT LONG COORDINATES.

3. PASS THIS INFO TO ALL UNITS PRIOR TO START OF MSN.

4. REQUEST CTF 78 PUBLISH CAP CALL SIGN TO ALCON ASAP.

ET

COORDINATES

33-0425N/55-52-55E

35-42-47N/51-25-30E

443

NNNN

MESSAGE 26 RECEIVED.

Classified By ~~DDO~~ NMCC
Declassified On OADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded to CONF by DDO NM
12 Aug 92

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EG
X

WEATHER 835

\$450

SAVITA WEATHER CLR FOR REQUESTED STAS AVKML FOR 23/1000Z HOUR.
MIL PLANE
1000 FT, HGT - 713, WEA - THE DIR/SD (KTG) - SEA LVL PRESS - TEMP

TABRIZ
1000-1100H - 17 KM, FADE - 24/11 - 1000.0MB - 21 DEG C.

SEZAYEH
1000-1300H - 16KM, FADE - 350/10 - 1000.1MB - 20 DEG C.

TEHRAN
1000-1300H - 15KM, I. STORM - 240/20 - 1007.1MB - 26 DEG C.

SEPAHAN/KHATAM
500 1000-1500H - 15KM, NONE - 240/1° - 1000.3MB - 26 DEG C.

SIRJANG
1000-1600H - 12 KM, NONE - 220/10 - 1223.6MB - 32 DEG C.

SHIRAZ
1000-1500H - 15KM, SUST - 100/12 - 1000.2MB - 32 DEG C.

ZAHEDAN
CLEAR - 12KM, NONE - 030/10 - 1007.0MB - 32 DEG C.

~~2000-02 APR 86~~

ET
#0144

Classified by:

DDONMC
12 Aug 92

Declassify on: DADR

Downgraded to

CONF BY
DDONMC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#438

- [REDACTED]
- (u) 1. TO ENSURE PROPER BILLING AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, ALL MISSION REPORTS WILL BE MAILED DIRECTLY TO THE CONTRACTOR AFTER A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH. ISOLATION ROSTERS WILL NOT BE MAILED AND MAC INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE FACILITATED. TALENTS ALLOWED DURING ISOLATION/RECOVERY WILL BE THOSE THAT ARE PLACED ON ISOLATION LIST. PRELIMINARY, HOSTILE AND CASUALTY REPORTING PRELIMINARY COUNT WILL BE REPORTED ONCE ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE REPORTED. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT SHOULD BE RECEIVED WITH SKEPTICISM BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WILL BE ACQUIRED.

- E 2. UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] ALL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE PILOTS AND AIRCREWS WILL BE MET IN DELTA TIME. EACH INDIVIDUAL TO BE CHECKED BY NAME AS THEY DECLINE. DATA WILL BE COMPILED AT JTF HQ. AND COMPILED. A SECOND RELIABLE REPORT WILL BE RENDERED.

- E X 3. CASUALTY REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AFTER SECOND BY NAME CALL OR AT [REDACTED]. AGREE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY RESPECTIVE SERVICE. POSITIVE ID OF KIA, IF ANY, WILL BE ATTACHED.

- E I DO NOT BELIEVE IT PRACTICABLE TO RETROGRADE THOSE HELO PERSONNEL NOT LAUNCHED ON MISSION. THOSE MISSION CREWS WILL BE RETROGRADED. THOSE PROVIDED CLEAN CLOTHING AND SHIPPED WITH DELTA TO CONUS FOR DEBRIEFING. THOSE REMAINING ABOARD THE NIMITZ WOULD BE TRANSPORTED THRU MAC CHANNELS. THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONUS WOULD COINCIDE WITH OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER RELEASE OF MISSION CREWS FROM ISOLATION.

- E (g) [REDACTED] AND SELECTED STAFF WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO COMPLETE ROLLUP. CHUTE, DECOMJTF TENTATIVELY WILL DEPART WITH DELTA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: JES
Declassify On: 04/08/2024

Classified by DDOWME
Declassify OA 08-
Downgraded by DDOWME
by 12 Aug 2024

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E,G

E

1. FLYING REPORT
REFRESH YOUR MSG 27 APR 78 P 78
2. THERE ARE THREE AIRLIFT SUPPORT MISSIONS
SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [REDACTED] 24 APR 78
3. THE THREE MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED
AS FOLLOWS:

AIRCRAFT	ETA	FUEL TON
C-130	241542Z APR	3,700 G
C-141	241643Z APR	20,000 G
C-141	241115Z APR	20,000 H

4. THE C-141'S SHOULD ONLY REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY
14,000 GALLONS OF FUEL EACH. HOWEVER,
WE ARE REQUESTING THE HIGHER AMOUNT
IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE IMPACT ON OUR
FUEL SUPPLIES.

ET

(C) - *-437

DDON MCC
~~DDON MCC~~
Classified By: O APR
Declassified On: 0 APR

Downgraded to CO NR
by DDON MCC
12 Aug 91

DENN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

卷之三

~~SECRET~~

TOT | 24/6/1452

1. OVERWHELMINGLY RECEIVED.
PLATED WITH OTHER INFO, AND
WILL BE PELTA SOURCE. ALT-750
100% CHAINMAN AT THAT STYLING.

*436

三三三

MESSAGE RECEIVED.

~~Classified by JCS
Declassified ON 6 ADR~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

REFUGED ON 8-12 Aug 97

~~DERIVATIVE OF~~ ~~DDGALME~~

~~□ REA~~ ~~100-1000~~ ~~1000~~

~~BLANK~~ - 100 ADR

卷之三

G

- RE: SENSITIVE SAD PREPARATIONS
1. ENSURE THAT SAD COMMUNITY TREATS KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATED PREPARATIONS FOR SAD EFFECT IN SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT CHANNELS.
 2. PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS ARE NOT REPEATABLE ALLOWABLE PRIOR TO SENSITIVE APPRAISAL

PLAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

435

Declassified
by DDCMCC
12 Aug 92

Classified By:
JC's
Declassified On: 6 APR

CON 173
12-1507 APR 30
2433Z ALPHAV/J2
TOM MINUTE/HELD JET

REFTRANS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

MSG124
DTG: 240333Z APR 30

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHAV

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: HOSTAGES LOCATION

1. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS AND SEPARATE SOURCES OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY THAT [REDACTED]

2. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE KEPT IN MIND ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THIS POINT WILL BE DATED BY THE TIME OF OPERATION. DUE TO DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED ON THE 24TH AND POSSIBLY THE 25TH THERE MAY AGAIN BE A RESHUFFLE/CONSOLIDATION OF THE HOSTAGES AND INCREASE IN MILITANT/REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ALERTNESS ON THURSDAY NIGHT AT LEAST. THIS SITUATION COULD LAST INTO FRIDAY IF DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE AND COME NEAR THE COMPOUND.

G 3. FOR MAJ [REDACTED] PLS PASS BEST WISHES/LUCK TO COL PITTMAN FOR ME, AND TO THE CREWS FM J2. THANX, [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

Classified By *JCS*
Declassified On *OPR OADR*

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1235Z
COMPLETED ON *1 Aug 92*
DRAFTED BY *DDO/NMC*
 APPROVED BY *ADM*
 REVIEWED BY *JAD*
 END BY *DIA*
 EXPIRES BY *1 Aug 92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ISN 1075
TO TTTTT
INFO 2-1111-2 AT 1111
FBI JTF1
TO JCS/KC

E [REDACTED]
SUBJ: MOVEMENT OF TWO
TWO C-1412 AND 241111Z
FROM [REDACTED] AND 241111Z APR 1975
ETD [REDACTED] 141140Z AND 241111Z.
G
#2175

#425

NNNN

Classified By: ~~DDO, NMIC~~ 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by DDO, NMIC
12 Aug 92

FOR QSL AT 0601Z INT 3605Z. AND IF U DONT HAVE
ANYMORE I HAVE ONE FOR U INT-RER RRR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CSN 0177
ZNY TTTT
UTG 0 240645Z APR 92
FM JTF
TO JTF/RC
BT

E/G [REDACTED] REB: LOCATION OF [REDACTED]
REFERENCE [REDACTED] MSG
240615Z APR 92
REQUEST YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
IN LOCATING THE [REDACTED] AND -
IF APPROPRIATE COORDINATE MEETING
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND US AMBASSADOR
IN [REDACTED]
BT
#0179

NNNN

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMC
Declassified On 0ADR 12 Aug 92

Downgraded by:
DDO NMC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(e) ETU 032315Z APR 90

FM JFMJTF

TO JFMJTF, FIXED WING AIR OPS [REDACTED] COL KYLE

JFMJTF, HELO OPS, NMITE//COL PITTMAN

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: REPORTS

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING REQUIRED REPORTS ARE IN ADDITION
TO THOSE LISTED IN PARA 5A, JTF 79 CECI(18 APR 1990)

INDIV MAKING REPORT	ACTIVITY REPORTED	CODEWORD	MEANS
COL KYLE(WOODPECKER)	ALL 130 TYPE ACFT DEPARTED DESERT LAND	SWEETROLL	MC 130/WSC3 SECURE
COL PITTMAN(ZEBRA)	RH53'S ARRIVED AT HIDEOUT LOCATION	HONEY DEW	WSC3 SECURE OR PT 25 SECURE OR PSC-1

BT

NNNN

Classified By: ~~DDO/NM~~
Declassified On: DADR

Downgraded by
~~DDO/NM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

2416414

65L 2915-

SSN 61841
ZNY TTTT
DTG 240300Z APR 82
FM COMJTF/VAUGHT
TO CJCS
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SENSITIVE LETTER

E (u) 1. I HAVE PASSED THE [REDACTED] LETTER TO [REDACTED] THE WILL PASS IT TO [REDACTED] WHO WILL CONVEY IT TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION.

E, E, G [REDACTED] WILL STAY IN [REDACTED] TO FACILITATE THE C-141 MISSION AND PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND CLARIFICATION ON ANY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY [REDACTED]

E (u) 2. ALL PARTIES WILL BE TIED IN WITH GEN CAST BY SECURE COMMUNICATION. EACH WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO. THEY WILL BE TRUEFUL OR [REDACTED] WOULD LIKE STATE OR SOMEONE TO BRIEF [REDACTED] AEGOT THE SAME TIME

[REDACTED] IS INFORMED.

(u) 3. ALL ELSE GOES WELL. WEATHER LOOKED GOOD AT 0700Z. WILL MAKE DECISION ABOUT 1300Z..

BT

70184

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMCC
Declassified On DADK 12 Aug 92

Moving to CONF
by DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SC JSC C9282~~

(E) ~~X417~~

SSN 0187
ZNY TTTT
DTG 240920Z APR 02
FM ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
ET

SUBJECT: FIGHTER REACTION TIMES

- (G)(U) 1. AFTER QUESTIONING HAD [REDACTED]
HAVE LEARNED THAT ALERT FIGHTERS CAN
START ENGINES WHILE STILL IN HANGAR.
- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 WITH
ENGINE RUNNING TO BECOME AIRBORNE
ONCE IT EXITS ITS HANGAR?
- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 THAT
IS NOT IN A HANGAR TO BECOME
AIRBORNE ONCE MAINT/CTRY PERSONNEL
ARRIVE AT THE A/C AND BEGIN TO PREPARE IT FOR LAUNCH?
2. WHAT IS EEST/EEST OF FIGHTER ON-STATION
TIME AT [REDACTED] ONCE ACTIVITY
AT THAT LOC IS DETECTED?

BT

#0187

NNNN

Classified By:
Declassified On: 0 ADA

35 DDO NM 12 Aug 92
Downgraded to CONF
by DDO JMC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX / 4SC 0830Z

SEN 145
ZNY [REDACTED]
LTS 241 0117 APR 92
FM JTF
TO JC8/RC
BT

#415

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT STATUS

AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 240900Z APR 92 IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. NIMITZ - EIGHT HELOS ALL FMC

B. [REDACTED]

(1) THREE MC-130S. ONE NHO DUE TO LACK OF
ETAKIE PARTS (ETIC PARTS PLUS 4).

(2) FOUR AC-130S. ONE PMC DUE TO AUTOPILOT HOLD INOP/ALR-40
INOP (ETIC PARTS PLUS 2).

(3) ONE C-141 FMC. TWO ENROUTE TO [REDACTED]

(4) ELEVEN KC-135S. ALL FMC.

C. [REDACTED]

(1) FOUR MC-130S FMC

(2) THREE EC-130S FMC.

D. [REDACTED] SEVEN KC-135S ALL FMC.

2. IF PARTS DO NOT ARRIVE FOR NMC MC-130 AND
PMC AC-130, CANNIBALIZATION FROM C-130S WILL BE CONSIDERED.

BT

02168

NNNN

Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassified ON [REDACTED]
Downgraded by [REDACTED]

DDO/NMCC

12 Aug 92

Classified by [REDACTED]

Declassified ON [REDACTED]

12 Aug 92

Classified by [REDACTED]

Declassified ON [REDACTED]

12 Aug 92

Classified by [REDACTED]

Declassified ON [REDACTED]

12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TG T

150 APR 80
1972

(Get) 7
FOLIO RETRANSM FOR UR INFO
SUBJ: 54TRAM EXTENSION (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/
ELTNS:

SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 230400Z/120000Z
TO 270400Z/240800Z



*414

REVW 23 APR 80

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DU 1200Z

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 72

NEGATIVE CL BY DPO NMCC

REL TO BOWING TO Secret

REVW BY OADR

REPORT FROM JL DIA

~~SECRET~~

ESM 0101
ZNY TTTT
DTG 0 231700Z APR 86
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/J-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JCC/RC-JC/LFHANAN

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

C-1055R
#091

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: INT REP 85

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY [REDACTED]

2. AGI 477 REMAINS SOLE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231700Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N 50.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG.

3. AT 0730Z FRENCH AOR 626 AND FR 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626 234N EAST OF AL MASIRAH (VIC 22.2N 659.1E) PROCEEDING S10 AT 12KTS.

ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW.
A.P. NO KNOWN SOVIET MERSHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LEMINA IS UNLOCATED.
BUT WE ARE STILL CHECKING TODAY'S FAC RECCE PHOTOS.

4. IN ADDITION TO IL-39 ACTIVITY REPORTED IN MY INT REP 84.

5. BOTH [REDACTED] REMAINED MINIMUM 25NM FROM NIMITZ AND DISPLAYED NO INTEREST IN CTF 70. IRANIAN AIR RECCE PREVIOUSLY NOTED. NO INDICATION OF CONCERN IN [REDACTED]

6. AT APPROX 0800Z LT COL STEFFERT AND CAPT [REDACTED] (NSM PRIMARY NAVY) FLEW LEADERS AERIAL RECCE OF CIP IN KA-35 8-6E. REVIEW OF FLIR TAPES AND BRIEFING INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE ACCURATE.

5. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240900Z AS PER YOUR REQUEST.

BEVVA 23APR86

BT

NMMN

BGR QSL AT 0555Z RNI QSL AT 0555Z KKSK

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

COMPLETED ON 12 APR 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDC NMCC

DEL 100% BY [REDACTED] Secret

REV ON 04DEC

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

CSN 11-2
EZY TTTTT

~~SECRET~~

(#4104)

O 241000Z APR 80
FM HELIO DET/NIMITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2
INFO [REDACTED]

JCC/RC-JC/LENINAH

ET

T & P ~~SECRET~~ //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUSUS INT REP 66

1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ [REDACTED] AGI 477 IS LOCATED [REDACTED] WESTERN OF AOR ALFA [REDACTED] CURRENTLY MAINTAINING SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240000Z 477 WAS 212NM FROM NIMITZ AT APPROX 22.6N 063.19E PROCEEDING CRSE 180° SPEED 18KTS.
2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA. LAST [REDACTED] POSITIVELY LOCATED [REDACTED]

HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSIAN GULF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT.

FLEET SCOUT A/C OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON.

3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.
4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERCHANTS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

5. FURTHER INTRPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA AND AGI. YOUR MSG 882 OF 221530Z REQUESTED LOCATION AND DTG OF INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERCHANTS IN THE AREA WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.

BEYM: 26APR80

BT

NNNN//A

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 1235Z

CONDUCTED ON 12 APR 92

DERIVATIVE CC BY DDC NMCC

DERIVED FROM ID ~~SECRET~~

REV ON OADR

BOMBED REV

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TDT 1117
KCL

E,G

- G
1. UPON ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] YOUR
LOCATION, IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN KEYLIST
SERIAL 143141, DAY 24 AND KEY GUN.
PROGRAM AND COORDINATE WITH
[REDACTED] TO KEY IF ALL AC-130
MATERIAL IN TANKER TASK FORCE.
2. INSURE THAT KEYING IS DONE AFTER
AIRCRAFT IS ON OWN INTERNAL POWER
AS KY-26 WILL UNKEY WHEN POWER IS
CHANGED FROM POWER CART TO APU.
3. LISTED BELOW IS KEY SETTING FOR DAY 24
TO BE USED SHOULD SALVAN NOT
ARRIVE IN TIME. PROSECURE KEY GUN
FROM LOCAL RESOURCES [REDACTED]

1.	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
MP	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN	HP	LP	MN	G	U	F	K	E	6
15	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26				
H	J	A	J	A	B	C	E	G	H	E				
27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37				
K	MN	MN	LP	MP	LN	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN				
38	39	40	41											
LN	MP	MP	MP											

4. INSURE ALL AIRCRAFT ARE KEYED WITH SAME
KEY GUN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BT

78132

NNNN

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: [REDACTED]

DDO 92

12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

7-7-13
7-7-13AAT

FM 01-9

TO [REDACTED]

EEZ 2410Z APR 93

FM COMJTF (VAUGHT)

TO DEP COMJTF [REDACTED] (CAST)

DEPCOM JTF/FIXED WING AIR OPS/ [REDACTED] (KYLE)

E TO [REDACTED] (BECKWITH)

DEPCOM HELO OPS NIMITZ (PITTMAN)

INFO JTF/RC

BT

[REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

EXECUTE MISSION AS BRIEFED

WE ARE READY AND ABLE. GOD SPEED

BT

#401

Classified by: DD 8/10/92
Declassified by: JES

Declassified ON 04 APR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOT 1300~~
~~FCL~~
~~Ec~~

SSN 203

ZNY TTTTT

ZZ 24 125 1Z APR 83

FM JTF/

TO:

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

THIS IS EXECUTE ORDER FOR

MISSION. LAUNCH KC-135 AIRCRAFT

FOR PREPLANNED SUPPORT OF CTF 70 AND

MC/EC-130 MISSIONS.

BT

NNNN

400

DDON NMC
12 APR 83
Classified By: 500
Declassified On: 0ADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFO DATE 1 JUL AT 1230Z 1972 NMCC

399

2/0SC 12423/R

SSN 8153

17 041240Z APR 72
FM SITE ALPHA
TO JTF/J-3
JTF/RG
INFO JTF
ET

E
~~INFO REQUEST~~
SUE IN SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT
1. ~~U~~ REQUEST YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING
CHANGES TO NIGHT TWO FLIGHT PLAN:
A. ADJUST AC-130 DEPARTURE TIME
FROM [REDACTED] TO 1420Z (VICE 1503Z).
B. ADJUST AC-130 PRE-ARCT TIME
TO 1730Z (VICE 1753-1818Z).
C. ADJUST DC-130 POST-DRCT TIME
TO 0120Z (VICE 0134Z).
D. ADJUST AC-130 RECOVERY TIME
TO 0450Z (VICE 0459Z).

CHANGES ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMMODATE
15 MINUTE SENSOR ALIGNMENT (OVERHEAD
AND FINAL FLIGHT PLANNING
BASED ON UPDATED ENROUTE WIND PREDICTION.
2. ~~U~~ REVISED TIMES DO NOT AFFECT
TIMES AT THE ORBIT POINT OR
AVAILABLE TIME ON TARGET.

ET

JTF/J3

Classified By: ~~DDO/NMCC~~
Declassified On: 0 APR

Downgraded by:
DDO/NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F file

~~SECRET~~

7011-202

CON 1 2000
ZNY TTTTT
0 241312Z APR 90
FM ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J-2
BT

- P-2
1. REQUEST ASSESSMENT OF FIGHTER THREAT TO AC-130 GUNSHIPS OPERATING OVER [REDACTED] SPECIFICALLY, INCLUDE ESTIMATES OF TIME REQUIRED FROM [REDACTED] UNTIL FIGHTERS ARRIVE OVER [REDACTED] AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FIGHTERS AGAINST [REDACTED]
 2. TO REDUCE/ELIMINATE CHANCES OF [REDACTED] FIGHTERS FINDING FRIENDLY A/C AT [REDACTED] WHICH [REDACTED]
 3. SAME QUESTION AS PARA 2 ABOVE FOR [REDACTED]

#398

0201

NANNDO

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

CONTINUATION

7-107 725.44-20
- - 1331 A
P - 1333 A

11111111
111 246-123 803 3
F. ALPHABETIC
111 385/31-31

EG - [REDACTED] - 11
MURKELD - 11

2. ONCE HELOS/100'S LAUNCH,
..... TO UP LOC'S
..... WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW.

IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS
JTF WILL EXIT

IFC TUTOR LOC'S DURING
INITIAL PHASE OF OWN ON MSG-

EXECUTION PHASE OF OPN. ON WSC-3 UPLINK FREQ 288.675 TFC
WILL INCLUDE COMPLETELY [REDACTED].

CF TFC
TFC TFC

TRANSMITTED TO YOU. QSL
OF HIS TRAFFIC BY YOUR STA IS NOT DESIRED.

THIS TRAFFIC AT YOUR SITE
TFC WILL BEGIN AND
CONTINUE AS YOU SEE FIT.

END THE CODENAME QUOTE
NO MEAT END QUOTE.

RECEIVED ENCL 60012.

Page

100

NINJA

RRRRRRRRR QSL AT 0320Z JMI QSL 5 0520Z KKKKKKK

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

WIKEDEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#392

TOT / 1501Z
KC

2201 REG4
2NY TTTTT
170 0 241447Z APR 89
FM JTF
TO JTF/RC
BT

SUJU: C-141 INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES TO MANZAR [REDACTED]
1. C-141 INGRESS ROUTE FROM [REDACTED] BASED ON A PLANNED
TAKEOFF OF 1811Z. NUMBER TWO AIRCRAFT WILL FOLLOW
AT 15 MINUTE INTERVAL.

ETE	ETA
12	1823
3	1826
35	1901
19	1920
6.6	1926.6
4.7	1931.3
6.1	1937.4
9.5	1946.9
3.7	1950.6
15.2	2005.6
5.5	2011.1
5.2	2017.3
4.6	2021.9
7.0	2028.9
12.0	2040.9
3.9	2044.8
7.2	2052.8

2. C-141 EGRESS ROUTE COORDINATES FOLLOW WITH ETE.

2.0
8.2
5.4
6.8
7.3
5.8
13.8
3.5
5.5
5.7
4.3
6.1

3. LAST COORDINATE IS COAST OUT POINT. ROUTE
FROM THIS POINT WILL BE A VFR CLIMB TO
INTERCEPT NORMAL IFR ROUTES TO CROSS

E
62204

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

CSN 0206
ZNY TTTT
ZB 241510Z APR 89
FM JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC

BT

SUJ: ALERT ORDER
REF: A. JCS/RC 241227Z APR 89
1. CINCPAC INST 93710.1C AND
MODIFYING MESSAGES LISTED IN
REF A ARE NOT HELD AT THIS SITE.
2. REQUEST SPELL OUT APPLICABLE IODE
IN EFFECT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT

ST

#7225

NNNN

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

JCS
Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *DADR*

1390

1971 DEC 07 1941-1952 PMS-V

1011115272

1

~~(L-#389)~~

ESM 7287
ENRY ~~7777~~
177 24162-2 WPS 00
P ALPHABET
TE 100000-02

LOCATION REQUEST
PROVIDE LOC OF IRANI
ACCEY IN TEHRAN. CURRENT
CITY MAPS AT THIS LOC SHOW
IT AT 2 DIFFERENT PLACES.

227

~~Classified By JES
Declassified ON 07/07/XX~~

Declassified by:

DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#388

SDV 12-1
2ND [REDACTED]
ZEE 241645L APP 1
FM JTF
TO JOE/RC

(f) SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT LAUNCH
1. EIGHT HELOS AIRBORNE 1527Z.
2. THREE MC130S AND THREE EC-130S
ABORNE ON TIME FROM [REDACTED] LAST
EIGHT AIRBORNE 1527Z

#2208

VIA W

Classified by: DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92 Declassify m:
0 ADD

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: [REDACTED]

Downgraded by:
NMCC DDO
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

{ ~~#384~~

~~SECRET~~

PSN 1010
PNL TTTT
DTG 242005Z APR 91
FM JTF
TO JOG/RC
BT

- ~~EKT~~
- 1. SUBJECT: C-141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT STATUS
 - 2. TWO C-141 FMC [REDACTED] ONE C-141 35- 3#-#4-, 242110Z APR.
 - 3. EIGHT NON-PASS CPT MAX SPENDING NIGHT ON A/C EQUIPPED WITH
AUX POWER.
 - 4. JOSE RIGGING A/C FOR WHICKEY 3 ANTENNA. WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT
WHEN INSTALLED.
 - 5. CLEARANCE RECEIVED FOR [REDACTED] OVERWATER [REDACTED] EXERCISE.
[REDACTED] ENROUTE [REDACTED] TO HANDLE ANY [REDACTED] PROBLEMS.
- ~~JEG~~
- BT
0017

EMRNOV

OPRR3E3TOPMS
DTG 242005Z
PARA 1 ETA EXX DHARAN

PSN 1010 DTG 242005Z APR 91

Classified By: ~~DDO NMCC~~
Declassified On: ~~01 OADR~~
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

SSN 0010
ZNY TTTTT
Z 24100Z APR 89
FM JTF-GEN VAUGHT
TO NMVITZ [REDACTED]
ET
[REDACTED]

(
#383
)

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORTS

1. ADVISE [REDACTED] ELEMENT AT YOUR LOCATION
THAT ALL REPEAT ALL SITUATION REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED
FROM JTF HQ ONLY. REQUEST [REDACTED] TO PDS DESIST IN
REPORTING TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

ET
#3217

NNNN

12 Aug 92
~~Classified by [REDACTED] DDCI/NSC~~
~~Declassified 0700 07 Dec 1992~~
~~Downgraded by [REDACTED]~~
~~DDO NSC~~
~~12 Aug 92~~

CLASSIFICATION NUMBER IS 12265
COMPLETED BY [REDACTED] 12 Aug 92
DRAFTED BY [REDACTED] DDCI/NSC
 THIS DOCUMENT IS SECRET
REVISED ON [REDACTED]
EFFECTIVE DATE [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

0
MSC187
DTG 271330Z APR 82

FH: JCS/RC
TO: ALPHA
SUBJ: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
GENERATED ON 12 Apr 92
DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCC
 REC'D BY SOURCE IS Secret
REV'D ON DADR
SOURCE REF Multiple Sources

TOP
0212
[REDACTED]

i-467

SUBJ: IRAN SITREP AS OF 0520 27 APRIL 1982

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE REPORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT ON 24-25 APRIL.

[REDACTED] THE AREA WAS VISITED BY MEMBERS OF IRAN'S HIGH AVIATION. GEN GHOBADI, IN CHARGE OF THE SEARCH OPERATION, REPORTED THAT 2 HELICOPTERS REMAINED INTACT AND THAT MAPS, WEAPONS, MONEY (1 MILLION RIALS AND \$1,000) HAD BEEN FOUND AT THE SITE ALONG WITH 3 DAMAGED HELICOPTERS AND 1 DAMAGED C-130. THE FUDIES OF 5 US SERVICEMEN WERE RECOVERED AND FORWARDED TO TEHRAN.

2. IRANIAN PRESIDENT BANI-SADR STATED ON THE 26TH THAT THE FORTIES OF US SERVICEMEN KILLED IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER RESCUE ATTEMPTS, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE EMBASSY AND BE DISPERSED AROUND TEHRAN. THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD LATER BE DISPERSED AROUND THE COUNTRY, WITH THE FIRST GROUP FLYING DISPATCHED TO THE CITY OF QOM.

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE ADVISED THE PRESS ON 26 APRIL THAT THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD DOWNED AND DESTROYED 2 OF THE 10 HELICOPTERS TO PREVENT THEIR FUTURE USE BY US FORCES. IN THIS OPERATION, THEY HAD UNINTENTIONALLY KILLED 4 IRANIAN GUARDIANS WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA. FURTHER MILITARY RESPONSES TO THE US OPERATION MAY FORTHCOMING AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED AT THE TABAS SITE.

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT BANI-SADR CALLED FOR A UNILATERAL GOVERNMENT CEASEFIRE IN KURDISTAN ON 26 APRIL, KURDISH SPOKESMEN EXPRESSED THEIR CONTINUED DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR SOME FORM OF AUTONOMY.

[REDACTED] 14 CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ARE UNLIKELY ALTHOUGH BORDER INCIDENTS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

60. IN BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAD TO USE TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE ALLEGED USE OF BAHRAINI FACILITIES FOR REFUELING US AIRCRAFT IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT. INTERNATIONALLY, DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS WERE MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EXPRESSING SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING WHILST THE SOVIET UNION, PLO, AND OTHER COUNTRIES CLOSE TO IRAN CONDEMNED THE LATEST US MOVE.

7. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. AREA OF U.S. FATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR, IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS FIELD FORCE GROUP ALPHA WAS SIGHTED REPLENISHING FROM AN OILER YESTERDAY.

9. SOVIET PRESS: THE SOVIETS ARE STANDING BY THEIR DENOUNCEMENT OF THE ABOATIVE U.S. RESCUE ATTEMPT. NO NEW COMMENTARY HAS APPEARED.

~~CLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12256~~

~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 04/04~~

89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-# 505

Addressed to
JCS AC

FM: JTF/J3
TO: JCS AC

~~TOR 160°
KCL 625~~

MESSENGER OF RECEIVED.

231500Z APR 70

E T 0017/J3

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT REDEPLOYMENT

J-40-130 64-0311 is to be returned to LAF ONTARIO. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS KEPT OUT OF MAJOR REPAIR TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION SINCE IT WAS SUBJECT TO NIGHT TIME LANDINGS ON NIGHT ONE OPERATION. IT IS UNABLE TO GET INSPECTION AT THIS TIME. PENDING OUTCOMES OF THAT INSPECTION ALLOWMENT ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO CONUS BE KEPT IN LATITUDE FULL WEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 40,000. ROUTE OF FLIGHT:

AND THE CONUS FOLLOWS: MONTREAL, QUEBEC, TORONTO, ONTARIO, WINDSOR, ONTARIO, AND THE CONUS. THIS ROUTE WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY 57 HRS FOR RETURNING LAF.

REASON: J-40-130 64-0311 has ANRP THAT WILL NOT HOLD IN LEVEL POSITION UNLESS UNDER HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OR WHEN AIRCRAFT IS PRE-SOURED. REPAIR CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST HERE OR IN CANADA. THIS AIRCRAFT REDEPLOY THROUGH ROMEIN-MAIN OR OTHER J-100 MAINT FACILITY FOR REPAIR BEFORE RETURNING CONUS.

GT

Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG 99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 2604
JUN 21

E,G

- REF ID: A651147
- SUB: REQUEST FOR INTELL SPOT
1. REQUEST THE FULL THIS INFORMATION : OR POSITION OF MC-137E SOVIET CONVENTIONAL MISSION.
 2. LOCATION AND DURATION OF TRAVEL OF CURRENT SOVIET MARSHAL FEDOROV IN KAZAKH SSR.
 3. SECOND/MONITORING PRESENCE WITH CALL SIGN OF THE 2D US ARMY FORCES IN KAZAKH.
 4. P-137E AND SEPT TIME SCHEDULE AND TO

500

INSTRUCTED VIA WSC-3
TO RECORDS QMNSO
TO JTF/EC (J-2)

Classified By: JES DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00 250532Z APR 92

E,G

REQUEST [REDACTED] LANDING APPROVAL FOR JTF 72.

AIRCRAFT FLYING IN SUPPORT OF JTF 72.

PERTINENT INFORMATION FOLLOWS:

1. AIRCRAFT DATA

SN	CALL SIGN	ETA	LTC
042564	FLOUD 42	270300Z	280700Z
037755	QUEST 14	270730Z	280730Z
021843	NUDE 73	271200Z	280800Z

2. PERSONNEL DATA

SN	AIRCRAFT COMOR	TOTAL CREW/PAX
042564	CAPT [REDACTED]	24
037755	CAPT [REDACTED]	21
021843	CAPT [REDACTED]	21

3. REQUEST ARRIVAL DATA BE PASSED TO LTC [REDACTED]

ET
2235

TOP | 064
CL | #00

496

NNNN

Classified BY: *JCS* DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: *OADR*
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

GENERATED ON 12 AUG 92
INITIATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DCL IS REVISED TO CONFID
REV IN OADR
REVISED FROM JS

HU HOW ON THAT ONE KK

DSU 6602

MSG 167
260525Z APR 88
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF ALPHA
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: ED

REF ID: A288635Z APR 88

1. EOD TACKLING PROVIDED ERICOM 260550Z APR 88.
2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFO AS FOLLOWS:
A. APPROX QTY AND GENERAL TYPE OF CHARGE.
B. DISARM AND MOVE, OR DETONATE AT
C. ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED?

~~SECRET~~
-489

TOR 1269/3
JC 1822M

acknowledged

AND HATE THAT WAS THE LAST I HAVE ATT INT DSU KKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G 142
GCT 260800Z AFR
FM COR [REDACTED] FRAN RSC
TO COM JTF// ATTNS

A

SUBJ: RANGER RETURN

TOR 10
JC

1. FIRST C-141 RETURNED [REDACTED] ARRIVED
262630Z. AIRCRAFT # WITH REMAINING PAY AND ALL PALLETS
EQUIPMENT IS NOT AROUND 2200Z.

b) 2. THE FOLLOWING STEPS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON
RETURN:

a. ALL [REDACTED] ON THE MISSION ARE ISOLATED AND BRIEFED ON THE
COMJTF GUIDANCE THAT ALL INQUIRIES ARE LEFT WITH THE RESPONSE OF
"NO COMMENT".

b. NO PHONE CALL HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.

c. THE [REDACTED] IS CONDUCTING A DEBRIEFING OF ALL PERSONNEL
INDIVIDUALLY FOR THOSE ON NIGHT #1, BY TEAM OF THOSE
INVOLVED IN NIGHT #2.

d. ONLY THE [REDACTED] EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THOSE DUTY
PERSONNEL AT THE AIRFIELD KNOW OF THE [REDACTED] RANGER RETURN.

e. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE PLANNED:

a. COMPLETE EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY

b. CONDUCT A COMPLETE SHAREDOWN INSPECTION OF ALL PERSONNEL

c. BEGIN RETASKING [REDACTED] 261730Z UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

f. NATURALLY, QUESTIONS EXIST OVER FUTURE PLANS.

AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE
IS NECESSARY IF CHANGES IN MISSION REQUIRE TO BE MADE.

g. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

LT

Classified

Classified By: *JCS DDO NMCC*

Declassified On: *OADR*

Downgraded by: *DDO NMCC*

12 AUG 92

MESSAGE TO RECIPIENT

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOR 1321

MSG171
201310Z APR 92

E FM JTF/HQ

TO [REDACTED] NMHITZ

E SEC [REDACTED]

SUBJECT & REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL AEGARD NMHITZ

E 1. REQUEST YOU COORDINATE PERSONNEL FROM NMHITZ
TO [REDACTED] IN TIME TO REDEPLOY WITH MC OR SEC-132
ACFT [REDACTED] ACFT CURRENTLY SUE TO DEPART
[REDACTED] ON 27 APR 92.

E 2. FOR [REDACTED] PLS ADVISE TO ALL ADDRESSES SCHEDULED
DEPARTING TIME OF MC & SEC 132'S FOR [REDACTED]

REF ID: A6142610210

NMHITZ

CLASSIFICATION DODIN 61123B

CREATED BY [REDACTED] 12 AUG 92

INITIATIVE CL BY DDO: NMCC

DOD DODCONFID

INFO BY [REDACTED]

DATA BY [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 12542 - JT
RC / 12552 - NM

- (u) (1) REQUEST FOR REEMPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL - JTF AND NMIC.
(u) (2) REQUEST YOU COORDINATE REEMPLOYMENT OF
JTF PERSONNEL - NMIC NMIC.
E/S (u) (3) NMIC RELOCATED FROM [REDACTED] CHICAGO.
SUPPORT UNITS ARE REPORTABLY LOCATED.
PLEASE ADVISE.

4/23/97

#484

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

GENERATED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC

NMIC CONFID

NMIC OADR

REL FILE JS

Classified By JCS

Declassified On OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSC 178
261115Z APR 88
FM JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: [REDACTED]

BT

SUBJ: INTELL SUPPL SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EAST APR

TDR/13352

RC

MCN

#0231

#483

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE ABORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT, THE IRANIAN MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD KILL THE SUSPENDED DREN H 1255 HOSTAGES IF ANOTHER RESCUE IS MADE. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO DIRECT INDICATION YET THAT THE MILITANTS PLANS TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST THE HOSTAGES AT THIS TIME. ACCORDING TO THE IRANIAN REPORTS, THE MILITANTS HAVE CALLED FOR REORGANIZATION AND BUILD UP. THE 24-HOUR PATROLS AROUND THE EMBASSY ARE BEING REACTED BY THE MILITANTS' COMMAND TO INCREASE SECURITY. THE HOSTAGES TO ONE OR MORE INQUIRIES FROM THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THIS REACTION. HOWEVER, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT COMMENTED ON THIS. SUPPORT FROM SOME NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IS LIKELY TO INCREASE. THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES ARE MOSTLY NEAR TURKMEN AND THE SOVIET UNION.

3. AYATOLAH KHOMINI WILL MAKE USE OF THE RESCUE ATTEMPT TO ONCE MORE DIVERT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S ATTENTION FROM DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO REINFORCER THEM FOR THE REVOLUTION. HE WILL CITE THE ABORTED RESCUE AS EVIDENCE THAT THE US IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1261715Z
102 237

201107 APR 92
NIMITZ HELD SET
10 JTF MARIVOL

[REDACTED] ZONE RAME OR DIRE

TEG

... OF TRANSPORTATION PLANS FOR NIMITZ SET
(U) FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED TO CONFIRM INFO PASSED TO AGUEES
THROUGH BY VIEIL.

E [REDACTED] PRESENT PLAN IS TO MOVE SET FROM NIMITZ TO CORAL SEA
1 HELLO 270200Z FOR FURTHER TRANSPORT TO [REDACTED] BY C-2.
CORAL SEA REPORTS C-2 NOW IN DOWN STATUS. IF C-2 REMAINS DOWN,
SET WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ UNTIL 25 APRIL WHEN HE WILL MOVE TO
[REDACTED] OR MAC CHANNEL LIMA UP. C-2 WILL REQUIRE TWO SORTIES TO
MOVE SET FROM CORAL SEA TO [REDACTED] THREE HRS REQUIRED FOR SORTIE

(U) HELD SET CONTAINS 15 BAGS WITH PERSONAL BAGGAGE. CARGO
1. T-3 (2) 40 X 60 FT ECOS OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE REMAINING FROM
HELLO JAPAN. WT ESTIMATED AT 2200 LBS TOTAL.
ALSO MAJ [REDACTED] STEEL CLASSIFIED ROLL AWAY CONTAINER
WILL GO. THIS ESTIMATED AT 30, 60 FT AND 200 LBS. TOTAL CARGO IS
170 X 60 FT AND 2200 LBS.

(U) IF SET FALLS BACK TO MAC CHANNEL TRANSPORTATION, BOTH
CARGO BAGGAGE AND [REDACTED] CONTAINER WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ.

C-471

NOTE
E

DDO NMCC
Classified By: JES
Declassified On: 12 AUG 92
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
OADR

100-1000000000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMERICAN AIRLINES AIRPORT, DIAH, KAF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02610117 APR 92
FM HELICOPTER-4
TO KAF/RC
BT

TIR 125/11
TFC 11/4
17 AUG 92

SUBJ: SERIALIZED ITEMS ISSUED

A. JTF/RC 260822Z APR 92

1. RCF REQUESTS SERIALIZED ITEMS ALLOCATED AMONG JTF/RC AFTER
TERMINATION OF OPERATION.

2. ACCORDINGLY, FOLLOWING SERIALIZED ITEMS ARE CURRENTLY
IN CUSTODY HM16 ACCORD SHIP:

AUG RIFLE, M16A1

7

1482

746116

773236

578630

502444

1588229

B. CAL .38 PISTOL

4D 13740

4D 13743

4D 17300

4D 17431

C. PINS

826

883

D. ~~MARCE 92~~

1 18135 14679

14567 16348

15869 15521

EJK MOTOROLA MX350

NONE

F. CAL .50 MG

1159450 1146242K

1169711 11645102

3/31/92

2. NOT IN USE

G. ~~AMERICAN AIRLINES~~ (NVO)

1978C 3146C

1997C 3146C

1983C

1977C

BT

~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 04/04/93~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 270³¹
VC | 8243

C-# 472

E [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

G

REF ID: A65105
Sensitivity: E-112F
DRAFT 000/000 251000Z APR 92
1.0 LIA JOL [REDACTED] DELIVERED LETTER 26 2401Z APR 92
COMPLIES WITH INSTRUCTION IN REF. MSG.

Classified By: DDC NMCC - NO 260
Declassified On: 04/05
Downgraded by: DDC NMCC
12 AUG 92

Retirement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFO STOD

RANGERS

1-SOM

700
M1

TOP SECRET

IL. AT 0115 EST THE WHITE HOUSE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF AN OPERATION IN IRAN WHICH WAS UNDERTAKEN TO PREPARE FOR A RESCUE OF OUR HOSTAGES. THE MISSION WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL THERE WAS A COLLISION BETWEEN OUR AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT A REMOTE DESERT LOCATION IN IRAN.

B. THERE WERE NO MILITARY HOSTILITIES, BUT THE PRESIDENT DEEPLY REGRETS THAT EIGHT AMERICAN CREW MEMBERS OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED AND OTHERS WERE INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT. AMERICANS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION HAVE NOW BEEN AIRLIFTED FROM IRAN AND THOSE WHO WERE INJURED ARE BEING GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER.

C. THIS MISSION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAN OR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND THERE WERE NO IRANIAN CASUALTIES.

D. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS RESCUE MISSION WERE ORDERED FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AND TO ALLEVIATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO ATTEMPT THE RESCUE.

E. THE NATION IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE BRAVE MEN WHO WERE PREPARING TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES.

F. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

G. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THEIR SAFE RELEASE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

H. THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE NATION THIS MORNING AT 0700EST. FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS JUSTICE/SCIENCE ALSO BRIEFED. AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY REPRISALS AGAINST THE HOSTAGES.

I. THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR REACTION FROM TEHRAN TO THE NEWS OF THE RESCUE OPERATION. AS OF 0400 EST, TEHRAN RADIO HAD NOT YET CARRIED ANY REPORTS IN ITS LOCAL BROADCASTS. ACCORDING TO AFP, IRANIAN LEADERS HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT. ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHADEH SAID HE HAS NO INDICATION OF EXACTLY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED. SHADEH SAID A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED LATER IN THE DAY.

J. THE MILITANTS AT THE COMPOUND SAID THEY WOULD RELEASE A COMMUNIQUE IF THE NEWS WERE CONFIRMED. THIS COMMUNIQUE WOULD SPECIFY WHAT ACTION THE MILITANTS WOULD TAKE. A SPOKESMAN INDICATED AS OF 0430 EST, THE MILITANTS HAD NOT YET MADE ANY STATEMENT.

K. THE FIRST BULLETIN FROM TASS CARRIED THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A FACTUAL MANNER WITHOUT COMMENT. SYRIAN STATE RADIO HAS CALLED THE REPORTED ATTEMPT AN "OVERT ACT OF AGGRESSION." ISRAELI RADIO REPORTS THAT THE RESCUE MISSION WAS UNQUOTE STOPPED BY THE IRANIAN SOURCE REFERRED TO AS THE "IRANIAN GUARD."

L. TEHRAN RADIO AT 0430 EST REPORTS THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY WITHOUT COMMENT. PARS NEWS AGENCY IS CARRYING AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE WRECKAGE OF AN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SPOTTED NEAR TABAS IN EASTERN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

-506

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1236

COMPLETED ON 17 AUG 72

INITIALS CL BY DDO NMCC

DEL DOWNGR AD Secret

REF ID: AADR

MULTIPLE SOURCES

6. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ABORTIVE RESCUE ATTEMPT OTHER THAN TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE PROBE INTO THE INCIDENT. CIA EXPECTS A HARDENING OF THE MILITANTS' POSITION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

7. THE LATEST PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD TAKEN ON THE FORM OF A FULL-SCALE WAR. A GROUP IN TEHRAN KNOWN AS THE KURDISH SOCIETY FOR HUMANITY STATED YESTERDAY THAT 150 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 1200 INJURED ON THE 23RD WHEN THE ARMY PARADED IN THE KURDISH PROMINENT CAPITAL OF SAMANDAJ FROM HELICOPTERS. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY LAUNCHED A BOC-KEY ASSAULT FROM PHANTOM JETS. IN WHICH PART OF THE CITY'S ONLY HOSPITAL WAS DESTROYED. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY THE ARMY ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT IT WAS USING HELICOPTER GUNSHIP IN THE SAMANDAJ FIGHTING.

10. ON 21 APRIL THE PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTED THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT APPROVED AIRLINE CALLED "SHAMEEN AIRLINES." IT WILL RUN PASSENGER SERVICES ON DOMESTIC ROUTES AND CARGO FLIGHTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

THE COMPANY WOULD PURCHASE FIFTH BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT, WHICH INDICATES THE IRANIANS MAY USE THEIR AIR FORCE 747'S FOR THIS PURPOSE. PROPOSED AIRLINES HAS BEEN APPROVING THE AIRLINES TAX HEAVILY ON THE BASIS OF THE AIRLINES ORDER 3D MAIN-
TECHNOLOGY

FT
Classified By: *JES*

Declassified On: *07/07/98*

SECRET

1/15/87 MIA JAN DE TIGER, RADM... HERE WITH ME WITH ONE
OBJECTION.

TAUDEOGUN WILL SHIFT BACK TO DE BOX FOR FOR DSC

Addressed to
JCS/RC

MAIL ~~1630~~ 507

O 251430Z APR 80
FM NMHIT HELO DET
TO JTF MAIN
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: CASUALTY REPORTS

1. MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL REQUIRES A CASUALTY REPORT IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT WITHIN 48 HRS OF DEATH. THIS UNIT POSSES RECORDS OF EMERGENCY DATA ON ALL HELD VICTIMS. THEREFORE MUST INITIATE REPORT. THE FOLLOWING FOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR RETRANSMISSION TO REQUIRED ADDRESSEES INDICATED AT YOUR DISCRETION. MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET FOR EXERCISE PURPOSE ONLY. PUBLISHING RELEASES AS UNCLAS, SECURITY PERMITTING, TO FACILITATE CASUALTY PROCEDURES.

2. PROPOSED CASUALTY REPORTS AS FOLLOWS:

a. SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY USMC

FROM: JDS
TO: USMC WASHINGTON D.C.
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.
MOTC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
HAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CMC FOR MSPW

G. J. REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (1) HQO P304P-4A (MARINE CORPS CR CASUALTY PROCEDURE MANUAL)

1. INFO REF A FOI INFO RPT.

a. SERGEANT JOHN DAVID HARVEY [REDACTED]

b. HMH 461, HAG 26, 2DMAW 0012/0032 USMC

c. KIA

d. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN HIS RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MH-139 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

e. CRN

f. 840125

g. [REDACTED]

h. NO

i. PAY DATA 153

(1) 773307

(2) 4170-90

(3) 100KREW MEMBER

(4) NONL

(5) LAST LGS IN THE BUREAU MONTH OF MAY 78

j. SGLT DATA

(1) 420-000-000

(2) 7-032

l. CHPTST SOUTHERN NO ATTACHED

m. MAJOR LESLIE C. BAPTIST

n. MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAFER JR

o. STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON

p. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES

q. 732424

r. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

s. STAFF SERGEANT DEWY L. JOHNSON USMC

t. 100 KIA, WASHINTON D.C.

u. SECNAV CASUALTY RPT

Declassified by:

DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
HAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:
2. STAFF SERGEANT DENNY LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 6123 USMC
3. HMH 461 MAG 23 ZUMAH RUO: 01401

C. MIA

4. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXIING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MH-130 ACFT AND WAS ENSHRODED IN FLAMES.

D. CIRCUIT

E. 200112

F. [REDACTED]

G. [REDACTED]

H. NAME

- I. PAY DATA
(1) 668412
(2) 688300
(3) 25.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE

J. SOLT DATA

- K. LAST LEI IN SRL FOR PERIOD OF TIME
(1) 82070000.00
(2) 702503

L. MEDIC-N CO ATTENDING CHIEF-LT

- M. MAJOR LESLIE W. PLATTY [REDACTED]
LTCM CHARLES H. SCHAFER JR. [REDACTED]
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED]
CAPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED]
- N. 624424

O. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

- P. COLONEL GEORGE W. HOLMES JR. USMC

G. CIO: JAMES R. HARRIS

TO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
HAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:
2. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR. [REDACTED] 113 USMC
3. HMH 461 MAG 23 ZUMAH RUO: 01401
4. 211

5. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXIING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MH-130 ACFT AND WAS ENSHRODED IN FLAMES.

6. CIRCUIT

7. 200112

8. NAME

9. PAY DATA
(1) 721514
(2) 623.00
(3) 72.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE

10. LAST LEI IN SRL FOR PERIOD OF TIME 70

11. SOLT DATA

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO

CG SECOND MAH

HAG TWO SIX

HHH FOUR SIX ONE

CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

RULE: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES H-HULL)

1. IAW REF A FCL INFO RPT:

2. STAFF SERGEANT JEWELL LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 0123 DMRG

3. HMM 461 MAG 26 ZUMAW RUCF 01431

C. MIA

D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH
HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED
WITH A MH-53 ACFT AND WAS ENCLOSED IN FLAMES.

E. CRR A

F. 200112

G. [REDACTED]

H. 1. PAY DATA

- (1) 668412
- (2) 688.30
- (3) 75.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LAST LES IN SRL FOR PERIOD OF TIME

I. DDTL DATA

- (1) 120000Z0200
- (2) 762003

J. UNIT/CT-ID ATTENDING OFFICER

K. MAJOR LEONIE E. PLITTY

L. 1956 CHARLES H. SCHAFER JR. 0123 DMRG

M. SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] 01431

N. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED] 01431

O. 120424

P. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (17 HRS 30M)

Q. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. 01431

R. CHC FOR MSPA-1

S. MCFC WASHINGTON D.C.

T. SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO

CG SECOND MAH

HAG TWO SIX

HHH FOUR SIX ONE

CHC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE

RULE: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES H-HULL)

1. IAW REF A FCL INFO RPT:

2. CORPORAL GEORGE JEWELL LEE JOHNSON [REDACTED] 0123 DMRG

3. HMM 461 MAG 26 ZUMAW RUCF 01431

C. MIA

D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN, DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH
HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH
A MH-53 ACFT AND WAS ENCLOSED IN FLAMES.

E. CRR A

F. 200112

G. [REDACTED]

H. 1. PAY DATA

- (1) 781204
- (2) 323.00
- (3) 78.00 CREW MEMBER
- (4) NONE
- (5) LAST LES IN SRL FOR PERIOD OF TIME

I. DDTL DATA

J. 120000Z0200

(2) 770815
K. LUTHERAN-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN [REDACTED] USMC-KIA
MAJOR LESLIE G. PERRY [REDACTED] USMC-KIA
MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] USMC-KIA
STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON [REDACTED] USMC-KIA
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [REDACTED] USMC-KIA

H. 800424
J. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)
MAJORS LESLIE G. PERRY USMC AND JAMES H. SCHAFER USMC

FROM: JCS

TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.

FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: HOSTILE CASUALTY

REF: (1A) MCOP3049.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

(11) A. MAJOR LESLIE G. PERRY [REDACTED] 7564/3902 USMC

B. HMM 461 HAG (26) 2DMAW RUC 01243

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1988 AT 0208 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,

WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXIING AFTER REFUELING.

COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I.

(12) A. MAJOR JAMES HENRY SCHAEFER JR [REDACTED] 7564/7577/2335

USMC

B. HANTS-1, 3DMAW RUC: 01243

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1988 AT 0208 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53,

WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXIING AFTER REFUELING.

COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I.

REVN 25APR88

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MMH

KK

NO EOH.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PR 12311 412
BN MCN

MCN 02011

HSG 084
230900Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: SFOD

1ST SOW

RANGERS

A

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500Z 23 APR 80

1. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT CAMPUS UNREST AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD CALMED. AS VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS CLOSED THEIR OFFICES. IN TEHRAN, SUPPORTERS OF THE LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY EVACUATED TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AFTER A DAY OF FIERCE CLASHES WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WHICH LEFT THREE DEAD AND AT LEAST 350 WOUNDED.

#591

C

3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEADEH APPARENTLY STILL HAS PLANS TO VISIT VARIOUS ARAB STATES TO PLEAD HIS CASE FOR ISLAMIC UNITY AGAINST VARIOUS THREATS, INCLUDING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND IGNORANCE CONCERNING THE GOALS OF HIS COUNTRY'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION HE PLANS TO VISIT AT LEAST SYRIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND THE UAE, PROBABLY DEPARTING SOONISH THIS WEEK.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SANANDAJ YESTERDAY. KURDISH GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY BESIEGED THE IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER'S CLUB AND THE LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE ARMY SAID KURDISH REBELS SURROUNDED THE OFFICER'S CLUB AND HAD CUT OFF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINKS. NEITHER SIDE GAVE FIGURES FOR YESTERDAY'S CASUALTIES, BUT THE ARMY ADMITTED LOSING 20 DEAD AND 36 WOUNDED ON THE 21ST WHEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS ATTACKED AN ARMY COLUMN SKIRTING SANANDAJ ON ITS WAY NORTH TO RELIEVE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SAQQEZ. MEANWHILE, KURDISH SOURCES IN SAQQEZ REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT FIERCE FIGHTING WAS STILL RAGING THERE. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE ARMY WAS SHELLING HOUSES FROM A HILLTOP GARRISON AND HAD EMPLOYED PHANTOM FIGHTER PLANES SPORADICALLY TO FIRE ROCKETS AT GUERRILLA POSITIONS.

Classified By *[Signature]*
Declassified On *[Signature]*

REF ID: A611254

12 Aug 92

DDA 100 NM

DDA 100 NM

DDA 100 NM

DDA 100 NM

SECRET

G. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z TUESDAY (22 APR) THERE WERE ONE HIGH-RESOLUTION PHOTO SATELLITE, ONE MANNED SPACE STATION WITH A POSSIBLE VISUAL/PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY, ONE EORSAT, TWO SECOND-GENERATION ELINT AND SIX THIRD-GENERATION ELINT SATELLITES IN ORBIT.

H. SOVIET PRESS (U): NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

BT

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TNT

AC

509

1. COUJS OF DEPLOYMENT

1. 52 ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING UNITS HAVE BEEN INITIATED

UNIT

DELTA

(1) 211102Z
(2) 211102Z

A/C.

LANCLEY

TIME

200440Z

RANGERS

(1) 211102Z
(2) 211102Z

LANCLEY

201610Z

200510Z

201740Z

2. COMJTF REPORTED THIS LOCATION ON SECOND DELTA A/C.

3. PLEASE NOTIFY X0 [REDACTED] RANGER ARRIVAL TIME.

BT

47248

NNNN

CASSPERN

CONNECTED ON

INITIATE ON

REF ID:

RECORDED MATE AND HERE WITH MSG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOT 2445
TMI TTTTT
D 281400Z APR 92
FM JTF/J-3
TO JTF/RG
CT

TOT /14502

RC

c#
510

REF ID: A61425
SUBLI: MC/EC/AC-130 REDEPLOYMENT

1. LTST UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, PLAN TO REDEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:

A. AC-130 (4) RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] IN TWO CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH (24 HOUR SEPARATION BETWEEN CELLS). WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 26/0600Z AND CLOSE 26/2330Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT

E E. PACAF MC-130 (3). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] IN A SINGLE CELL. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 27/0200Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]. WILL REQUIRE THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. PLAN TO CONDUCT FINAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE DUTY FROM [REDACTED] 06 APR.

C. CONUS MC-130 (4) ABCCC (2). RETURN FROM [REDACTED] TO HURLBURT IN THREE CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 28/1040Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [REDACTED]. ONE MC-130 WILL PROCEED ON TO ONTARIO CA (DEPOT) AND THE OTHERS TO KEESSLER. DEPARTURES MAY HAVE TO SLIP PENDING REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT AT [REDACTED] AND RETURN TO

(C) 2. LTST REQUEST YOU ASSIST IN OBTAINING THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE.

DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED BY JTF [REDACTED]

3. (TS) FOR [REDACTED] REQUEST YOU COULD MAKE REQUIRED ENTRIES FOR THAT OVERFLIGHT TO JTF/RG. PLAN TO DEPART [REDACTED] 26 APR/1000Z ET

HUMA

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

131072

TDR
KCL McN
0209

040002Z
CG 201130Z APR 91
FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF/J-2
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RICKREP NUMBER 5

1. EC-130/U21411: REPUBLIC 5/241035Z/2002-02

2A. NTP

2C. GOOD-HAZE LAYER STARTED APPROX 20 DEGREES AND CONTINUED TO LS

3. LZ 330422N01502405

3A. SCHEDULED 1030

LANDED 1030

3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL A 30,000 LB. JP-1

3C. N/A

TE. LANDED LAST, TAXIES TO POSITION RECEIVES ONE HELO, REPUBLIC 4 HAS 2 HELOS,
MUCH CONCERN IF EXERCISE WAS GOING TO
CONTINUE.

HELO ROTOR BLADE WAS SPINNING

ON FRONT OF FUSELAGE. HELO PILOT JUMPED
OUT OF WINDOW AND WALKED OVER AND STOOD
IN FRONT OF NUMBER 1 PROF. CREW CHIEF FROM ONE
OF THE MARINE HELOS LED PILOT TO THIS ACFT.
SECURED THE AREA PICKS UP ALL POSSIBLE PERSONNEL
WITHIN THE AREA AND TAXIES.

DRAGON 3 TOOK OFF FOLLOWED
BY REPUBLIC 5. REPUBLIC 16 FOLLOWED
REPUBLIC 5 FOR

TAXI-OFFING

5F. WOOD/CLEAR BUT A LOT OF DUST
AND SMOKE. VCPY 4 MILES

A 5A. SOME [REDACTED] INTERFERENCE (1) POSSIBLY [REDACTED] FROM ANOTHER
ACFT AND (2) SINGLE STRINGS OF SLOTS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN
GROUND RAGGED.

5E. FLEW MODIFIED HSI IN AREA OF THREATS

5G. SAME AS INGRESS

5H. LZ CONDITION WAS NOT AS BRIEFED
POW PEOPLE COULD NOT SEE HELOS AND VICE VERSA.

ET

200

6.

XXXXXX

Classified By: *SES* DDO NMCC
Declassified On: *OMAD* 12 AUG 92

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TON 25/11/15
MCN 02/01~~

THE HABITS

A black and white photograph of a printed circuit board (PCB) component. The component is rectangular with a central black area and two metal pins extending from the bottom. Above the component, the text "APC 12" is printed in capital letters. To the left of the component, there is some handwritten text that appears to read "100% TESTED".

~~#~~ 517

ד^ב

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDO NM
Declassified ON: 0ADR
Downgraded by: DDO M
12 AUG '11

07 AUG 1992
1000Z 18 AUG 92
FM 001 JTF
TO CDR

10T / 10A 29E

KC

- (U) [REDACTED] FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CH-47 HELICOPTER COLLISION:
- A (A) LE TO, HAROLD L. JR. CAPT USAF 040346017
FM-101 CREW MEMBER
- R (B) MCINTOSH, LARRY. 1STLT USAF 215711701
FM-101 CREW MEMBER
- H (C) MAYO, JOEL C. T3C USAF 203141702
FM-101 CREW MEMBER
- G (D) HAMM, RICHARD L. SFC USAF 05077 718
FM-101 CREW MEMBER
- G (E) MACILLAN, CHARLES W. CAPT USAF 0403740
FM-101 CREW MEMBER
- G (F) JOHNSON, DENNY L. SGT USAF 04072-
FM-101 CREW MEMBER

④ - #520

074

RHS3 CREW MEMBER

(G) HARVEY, JOHN S. SGT USMC 22052 647

RHS3 CREW MEMBER

(H) HOLMES, GEORGE A. JR. CPL USMC

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER

- (U) [REDACTED] PERSONNEL INJURED AS A RESULT OF
REF COLLISION AND CURRENTLY BEING
PLACED ABOARD C-141 AIRLIFT AIR FORCE

(A) PRETTY-MCGEE, T. MAJ USMC

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER. STATUS -

20-30 PERCENT SEVERE AND THIRD DEGREE

BURNS OF EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND

IS CURRENTLY STABLE.

(E) SHAEFFER, JAMES H. MAJ USMC

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER.

STATUS - 30 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE

AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE.

(G) HARRISON, JEFFREY E. 1LT USAF

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER

STATUS - 30 PERCENT SEVERE AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS STABLE

(G) SEVERS, JOSEPH J. 1STLT USAF [REDACTED]

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER

STATUS - 30 PERCENT SEVERE AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE,

EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.

(G) TIGLER, WILLIAM V. 1STLT USAF [REDACTED]

401-01-134, AN 08 1001 MEMBER

STATUS - 30 PERCENT SEVERE AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE

EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.

(A) THREE OTHER PERSONNEL WERE

INJURED FOR MODERATE BURNS AND ONE

INJURED FOR SEVERE BURN. ALL WERE RELEASED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12056

REDUCED ON [REDACTED]

DERIVATIVE CL BY [REDACTED]

DECL DOWNNG TO [REDACTED]

REV ON [REDACTED]

DERIVED FROM [REDACTED]

Declassified by:

DDO DMCC

12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SC/09108
#098

USN 2222

25 2342Z APR 82

FY [REDACTED] NSES PRINT

TO CDR JTF [REDACTED]

E

[REDACTED] 16 2309Z

SUBJ: FORCE STATUS

1. GENERALIZE THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL GOVERN HOW LONG WE REMAIN AT [REDACTED]. OUT FORCE STATUS FOLLOWS FOR PLANNING.

2. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 166 PERSONNEL HERE.
3. AIRCRAFT STATUS FOR 6 C-130S:

A. THREE IN COMMISSION

B. THREE OUT OF COMMISSION

C. MC-565 HAD 4 AND ONE HALF GS LANDING AT REFUELING SITE WITH 150,000 POUNDS ABOARD. THIS IS AIRCRAFT OVERDUE PDV. WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE INSPECTION TEAM TO INSPECT WINGS AND NEW AND MATERIALS.

D. EC-130 AND 130-7 NEEDS SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR ACCESSORY HOUSING, WILL FORWARD PARTS LIST LATER.

E. EC-130 NO. 1313. ON TAKE OFF BECAUSE OF HEAVY LOAD AND RISING TERRAIN PILOT OVER TORUED ALL FOUR ENGINES FOR ONE AND ONE HALF MINUTES.

WE ARE INSPECTING ENGINES. MAY BE ABLE TO CLEAR FOR ONE TIME FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE.

F. PACAF MC-130S CAN TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT EASTWARD. G. CONUS BOUND C-130S REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT BECAUSE EC-130S HAVE FUEL BLADDERS INSIDE WHICH INCLUDES OTHER LOADS.

ALSO MC-565, WHICH WAS OVER GS SHOULD NOT CARRY LOAD EVEN IF INSPECTION PERMITS FLIGHT. WE ESTIMATE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT FOR PALLETS TO BE 17-19 POSITIONS (INCLUDE ROLLING STOCK).

ALSO HAVE REQUIREMENT TO MOVE APPROX 90 PEOPLE. ALL OF THIS PARA IS FOR CONUS.

E

1122

(#521)

14
MAC
DDO NMCC
Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified On: 0 APR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOR / 1110~~
~~KCL #0205~~

1125 1 AUG 92 NMCC

G
J 201007 AFM 10
FM NMCC [REDACTED]

TO JUR JTF 4000

BT

[REDACTED] 17/00 AND AUTOMATIC OVER CONTROL REQUEST

REF: JTF4 000352Z JUL 92

- (U) 1. REF REQUESTS TANDEM SUPPORT REQUEST APPROVAL.
2. REF REQUESTS AVAILABILITY OF F-16 AND A-100
AIRS AND REQUESTS APPROVAL AS NEEDED DUE TO NO MAJOR
REQUIREMENTS AT THIS TIME.
VERY RESPECTFULLY,
NMCC NMCC

JF

i - #522

NNNN

Declassified by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

ZYU.

FS 18/21713

NO. 2452 711. 121

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR

1035Z

KCL

0204

NO COM.

OPEN 3025
09 251000Z APR 60
FM [REDACTED]
DD 31/J-2
LT [REDACTED]

SUBJ: MISREP NUMBER 32

1. MC-137/505/DRAGON-1/241400Z/241400Z

2A. L40 NO INDICATIONS

2B.

2C. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3. LT 3304N 05504E

3A. 241400Z

3B. SUCCESSFUL TAKIL + TO PAX

3C. N/A

3D. ENO NONE

3E. TRUCK NOTED ON ROAD IN THE WEST

DURING FLIR PASS. TWO OTHER

VEHICLES NOTED ON ROAD. LARGEST ONE

FIREBALL NOTED AT 241400Z WEST OF LT 3304N 05504E

LANDED NEXT TO A CUL. ORIGINALLY
WERE GOING TO LAFIL 444 TRUCKERS. DID NOT USE
TO LOSE PAX REASON.

3F. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES

3G. N/A

3H. POS F-4 WHILE AT 241400Z

SITTING WAS REAR AT 3 CUL. IN THE WEST

UNKNOWN. ACFT NUMBER 177. LT 3304N 05504E

3I.

3J. HAZE VSBY: 3-4 MILES

3K. GENERAL REMARKS: OUT COMM IN THE WEST

HOURS OF BOTH 100-1200 WKS COMM IN THE WEST

UPON LANDINGS

LT

3225

NONE

Classified By: *JES* DDO NMCC
Declassified On: *OADR*
Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG 91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOR / 1035Z~~
~~RCC / # Q243~~

~~i-525~~

(b) 1000 0026
 00 201125Z APR 82
 E TO JTF/J-2
 ST

MESSAGE NUMBER 0026

- A (b) 1. 1000-1200Z 201125Z APR 82/ 03/1034Z/0200Z/
 2. [REDACTED] OF APPROX 11000 FT AND AT APPROX 10000 FT.
 3. APPROX. ACFT HEADING 030 AND 340 RESPECTIVELY.
 1032Z AND 1031Z. MULTIPLE [REDACTED] VFR AT DARDEN POINT TO AFLB AT 1000Z
 014700N 057400E.
 4. 000 FIRST MIL. TWO SECON MIL. OF APPROX RTE.
 5. L2 332420N 055024E
 6. 1042Z-3 MINS LATE.
 7. SUCCESSFUL IN 1032 AND 1031 ZONE FULL.
 8. N/A
 9. NONE
 10. SECONDARY EXPLOSION DUE TO LEFT UPON APPROACH
 EXPLOSION HERE APPROX 1-2 MILLS AWAY FM L2. APPEARED
 TO BE PGL TRAIL.
 11. 000033H BROKEN CLOUDS-3700 SCAT TO
 BROKEN-(NO FACTOR)
 12. N/A
 13. NONE
 14. PLANNED CLOUDS NOT FULL. DUE TO EXPECTED
 DEPT. EXPLOSION PGM DUE TO MITIGATING
 CIRCUMSTANCES. 000033H CLOUDS DUE TO
 INFORMATION SITUATED AT 1031Z.
 15. APPROX 1000Z 1031Z 000033H SCAT TO
 16. IF CLEARLY OVERCAST DUE TO CLOUDS.
 ST
 1720

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By ~~SFS~~ DDO NMCC
 Declassified ON ~~OADR~~ 12 AUG 92
 Downgraded by: DDO NM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RC~~ / ~~09102~~

OO
JSN 0230
BNY ~~11111~~
DTG 250300Z APR 86
FM JTF
TO JCC/ARC
BT

~~REF A~~
OOBJ: POST MISSION DEERICF/ISOLATION AREAS
REF: JTF/RC 250700Z APR 86
P: JTF/U3 250317Z APR 86
1. RANGERS SHOULD REDEPLOY TO ~~██████████~~ NO
ISOLATION REQUIRED. REFS A AND D REFER.
BT

#230

~~521~~

~~Classified By: YES~~
~~Declassified On: 01 MAR~~

C/S

~~CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE: 17 JUL 92~~
~~DISSEMINATION: DDCR NMCC~~
~~ROUTINE CODE: CONF~~
 ~~DDC: DDCR NMCC~~
~~DDW: NMCC~~
~~DDA: NMCC~~
~~DDP: NMCC~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO 7
KCC

0932Z

SGNC327
0 230636Z
FM JTF
TO JTF/R
USS NIMITZ
BT

SUBJ: RETURN OF HELO MISSION MEMBERS
TO CONUS.

1. REQUEST THAT ALL HELO MISSION
MEMBERS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERS
BE RETURNED TO CONUS FOR

TRANSFER [REDACTED] OR DEBRIEF. FOR JTF/R
REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE CIRUPAC FOR PRIORITY AIRLIF.
REGULST USS NIMITZ ASSIST TO PICKUP POINT.

BT

NNNN

i-529

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1256

COMPILED ON 12 AUG 92

DETERMINED BY DDO NMCC

DATE 08 SEPTEMBER 92 Secret

DD FORM 13 SEPTEMBER 92 OADR

Classified by JCS
Declassified ON 08 SEP 92

File #

~~SECRET~~

GEN. MSG
DTG: 0231020Z
FM: JTF
TO: NMCC

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION
FROM COMMANDING OFFICER JTF HELD SET

1. STATEMENT OF DEATH FOR [REDACTED]

STAFF SERGEANT DENNY L. JOHNSON [REDACTED] USMC
SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY [REDACTED] USMC
CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [REDACTED] USMC

1. SUBJECT INDIVIDUALS WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD
AN H-53 HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED EARLY AM
25 APRIL 89 INTO A C-130.
2. I WAS ANY EYE WITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT FROM
A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS. THE
H-53 WAS SITTING ADJACENT TO THE C-130.
THE CABIN AREA OF THE H-53 BURST INTO FLAMES
ON IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLODED.
3. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE H-53 CABIN,
WITH TWO FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS (APPBOX 850-600
CAL/SOF JP-4) AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR WOULD
HAVE BEEN TOTALLY PROHIBITIVE FOR REASONABLE
EVACUATION.
4. SUBJECT MARINES ARE DECLARED DEAD. SIGNED [REDACTED]

G STATEMENT OF DEATH CONCERNING [REDACTED] D. JOHNSON,
SGT. HARVEY, CPL HOLMES

I WAS SITTING IN MY RH53 ABOUT 100' FROM THE C-130 A/C
RH53 NUMBER 3 WAS THE SECOND PLANE TO MY LEFT. RH53 NUMBER 3
HAD (300 GAL) FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS, (250 CAL)
RAMP TANKS AND 2 FULL (320 GAL) SPONSON TANKS. ABOUT 1020Z RH53
(3) PICKED UP AND FLEW AT AN ESTIMATED ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 25'-50'
ASL TOWARD THE LEFT SIDE OF THE C-130 TO OUR FRONT. THE DUST BECAME
VERY BAD BUT I COULD STILL MAKE OUT THE C-130 AND RH53-(3) AS THE
RH53-(3) WAS OVER THE C-130 THERE WAS THE LOUDEST EXPLOSION I HAVE
EVER HEARD ABOUT 30 SEC LATER THE C-130 STARTED EXPLODING. IN MY
OPINION NOBODY IN THE BELLY OF THE RH53 COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE
BLAST. SIGNED [REDACTED]

USMC

G REPORTING STATEMENT OF DEATH
CASE OF: (1) SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY AND
CPL HOLMES.

I WAS THE CRASH OF THE H-53 HELO THAT HIT THE C-130 AIRCRAFT. I
AM ABOUT 75 FT. BEHIND THE C-130 WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED.
IMMEDIATELY UPON IMPACT BOTH AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES. THE H-53
IN THE AREA WAS ENSHRODED COMPLETELY. IN MY OPINION, IT WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO SURVIVE THAT CRASH IF THEY WERE IN THE
AREA. THERE WERE 2 INTERNAL FUEL CELLS [REDACTED], THE RAMP
TANKS AND THE PERSONNEL DOOR WAS ALSO CLOSED. MOBILITY
IN THE CABIN AREA WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANKS,
THE SEAT BELT STRAPS, AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR. I SAW NO ONE EXIT THE
CRASH. SIGNED [REDACTED]

Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *04 APR*

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

STATUS

MSG SEG ORIG

31 32 R
30 SEGMENTS AVAILABLE.

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

E~~0221~~
00 252407Z APR 83
TO JTF-2
CI

MISREP NUMEEG 01

1. A/C TYPE/TAIL NO./CALL SIGN/TAKE-OFF/LANDING
ML-130/564/DRAGON-2/15172/2335E
- 2A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 2B. NTR
- 2C. GOOD
3. LZ 33304N25557E
- 3A. 191 WITH ONE GO ARU
- 3E. SUCCESSFUL INFIL X51 PAX
- 3L. N/A
- 3D. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 3E.
- 3F. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM
ALL QUADRANTS
4. N/A
- 5A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
- 5B. CREW SAW KU-135 BEACON BUT COULD NOT
ESTABLISH EITHER COMM OR JOIN-UP
- 5C. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM ALL QUADRANTS
- 6A. EEI SIGHTED POSS. POL TRUCK ON FIRE ON HIGHWAY
338L25N0555128E. WITH SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

BT
0221:

NININ

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

Classified By ~~SJS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On 04DR

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

NO EOM.

~~TOP 0900Z~~
~~0197~~
~~XCL~~

(#530)

Wolfe

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP~~

0847

~~RCL~~

0196

ENR C BAWKONE MORE TO GO SO AND HERE IT IS

O 250540Z APR 92
FM DDCI OBLT /MINT/ 3-2 AND S-3
TO SITE ALFA J-2

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPTINTEL OR CIRCUIT.
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE.

REF: DDCI ON 250540Z APR 92 SAME SUBJ

(U) 1. (S) FOLLOWING IS HARO COPY JACK-UP REQUESTED DURING REF FONECON.

a. EACH A/C CDR WAS ISSUED BLUE CINDER CONTAINING EMERGENCY
LTS IN TURAN. THIS BOOK IS FAMILIAR TO MAJ. [REDACTED] BUT I WILL
RECAP CONTENTS --- EACH LT WITH PHOTO (CIVILATS/CODE WORDS REMOVED)
AND COORDINATES; CITY MAP WITH EACH LT MARKED; PHOTO STRIP MAPS
OF HELD HIDE, TEHRAN EAST APPROACH, TEHRAN-MANTARIYEH, TEHRAN-
KARAJ. ALL PHOTO STRIPS WERE MARKED QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE BUT MOST PILOTS
HAD SANITIZED BY CUTTING OFF CLASSIFICATION. BELIEVE SHOULD ASSUME
ALL OF THESE BLUE CINDERS ARE COMPROMISED UNTIL THEY ARE RETURNED
OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.

b. S-3 PREPARED KNEEBOARD CARDS FOR ALL PILOTS WHICH LISTED
EMERGENCY COMBAT AIR PATROL CHECKPOINTS. ONE OF THESE WAS QUOTE
UNQUOTE WITH GEO REF COORDINATES WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT [REDACTED] KNEEBOARD CARDS WERE LOST, PRUDENCE DICTATES CHECK AT
[REDACTED] THERE WERE NO REPLAT, NO PHOTOS OF [REDACTED] GIVEN TO
PILOTS.

c. ALL PILOTS WERE ISSUED PHOTO PRODUCTS QUOTE DESERT TRACK 1
AND DESERT TRACK 2 UNQUOTE. THESE ARE IN SAME CATEGORY AS SUEPARA
ALSO ABOVE.

d. ALL PILOTS REC'D CLOTH EXTRACT OF WARFARE DETAIL TAILORED
TO INDIVIDUAL PILOT NEED. THE CEDT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMPROMISED.

e. DELTA MATERIAL ISSUED AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME
INCLUDES ONE (1) COPY OF USAF G-312, ONE (1) COPY OF USAF 2070
EDITION ALFA REG NO 18 DAY 24 APRIL 92 ONLY, ONE (1) KT-65 (PARKHILL)
AND ONE (1) KT-11 NEVER.

REV: 25APR92
ST

NRN/1

MESSAGE DA RECEIVED.

AND SE TIGER RAD QSL FM FM N FNL
K K K K K

NO EOM.

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDO NMCC

Declassified On: ~~OADR~~

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP~~

250425Z
0187

NCC 143
250415Z APR 92

FM JCS/NM C
TO: JTF: [REDACTED]
BT

G

1. AIRCRAFT COVERED IN REFERENCE WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FORWARD TO
DOVER AFB IN ANTICIPATION OF FURTHER FORWARD DEPLOYMENT.

2. BASED ON INFORMATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR, ALL
PREPARATIONS FOR SAR PLANNING ARE CANCELLED.
LT

INFO

#532

~~Noted~~

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: OADA

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ C-539 112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SITUATION REPORT

E (u) THE C-141 LOAD OF C1500 LBS THAT CLOUDS HAD ARRIVED AT THIS LOCATION IS DUE TO APPROX.

(u) WITH EXCEPTION OF 7 SUPPLY AND 10 PERSONNEL ALL OF ~~THIS~~ SOON HAS

E (u) ONE ELEMENT AT ~~THIS~~ WILL DEPART FOR RAMSTEIN ON MAC CHANNEL 1100Z 18 SEPTEMBER. TWO OTHER ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO MAC

(u) ONE JTF ELEMENT, EQUIPPED WITH PERSONNEL AND NINE ~~THIS~~ ARE
ARRIVING THIS LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 091045Z FOR RAM-
STEIN. RON ANDREWS OR HIS TEAM WILL COORDINATE REQUEST TRANS-
PORTATION FOR JTF ELEMENT. JTF ELEMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED/PROVIDED.
JTF'S AWAITING TRANSPORTATION THIS LOCATION.

(u) MAINTENANCE PARTIES ARE PLANNED FOR 18 SEP.

(u) JRC (PARALLETS)

(u) KC135 MAINT EQUIP ARRIVED

(u) AC-130 AMMO

(u) MILITARY PERSONNEL NOT EQUIP.

(u) TOTAL KG-1300 REMAIN. KG-1 ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART TOMORROW AND
LEAVING THIS BY PERIODIC.

E (u) UNARMED ARMS, GS AND DIFFERENT CHARGES HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO
THE COMMANDER AND USAFE FOR TECH. CHARGES WILL BE DESTROYED AT THIS
LOCATION. COORDINATED ~~THIS~~.

(u) TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 1000 LBS OF GUN CHARGE ARRIVED THIS MORNING 26
SEPTEMBER. THIS LOAD IS SHIPPED OUT TOMORROW AFTER-
NOON. ALL REMAINING LOADS WILL BE MARSHALLED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

#539

Classified By: ~~DDO~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On: ~~CADR~~ NMCC
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 1996

100% NO. 100 ONE FOAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: 12806362
Rptd QSL 0637Z

R
MSG J2E7
0000-701 APR 90
FM SITE ALPHA/JTF
TO: JTF/RC
TT

SUBJ: STATUS OF INJECTED ASSETS
HAVE ASSETS BEEN ABLE TO EXFILTRATE?
ET

{ *542

Received
Initial response
J

AMNN

~~Classified BY JCS
Declassified ON QADR~~

Declassified by:
NMCC
AUG 92.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOT 87372~~
~~RC~~

SSN 8281
0 270725Z APR 87
FM JTF/J3
TO JTF/RC
BT

~~[REDACTED]~~ S-6

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT
(C) 1. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (562,567) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION

270602Z AND 270615Z. ET [REDACTED] (APPROX) 271115Z.

(C) 2. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (567,575) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION

270702Z AND 270705Z. ET [REDACTED] (APPROX) 272233Z.

3. REQUEST RELAY POC AT HQ TAC.

ET

#9281

i-*547

NNNN

DDO NMCC
SOS
Classified By:
Declassified ON 0ADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TOT

27 Dec 91

G Col [REDACTED] VC

MESSAGE IS ASIGNED.

SSSSSN 0276
0 270502Z APR 80
FM JTF NEAR SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC
SUBJECT: BRIEFING STATEMENT
REQUEST YOU SEND FORMATTED
JTF BRIEFING STATEMENT
VIA TTY
ET

LX#550

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: 07/07/94

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE #1 SELECTED.

TDT 0628Z
RC

SSN 9277
0 270015Z APR 60
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO JTF/RC
ET

SUJ: MSG. ~~DELTA~~ TO 291233Z AND SUJ: ~~DELTA~~ STATUS RPT AND MORE.

(U) 1. REF UR MSG NO. 176 DTG 201300Z APR 60 SUJ SAME AS ABOVE

(U) 2. LTC [REDACTED] SEP THIS LOCATION ON MAC SAAM NO. 1100/3 ENROUTE
TO POPE. ETA ANDREWS 271400Z LIA POPE UNKNOWN. SUGGEST
COORDINATE [REDACTED] MOVEMENT TO DTC FROM LOCATIO.

E
3. ONLY 5 ~~DELTA~~ SUPPORT PERSONNEL REMAIN AT THIS SITE. INTEND
TO REMAIN UNTIL ROLLUP IS COMPLETE. ONE ~~DELTA~~ OFFICER IS
ACROSS NIMITZ AND ONE AT [REDACTED] ATTEMPTING TO RECOVERY BOTH
TO ALPHA TO DAY. ETA CONUS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
ET

#2277

E #551

NNNN

DDO NMCC
Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified On 04DR

Approved by
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0006
P 267535Z APR 10
G FNU JTF [REDACTED]
TO: JTF/RC
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES
BT
~~SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES~~

TOT 0550
JC

1. HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION
THAT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE JTF
HAVE BEEN CHOPPED FOR REDEPLOYMENT
I.E. PCS AND AC TO EUCLON.
2. PLEASE ADVISE.

BT

MURKIN

#564

JIR

Classified By JRC

Declassified On 04/10/2010

Declassified
DDCIPR

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED

TO: [REDACTED]
C 000200Z
FM JTF ALPHA
TO NMCC/INT C 000200Z
JTF/ C

TO 11251921Z
CT

1. MSG: MISSION HELO PERIOD SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FROM USG NMCC
2. US NMCC HAS 21 MISSION HELOS
PERIOD AND 2000 LBS CARGO PLUS
PERIOD LUGGAGE TO RETURN TO CONUS.
3. NMCC WILL TAKE TWO USG FLIGHTS.
4. REQUEST JTF/RG EXPENDED RETURN
PERIOD PERS.

FOR INFO COMM JTF 300 PERSONNEL
WILL REMAIN IN [REDACTED] UNTIL
18 AUG 92.

A: G/
E 1. PILOT AND [REDACTED] ARE
COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC
TO WASHINGTON D.C. TO
PARTICIPATE IN HELICOPTER SHOWDOWN
2. FOR USG NMCC ALREADY STRAINED
OF HELOS FROM CREW SHOWDOWN
FOLLOWING

3. NMCC HELO NO PROBLEMS
4. NMCC 2 NO STALL PROBLEMS
5. NMCC AFTER T/D
6. NMCC 3 2 NO STALL PROBLEMS
PROBLEMS ENROUTE. UNABLE TO
LEAVE
7. NMCC 4 NO PROBLEMS
8. NMCC 5 NO PROBLEMS AND
ABANDONED LEAVE DEPARTURE
LAKE AFRON 1 NO PROBLEMS
PROBLEMS AFTER COMING HOME AND
STALL. NMCC 6 NO PROBLEMS FULL
TRANSITION PROBLEMS
PROBLEMS 7: MINOR PROBLEMS
EXECUTED. NMCC 8 NO PROBLEMS. INTERMEDIATE
LAKE AFRON CHIP LIGHT AT COAST IN
PROBLEMS. NMCC 9 NO PROBLEMS
10. NMCC HELO UNABLE TO DEPART JTF ALPHA
PER CONUS TOMORROW

CT

CATEGORIZATION REVIEW EO 12336
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
INITIATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DECLASSIFICATION TO CONFID
NEW ON DADR
DERIVED FROM JS

C-565

NAME

Classified By JCS

Declassified On DADR

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC161
251522Z APR 92

FM JTF-RC
TO JTF

~~TDR / 15282~~

~~RC~~

0214

1. DECISION MADE NOT TO SUPPORT
JCRX FLINTLOCK 26 WITH SECOND TAC
MC-130 FROM YOUR ASSETC. IAC.
AIR STAFF AND USEUCOM CONCURE.

REVM 25; 0E4 87

NNNN

C-# 567

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOT~~
~~KCL~~

1150Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
251124
AMERICAN
E 2 [REDACTED]
SUBJ: RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT

A

1. DURING EXTRACTION ON NIGHT OF 24 APRIL
DELTAP PERSONNEL LOADED EQUIPMENT
FOUND IN THE FIELD INTO VARIOUS DEPARTING AIRCRAFT.
IDENTITY OF A/C IS UNKNOWN. PERSONNEL DID
NOT DEPART ON THE SAME AIRCRAFT.

2. SM STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY LOADED
TWO RUCKSACKS, ONE PISTOL BELT W/HANDGUN,
AND OTHER ITEMS ON AN AIRCRAFT.

3. THIS EQUIPMENT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN
TRANSFERRED WITH THE PERSONNEL.

4. REQUEST A THOROUGH CHECK TO BE MADE FOR
ANY EXTRA EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE ON THE
AIRCRAFT. EXERCISE CARE WHEN HANDLING
RUCKSACKS OR

B/1. OTHER ITEMS. THEY MAY CONTAIN DEMOLITIONS,
B/2. AMMUNITION AND GRENADES, OR
B/3. FRAGILE COMM/NIT W/ VIOLENT ITEMS.

C. REPORT ANYTHING FOUND TO JTF. J-4 FOR
DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.

#573

Approved by [Signature] 305
Declassified on 01/01/2024

Classification Review FA 12268
Date MM DD YYYY
Category 1
Status APPROVED
By [Signature]

~~TOT / 1150Z~~
~~KCL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(c)
1227
1228
J-F/03

E

- SUBJ: C-130 SUPPORT
1. PART LISTED PARM 1 - YOUR MESSAGE DO NOT
ON HAND THIS STATION. AS AN ALTERNATIVE
TO POSSIBLE DELAY IN PART SHIPMENT
FROM USAFE, I SUGGEST IT PROPOSING ENGIN
CHANGE. ENGINE AVAILABLE. ONLY QUESTION
IS WHETHER CRANE OR SIMILAR
EQUIPMENT TO HOIST PROPS/ENGIN IS AVAILABLE
YOUR LOCATION. PLEASE ADVISE.
- (u) 2. TENTATIVELY PLANNING FOR C-130 AIRLIFT
SORTIE TONIGHT.

ST
#0237

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1228

CLASSIFIED ON 12 AUG 92

DERIVED FROM DDO NMCC

RELEASER TO CONFID

REF ID: OADR

EXPIRE: JS

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: 2000

~~#~~ 574

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT | 1045Z
KCL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
 DDLR & OWNER TO CONFID
NEW IN OADR
REMOVED FROM JIS

SEN 8235
ENY ██████████
JTG 251635Z APR 90
FM ALPHA/J2
E, X TO ██████████ KYLLE

- SUBJ: OPSEC VIOLATION
- E X 1. REPORTS THAT A USAF MAJOR HAS TAKING PHOTOS OF ACTIVITIES AT DESERT TRACK AND IN ██████████ WITH JOHN CARLSON. HE IS MEMBER OF ECU OR HU-130 FLIGHT CREW. ONLY IDENTIFICATION MAJOR, LIGHT BROWN HAIR.
- (U) 2. PLEASE OBTAIN FILM OF INDIVIDUAL AND FWD IT TO JTF-177
BPE
8235

~~Classified by ████████~~
~~Declassified on 04X~~

MARIN

14575

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TJT~~

~~JOC~~

125/250

1 - 578

SSN 8221
ZNY TTTT
0 250240Z
FM JTF/VAUCHT
TO JCS
BT

~~REF ID: A6512~~
SUBJ: CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE

1. INITIAL DEBRIEFINGS INDICATE THAT
SUBSEQUENT TO THE COLLISION AND EXPLOSION OF THE RH-53 AND EC-130
AT DESERT TRACK, HELICOPTER ROUTE MAPS, CECI'S, KEYLISTS AND
OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIAL WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT ABOARD THE
ABANDONED HELICOPTERS. CECI'S SINONICATE

E (U) 2. WHILE THIS IS A SERIOUS CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE, I RECOMMEND
AGAINST A DESTRUCTIVE STRIKE TO DESTROY THIS MATERIAL.

Classified By: ~~JES DDO NMCC~~
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

X 578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

101 | 0400Z
PM

i - 579

SSN 0222
0 DTG 250315Z APR 80
FM: JTF/MOORE
TO: JTF/RC

~~S C R E~~
SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF JTF KC-135(TS)
1. ~~JTS~~ RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR
REDUCING KC-135 ACTIVITY AT SITE ALPHA AND

E 27 APRIL: 3 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA
TO [REDACTED]

2 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY [REDACTED]
TO GUAM

E 28 APRIL: 1 KC-135 ART AND 2 KC-135A'S REDEPLOY
SITE ALPHA TO [REDACTED]

1 KC-135 ART AND 1 KC-135A REDEPLOY
TO GUAM.

ONCE REACHING [REDACTED] AND GUAM, AIRCRAFT
COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EUROPEAN/
PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

E 2. ~~JTS~~ FOUR AIRCRAFT WOULD REMAIN AT
SITE ALPHA AND [REDACTED] TO CONTINUE
KC-135 PRESENCE. IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO
RETAIN THESE LEVELS, AIRCRAFT COULD BE
REPLACED BY EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER
TASK FORCE ASSETS.

E 3. ~~JTS~~ [REDACTED] WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE COULD
BE ADJUSTED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OF
KC-135'S TO [REDACTED] IF DESIRED.
ET

NNNN

#579

File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: ~~JTS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL COACH

~~TO T 1000Z
FOR~~

(-581)

(C) SSN0276
NY TTTTT
G 252500Z
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO NIMITZ

G
INFO JCS/RC
ET

~~SECRET~~
SUEJ: JTF TO CEOI {18 APR 88} (U)

1. LTST SUEJ CEOI NO LONGER REQUIRED. REQ ALL ADDRESSES DEST
REF CEOI AND FWD CEST REPORT DIRECT MAIL TO JCS JS ATTN SCD.

E
[REDACTED] INSURE ALL CYS REC'D AND DIST ARE

ACCOUNTED FOR.

2. (U) REW ALL ADDRESSES ACK REC'T THIS MSG BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAIL
ET

NMCN

581

DDO NMCC
JES
Classified By: *order*
Declassified DOD
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC

12 AUG 92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

Classified
S Col [REDACTED]
Secti
24/11/02

G PREDEBARN DE MESSSEL
PASSTIC? FM [REDACTED]

STATES NO RPT NO QUESTION PERTAINING TO URSTA
FLASH MSG DTG 241251Z AND NO PROBLEMS ON THIS END
ATT. DO URSTA COPY TTY MSG
GGMB3RY1!?

E #585

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

50EKK

EG
REB GARN BE EUSEL AND MURR I WAS JUST ASKED BY LTC [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED] (NAVY) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE GENERATORS THAT THEY SEND YOU FROM ON THE J-130 S.....THEY (GENERATORS) WERE SENT OUT WITH [REDACTED] NEED TO KNOW IF THEY ARRIVED OK AND IF THEY ARE OPERATIONAL AND FIVERS.....KKK//KKN
NNNNJOTJDUKMD
P-8728881; -386NLXOVHRTDIMPYURVNMZ CMM10 LLTL.

22:

i-#587

Classified by
Declassify on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 13097

SC / MCN #U124

MSG 02
ITC 231307Z APR 68

TO: CJCS
TO: SITE ALPHA/CDR JTF

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: OPERATION RICE BOWL/EAGLE CLAW

REF YOUR 230518Z APR 68
CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

REMV 23 APR 18

NNNN

C-#588

*Decommissioned
200 Smcc
12 Aug 92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LEG TO RECIEVE.

(S) 03 3813 1
03 3813 0402 APP 50
03 3813 0402 IN
03 3813 0402 JTF/J
03 3813 0402 ST

OK

MCN 0118

E G

SUBJ: INTEL SUPPORT

1. INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION DIRECTION
SPEED OF CRP 323/STOROZHEVOJ, KRIVAK I

LAST NOTED [REDACTED] END ACT PELENG

LAST NOTED [REDACTED] REQUIRED AT THIS
UNIT.

2. ADDITIONALLY REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS UNIT WITH
ALL CURRENT NAVAL POSITIONS IN GULF OF OMAN
AND ARABIAN SEA. INFO REQUIRED NO LATER
THAN 241100Z.

REVIEW 23 APR 10

BT

0313

X594

NNNN

CASSIFICATION REVIEW BY 12356
COMPLETED ON 12 Aug 92

BY [REDACTED] NMC

REVIEW BY [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON 0212
0 238807 APR 83

EG [REDACTED] 1517
TO JTF/LG GASI

~~SECRET~~

E [REDACTED]

JDC: [REDACTED] SITREP NUMBER 6
1.) 30 MINUTE C-141 SEPARATION
SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM. WE WILL
PART AND OFF LOAD C-141'S ON LCOP
TAXIWAY AT NORTH END OF MAIN RUNWAY.
AFTER OFF-LOAD, THEY WILL TAXI TO NORTH
RAMP NEAR TOWER. C-141 REFUELING WILL
TAKE PLACE AFTER C-130 LAUNCH.

(U) 2.) INSURE THAT INBOUND C-130 ON
24 APR ARRIVES NLT 0800Z.
REFUELING CAPABILITY INADEQUATE TO
REFUEL C-130/C-141'S AND TOP OFF
MC/EC-130S AT SAME TIME.

3.) ATC PROBLEMS AT [REDACTED] HAVE
BEEN RESOLVED. SILENT ARRIVAL AND

PAGE 2 ~~SECRET~~
DEPARTURE ARE NO PROBLEM AS LONG
AS WE ARE ADVISED AHEAD OF
TIME AND GIVEN ACCURATE ETA'S FOR
COORDINATION PURPOSES.

4.) MET WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INFORMED US THAT HE WAS
INSTRUCTED [REDACTED] TO STAND
BACK AND OFFER SUPPORT ONLY
WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO. HE
DID NOT QUESTION THE SEA
SURVEILLANCE EXPLANATION. SPECIAL
AIRLIFT FOR [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] ON
25 APR WILL BE PROVIDED BY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WILL PLAN TO RETURN TO
[REDACTED] AT 0640Z 26 APR ON A
SCHEDULED [REDACTED] FLIGHT.

ET

0212

NNNN

Classified By
Declassified On:

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

S OADR

Declassified by

DDO NMCC

12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10-10-87
JRC C.R. 0116

MSC 706
230015Z APR 87
FM: CJCS
TO: CDR, JTF
BT

~~SECRET~~

E) ADMIRAL LONG AND I AGREED THAT PACOM MC-138'S AT [REDACTED] ARE
CHOPPED TO JTF EFFECTIVE 2100Z.
BT

(-596)

NNNN

Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *DADR*

OT

Classified by
DD NMC
12 Aug 87
Declassify on DAD
migrated to CIP
by DD NMC
12 Aug 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TAPE FURS.

ZNY TTTTT ZFD
023275Z APR 82
FM HELO DET/MINITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JCS/R C-J2
BT

G SC/TOT/13208

TOP SECRET //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
REF SITE ALFA MSG 082 DTG 221830Z

SUBJ: HELO DET INTREP 04

1. AS OF 0700Z 23 APR 82 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS ORIENTED
WELL TO SE OF NIMITZ TG.

VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SOVIET SURFACE COMBAT-
ANTS ARE WITHIN 200 NM OF THIS POINT

2. AG 1 477 IS STILL [REDACTED] CTF 70 IS IN
PROCESS OF MOVING ARG EASTWARD. THIS WILL UNCOVER AIRSPACE FOR
132 MISSIONS OUT OF [REDACTED] TAG 1 HAS [REDACTED]
OF TRACKING OUR BIRDS.

3. TWO ILGAEI'S FM [REDACTED] TO
SE OF SOCOTRA THIS MORNING.

ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN P-3 AND C-130 ARE ACTIVE IN VISUAL
RECON OF US NAVAL UNITS IN GULF AND JUST SOUTH OF STRAITS. MORE
INFO WILL FOL IN NEXT INTREP. NO AIR ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED
AT NIMITZ THUS FAR.

4. REF AREA OF INTEREST DESCRIBED IN YR MSG 082, AG 1 477 IS ONLY
PLATFORM IN OR NEAR BOX AT THIS TIME. ANTICIPATE INTREP 05 WILL
BE COMING YOUR WAY APPROX 231800Z. WE HAVE GOOD HANDLE ON SIT AT
THIS END AND ARE PROVIDING INTEL SUPPORT TO CAG-8 FOR FIGHTER
COVERAGE OF NIGHT NR. 2 EXFIL OPS.

REW 23 APR 00.

BT

NNNN

599

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW 09 1200
GENERATED ON 12 Aug 91

NEGATIVE CL BY DDON MCC
 FORM 120-200-10 SECRET

FORM 120-200-10 QDR
DIA

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

MCIV 112

MSO: 230145Z APR 80

FMO: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J2 MSO 221705Z APR 80

BASED ON RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOUR SITE, INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM OUNCS, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN US TO ASSESS THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARABIAN SEA AREA. WE STAND READY, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ANY BACKUP SUPPORT THAT YOU MAY REQUIRE, ALTHOUGH OUR INFORMATION MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE OR CURRENT AS YOURS.

BT

NNNN

601

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: 04/04/2024
Approved by DIA C
Date: 04/04/2024

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A DUPLICATE

TOR / 230541Z
RAN / MCN 109

MSG#701
DTG: 230035Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TP: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: KC-135 DETECTION

1. REF YOUR MSG 221710 APR 80, SA.

2. KC-135 ACFT COULD BE DETECTED AT 25,000 FT

3. IF DETECTED [REDACTED] WOULD PROBABLY QUERY FIRST VIA OPEN ATC
COMM AND [REDACTED] AND, IF THESE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INTERCEPT
WITH FIGHTERS FOR VISUAL IDENTIFICATION. THE IDENTITY OF THE ACFT
WOULD PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCED IN THE CLEAR TO GROUND CONTROLLERS.
BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ENGAGE. FOLLOWING A SIMILAR
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY ENGAGE IF THEY
PERCEIVED A THREAT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. IRAN WOULD ALSO PROBABLY
FOLLOW A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE. ALTHOUGH IRAN WOULD
PROBABLY NOT ENGAGE IF THE ACFT STAYED OUT OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE,
THEY WOULD ANNOUNCE THE AIRCRAFT PRESENCE THROUGH THE AIR DEFENSE
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM.

4. REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION IS NOT CONSIDERED
POSSIBLE
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON MCC
 OADR
 DIA
REV'D ON OADR
DERIVED FROM DIA

K604

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0 238745Z APR 80

FM [REDACTED] KYLE

TO JTF/VAUGHT

INFO JTF/BECKWITH

BT

(S) SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF DELTA FROM C-141

TO MC-130 AT [REDACTED]

1. LIST HAVE OBTAINED TWO TRUCKS
LOCALLY FROM [REDACTED] THAT ARE
DEDICATED ASSETS FOR OUR EXCLUSIVE
USE 24 APR 80. TWO (2) MAN DELTA
ADVANCED PARTY HAVE INSPECTED
VEHICLES AND HAVE PRACTICED
DRIVEN SAME. VEHICLES ARE

[REDACTED] ARMY STYLE AND IN
EXCELLENT CONDITION. ESTIMATE 20-30
PERSONNEL CAN BE MOVED ON EACH SHUTTLE
FROM OFFLOAD AREA TO MC-130 MARSHALLING
AREA. WE TIMES THE DRIVE.

AT THREE MINUTES (3) FROM OFF-LOAD
POINT TO MC-130 AREA FOR
ON LOAD. WILL CONSTRUCT COVER

FOR TRUCK BED (TENT) TO ENSURE
SECURITY OF CARGO/PAX MOVEMENT.
ESTIMATE 100 PERSONNEL CAN BE
TRANSLADED IN 40 MINUTES (4).

IF 2-C-141'S ARE LOADED TO SPRAU
DELTA EASILY, CAN PROCEC PAINLESS
AND SECURE OPERATION. IF NOT
OF [REDACTED] ARRIVE ON FIRST C-141, WL
WILL MOVE THEM IN SHORT ORDER.
PATIENCE REQUESTED.

2. LIST I HAVE CONDUCTED TO THE
RUNWAY WITH DELTA PARTD AND LTCOL
[REDACTED] TO PAVE OFF POSSIBLE
BACKING OF C-130 TO C-141
FOR TRANSLADE. THIS IS AN
EXTREMELY AWKWARD AND POTENTIALLY
ACCIDENT PRODUCING SITUATION SINCE
WE HAVE NOT PRACTISED SUCH
AN OPERATION.

3. LIST OF THE TWO(2) ALTERNATIVES,
I STRONGLY RECOMMEND
TRUCKING AS SUREST, SECUREST,
AND MOST EFFICIENT MEANS.

TO ACCOMPLISH THE JOB. THE
AREA SELECTED FOR C-141
PARKING IS DEPARTURE END OF
RUNWAY [REDACTED] (SMALL LOOP AROUND
TAXIWAYS). IT HAS BEEN TO

AREA AND PACED OFF WING
CLEARANCE. C-141'S WILL NEED TO
SHUT DOWN OUT BOARD ENGINES

PRIOR TO LEAVING ACTIVE RUNWAY.
C-141'S WILL REMAIN ON HARD SURFACE
TAXIWAYS AT ALL TIMES. FOLLOW ME

WILL LEAD C-141 TO OFF-LOAD POINT
[REDACTED] WILL PARK C-141'S MAY OR

MAY NOT SHUT DOWN YOUR CHOICE.
SUBSEQUENT TO OFF-LOAD WILL

REPART C-141'S AT BASE OPS
RAMP FOR REFUEL AND RELAUNCH.

ANTICIPATE FUEL DELAY DUE TO
LIMITED TRUCKS WITH LIMITED
CAPACITY. AFTER ALL MC/EC-130'S

HAVE BEEN TOPPED OFF, GAS
TRUCKS WILL PROCEED TO C-141,
SUPPORT FROM [REDACTED] TOWDATE

SUPER, WE ARE WORKING INTO
THEIR WEEKEND SCHEDULE NOW
TO ENSURE NECESSARY SUPPORT

IS AVAILABLE TO OUR OPERATION.

(U) 4. LIST AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.

BT

2811

Classified By [REDACTED]
Declassified On: 0 APR 2009

Downgrade to CONF
by 2009-04-01 1200Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1000
TUE 27 APR 82 APR 82

FAX JCS/RD-JE
TO: SITE ALPHA/JE

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: EMERGENCY LZ'S FOR KC-135's

RESPONDING TO YOUR REQUEST 222340Z APR 82 SAE, THE FOLLOWING
LZ'S MEET THE REQUIREMENT SPECIFIED:

- A. SAUDI ARABIA
(1) AL FAJIR (2754N 04531E)
(2) AL JORY (2947N 04006E)
(3) FISHA (1959N 04238E)
(4) DAHRAN INT'L (2616N 05309E)
(5) GASSIH (2618N 04346E)
(6) GIYAN (1654N 04235E)
(7) HAIL (2727N 04142E)
(8) JEDDAH INT'L (2130N 03912E)
(9) KHAMIS MUSHAIT (1619N 04229E)
(10) MEDINA (2433N 03942E)
(11) NEJRAN (1737N 04426E)
(12) RUJADH INT'L (2443N 04644E)
(13) SHARURAH HS (1725N 04706E)
(14) SULAYEL (2028N 04536E)
(15) TAEUK (2622N 03638E)
(16) TAIJ (2129N 04033E)
(17) WEJH (2612N 03629E)
(18) YENBO (2409N 03807E)
- B. KUWAIT
(1) KUWAIT INT'L (2914N 04759E)
(2) KUWAIT MAINBASE (2656N 04747E)
(3) KUWAIT WEST (2921N 04731E)
- C. OMAN
(1) MASIRAH (2041N 05653E)
(2) SALALAH (1702N 05406E)
(3) SEER INT'L (2336N 05817E)
(4) THUMRAIT (1740N 05401E)

BT

#607

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: 12 Aug 94
ADR

Declassified by
DDONMC
12 Aug 94

0 08100 Z APR 7
FM: HELICOPTER
TO: JTF/JI
INFO: JTF/RG

SIGNS AIRCRAFT & SIGNATURE

REF: (A) JTF/JI 080100Z APR 7

1. FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT LISTED IN THE ORDER AS FED BY REF (A). IS PROVIDED.
ACFT NUMBER USED INSTEAD OF TAIL NUMBER. NONE OF THE
ACFT WILL HAVE TAIL NUMBERED. DATA IN FIVE COLUMNS.

ACFT NO	PILOT/ENG NO	NAME	RANK	SER	SSAN
-1	150744	LVR. STIFFETT	LT COL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AD3	USN	
		[REDACTED]	USMC		
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USA	
-2	150753	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AT2	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USMC	
-3	150761	J.H. SCHAEFER	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USMC	
-4	150763	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
-5	150764	[REDACTED]	LCDR	USN	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	SGT	USA	
		[REDACTED]	COL	USMC	
-6	150750	[REDACTED]	MAJ	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	LT	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CPL	USMC	
-7	150646	[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USAF	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AT2	USN	
		[REDACTED]	GYSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	CAPT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	LCDR	USN	
		[REDACTED]	AMHI	USN	
		[REDACTED]	SSGT	USMC	
		[REDACTED]	AE2	USN	
-8	150758	[REDACTED]			

2. ABOVE INFO BASED ON LAUNCH OF 8 ACFT. IF NO. 8 IS NOT A
FLYER, CREW COMPOSITION WILL CHANGE. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

BT

Classified By JCS
Declassified On 0 APR

MSG #71
TAC 222145Z APR 87
FM: 1-SAM /
TO: SITE, ALPHA

TAC 222310Z
LT MCN 611

i-#616

G

ATTN: [REDACTED]
SUBJ: A/C 630569

1. AIRCRAFT 630569 MAY HAVE DEPARTED HOME STATION WITH THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM:
NUMBER THREE ENGINE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM INOPERATIVE, FLY IN NULL.
2. PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE, THE FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED TO RESOLVE TD PROBLEM.
 - A. REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE RELAY BOX, COORDINATOR, AND TD AMP.
 - B. TROUBLESHOOT THE LEFT HAND ELECTRICAL HARNESS.
 - (1) EVERTHINHVLFREBSA
 - (2) NINE WIRES WERE FOUND DANGLING IN THE ELECTRICAL HARNESS JUNCTION BOX, WIRES WERE REMOVED. THESE WIRES MAY HAVE CAUSED FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUSLY CHANGED TD SYSTEMS COMPONENTS.
3. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING IF PROBLEM STILL EXISTS WITH THE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM.
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED~~
Declassified by
DDO ALM
12 Aug 92

02200500Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)

- A. SECURE PHONECON LTG GAST/COL PITMAN 221730Z APR 80
B. SECURE PHONECON COL PITMAN/CCL KYLE 221745Z APR 80
1. AS PER REF, UNDERSTAND PLANNED "OVER THE WALL" TIME
IS 2100Z. REQUEST FIRM TIME WHEN HELOS SHOULD GET AIREORNE IN
THE EVENT ALL COMM FAILS; NO RADIO LAUNCH TIME SHOULD PROVIDE FAIL
SAFE METHOD OF LAUNCH.
2. REQUEST EXPECTED TIMING BETWEEN MFA AND COMPOUND IN-
FILTRATIONS. I.E. SIMULTANEOUSLY, MFA WHEN FORCE REACHES THE
WALL, NJ WHEN OTHER FORCE DISCOVERED. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE EVENT
OF LOST COMM BETWEEN GROUND FORCES?
3. WEATHER DATA EXCELLENT DETAIL AND LOOKS GOOD FOR TARGET DATE.
4. HELO STATUS 221300Z SEVEN MISSION CAPABLE. EIGHTH HELO, 736, UL
HAS FLOWN BUT IS DOWN EST. UP BY 231000Z. FOUR HELOS HAVE BEEN PAINTED
(LOOKS GOOD) AND THE OTHER FOUR ARE PRIMED. EST COMPLETION
AT 231400Z.
5. IN DISCUSSING PLANNED TACAIR SUPPORT ANCHORED AT NORTH-
WESTERN END OF PERSIAN GULF ON NIGHT TWO, THE LIKELIHOOD OF
NEEDING FIGHTERS TO PROTECT AIREORNE WITHDRAWAL WOULD SEEM
MORE PREVALENT THAN A REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.
INDICATIONS IN REF A WERE THAT FIGHTERS WERE TO PROTECT THE
TANKER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT (A-6) WOULD RENDER
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IF REQUIRED. REQUEST CLARIFICATION
OF TACAIR MISSION NIGHT TWO. CTF 70 HAS INDICATED THAT HE
COULD PROVIDE 4 F-14'S AND 2 A-6 TRAMS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
FIGHTER COVER FOR THE EXTRACTION FORCE AS WELL AS THE TANKER
AND NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.
6. REF B CONFIRMED TANKING PLAN FOR DESERT ONE IF EIGHT
HELOS ARRIVE. NO. 1 AND 2 ON NORTHERN MOST TANKER, NO. 3,
4 AND 5 ON MIDDLE TANKER (NORTH SIDE) AND 6,7 AND EIGHT
ON SOUTHERN TANKER. EST. 1600 GAL REQUIRED BY EACH HELO.
7. STANDING BY FOR PAX/CARGO WT. BREAKDOWN FOR FIRST SIX HELOS.
8. CONCERNING EMBASSY EXTRACTION, STADIUM LZ STILL CONSIDERED
PRIMARY AND BEST FOR MISSION DUE TO SPACE AND DEPARTURE AREA
WHICH WILL PERMIT HEAVIER LOADS. UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT MAY
COME UP FOR USE OF EMBASSY LZ. THIS WILL BE PASSED TO INBOUND
HELOS BY LZ CONTROL. RECOMMEND USE OF PRIMARY ZONE IF POSSIBLE.
REVM: 22 APR 80

BT

Dickens
DDA

1206
TOP SECRET
#617

DHR

21 APR 00

~~TSR gen C991~~
JB

E-#618

O 220845Z APR 00

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 00
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR GUN WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...

REVW: 21 APR 00

BT

NNNN

Delivered

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A65124

BERGEO. ONBOARD BODEREE.

REL ON
E U

BERGO

022040Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/J-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR HELO DET.

A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80

1. PARA 3 AND 4 OF THE REF REFER. REQUEST VERIFY FOLLOWING MISSION
EQJAP IN QUANTITIES/LOCATIONS INDICATED:

ITEM	QTY	LOC
CARRIER BAG NEP / SUPPORT 48 SYSTEMS (SACFT)	02	DESERT ONE
CAL .50MG	BT	MAN/STATION
CAL .50 AMMO	1500 RDS	MAN/STATION
BT		

NNNNJVH

Classified by JCS
Declassified on 12/1/2024
by [Signature]

DDO
10/2024

~~SECRET~~

128
TOR 122 JC MAR 03

OSU DTG 221710Z AT 2126Z

MSG #65
DTG 221930Z APR 03
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF/CDR

FOP [REDACTED]

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

1. CHIEF U.S. [REDACTED] IS DEPARTING
EU COM FOR [REDACTED] VIA [REDACTED] DEPARTURE FROM EU COM 2400HOURS
EU COM TIME TODAY. HE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PICK UP A PACKAGE FROM [REDACTED]
FOR DELIVERY TO [REDACTED] GEN. PUSTAY WILL DISPATCH
SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH GEN. EAST AND [REDACTED] USMTM

2. YOUR [REDACTED] SUGGESTION BEING IMPLEMENTED HERE. YOU WILL GET
A COPY OF [REDACTED]

NNNN

EC-2
BT
CLASSIFIED BY JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

A [REDACTED] FM SITE

[REDACTED] 1500 HRS

SITE ALPHA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 22 APRIL 1983

TER 2221Z
VC 14N 483

is
#625

2. FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN YESTERDAY BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST AND LEFTISTS ON THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, NOT ALL OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CLASHES THROUGHOUT IRAN OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS AS OF YESTERDAY.

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR DENOUNCED THE RIGHTEOUS MUSLIM ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER UNIVERSITIES AS BEING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY," AND SAID THESE ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL BACKING ENJOYED HIS GOVERNMENT AMONG MODERATE, CENTRISTS, AND OTHER GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE ISLAMIC JUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE THE BACKING OF THE QOM THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY (WHICH HAS CLOSE TIES TO KHOMEINI) AS WELL AS SUPPORT FROM THE CLERGY-DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO FURTHER STRENTHEN THE CLERGY'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY, APPEAR TO BE YET ANOTHER FACET OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULARISTS AND THE HARDLINE CLERGY.

4. SHOOTING BETWEEN ARMY TROOPS KURDISH GUERRILLAS ENTERED ITS FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY IN THE KURDISH TOWN OF SAGGEZ.

THIS IS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF INTENSE EFFORTS BY THE IRANIANS TO IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE READINESS ALONG ITS WESTERN BORDER BECAUSE OF RECENT PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ.

GCS ADP
BY ONE

SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY MADE EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN TRADE THROUGH SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE" TO IRAN BECAUSE OF THE THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT RAIL TRAFFIC THROUGH JOLFA AND ASTARA IS SLOW DOWN SO MUCH THAT THE FREIGHT TIE-UP COULD LAST FOR MONTHS.

CSF
14. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR
AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS
CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA.

F. INDICATIONS OF BEAR/BEAR II DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN
NO CHANGE, NO ACTIVITY

G. IL-38 MAX DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN AND IL-38 RECCE MISSIONS

TOR 1950.2
T.C. MCN 07-

MSG #25
DTG 211805Z APR 72
FM: CJCS
TO: JTF CDR/SITE "E"

~~TOP SECRET~~ ✓

i-~~630~~

1. EUCOM HAS VERBALLY CHOPPED THEIR FORCE INVOLVED IN RICE BOWL TO THE JTF EFFECTIVE 1000Z TODAY. WAS AGREED TO BY GENERAL ROGERS, CINCPAC. HE HAS SO INSTRUCTED GEN. ALLEN, DCINCPAC AT EUOM. GENERAL HUYSER, CINCPAC, HAS INSTRUCTED HIS PEOPLE TO COMPLY WITH YOUR OPERATIONAL ORDERS ON USE OF C-141 DURING EXECUTION PHASE.
2. WOULD YOU SEE ANY PROBLEM IN OUR CALLING THE EXECUTION PHASE EAGLE CLAW. THIS WOULD DIFFERENTIATE EARLIER PHASES FROM EXECUTION. ALSO EAGLE CLAW WILL CONNOTE A STRONGER IMAGE IN THE AFTERMATH THAN RICE BOWL. IF ANY PROBLEM WITH THIS, WE WILL LEAVE ALONE.
BT

NNNN

Classified by JCS
Declassify on 10 APR
Declassified by
DDONMC
12 Aug 82

0644Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOX FIRE

G

O 230645Z APR 80

FM NIMITZ

TO COR JTF

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT ON OPINTEL BROADCAST

SUBJECT: COORDINATION DATA

REF: JTF 222350Z APR 80

1. REF REQUESTS CAP DATA

2. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE PARA 5, REF:

FUEL REQUIRED:

2F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...53,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...73,000 LBS.

4F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...81,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...111,000 LBS.

3. RATIONALE FOR 4. F-14'S BASED ON POSSIBLE AIR THREAT FOR
WITHDRAWING FORCES.

4. ORDNANCE LOADS: EACH F-14...4SPW, 4SW & GUNS; EACH A-6 (TRAM)...
B-APAM (CBU-59).

5. NO, REPEAT NO, OTHER MISSION PRIORITY HAS EVER OR NOW STANDS IN
WAY OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY

REVW: 23APR80

BT

NNNN

1010 06 463
~~TOP SECRET~~ MCN 1057
E-X 631

Declassified by
DDO/NMC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MUR 57
DTG 221448Z APR 68
FROM JTF RC/MJ-4
TO ALPHA // (COL ██████████) / COL KYLE // LTC ██████████

G

MDN

#73

A

(-1). ALL ITEMS REQUESTED BY ████████ MUR 57 DTG 211830Z,
LESS THOSE TASKED TO ENCOM TOOK OFF FROM ██████████
2200Z APR 68 LOCAL APR 68. INCLUDED ARE 45 1ST AID PACKETS
FOR ██████████

2. ITEMS TASKED TO ENCOM APR
1942 50 T SWITCH
TUBING
SLEEVES
HYDRO PACKING ITEMS
5985-80-353-6518

A

(-2). MEDEVAC ACFT THAT DEPARTED POPE 22 APR 68 WILL
HAVE 45 AID PACKETS FOR ██████████ THIS WILL FILL
THEIR TOTAL RGMT.
BT

NNNN

AC2006 OSL 1543Z
KKKKKKK

Classified By:
Declassified On: DADK

Downloaded by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

221300Z APR 90
FM HELLO JET/NIHITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
BT

INT RLP 83 1100 NOT RETRANSMIT OVER SPINTEL BROADCAST

ACTIVITY IS NOW WELL SE OF NIHITZ. ESTIMATE FOCUS OF USSR
2. KRIVAK 593 IS STILL INDICATED DESPITE AIR RECON

MEGATRONIC STYLING LINE M-300 - AIR RECON

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED
SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED

1 NIMITZ FLAG SHIP IS HOLDING
GROUP VIC 03 22N 063 27E AT 0145Z
3. ONLY AGI 477 22M 063 27E

~~477 IS IN TRAIL OF AND IS~~ REMAINS IN CTF 76 SURVEILLANCE POSITION

• SOVIET MILITARY SURVEILLANCE ROLE AT PRESENT
IN THE AREA OF AMPHIB READY GROUP VIG 22 53N 060 05E.

SUDETIAN AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF ROGOV BY IL-33 MARS BASED IN ADE. MISSION WAS FLOWN ENTIRELY DURING 21-22 APRIL PERIOD OF DARKNESS. OTHER SOVIET AIR ACTIVITY OF INTEREST

EXCESS OF 300NM) CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH TO NIMITZ WAS IN
5. AS OF 2220Z APRIL 82, NO INDICATION OF IRANIAN SOVIET OR
OTHER 3RD COUNTRY INCREASED INTEREST IN NIMITZ OR HELO OPS.
6. REF MFA GRIDS. WE REQUIRE 6 COPIES ONLY AT DESERT TRACK.
BT

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
DISBURSTED ON 12 Aug 91
DERIVATIVE CL-89 DD Form CC
 DDCI DIA COMINT SECRET
BETH ON 7/15/92
EBC/STE Initials

509

GEDGET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1466Z
JTF

(G)
MSG F2
LTC 221307Z APR 87
FROM JCS- RC (LTC) [REDACTED]
TO JTF-SITE ALPHA (LTC) [REDACTED]

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO CEOI.
PARAGRAPH 5. C. (1) REPLACE PERIOD AFTER
[REDACTED] WITH COMMA.

PARAGRAPH 5. C. DECODE SECTION.
INSERT FOLLOWING CODEWORDS/MEANING
IN EXISTING PARAGRAPH IN ALPHABETICAL
ORDER.

CODEWORD	MEANING
ERONSON	[REDACTED]
CONCEPT	C-141 BASE
ELECTION	[REDACTED]
HERETIC	CORAL SEA
RED EARN	JTF-HAIN

PARAGRAPH 7. A. CHANGE FIRST
KY-70 NUMBER TO 75847 RPT 75847.
CHANGE SECOND KY-70 NUMBER (JCJS) TO
75845 RPT 75845.

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

MCN

869

1cy 70

1cy 70 Col

#630

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMC
Declassified On: 0 ADR 12 Aug 2001
DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] NMC
DDU 308 NMC
12 Aug 2001

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

- A. JTF 220150Z APR 80
B. SECURE PHONE CON JTF CDR/DEPHLG OPS 220330Z APR 80
1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, ALL HELOS STRIPPED OF MIN. WT. AND PAINTING HAS COMMENCED. EST. PAINTING COMPLETE 2314-0Z.
ENTIRE SHIP HAS TURNED TO IN SUPPORT OF JTF JET.
2. HELO STATUS AS REPORTED REF B, SEVEN OF EIGHT UP. EIGHTH HELO UP FOR TEST 220530Z. BASED ON REF A AND B GUIDANCE EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO TAKE EIGHT.
3. ~~JAW~~ REF B, ~~NETS~~ FOR UHF AND FM WILL BE REMOVED. EACH OF FIRST SIX HELOS WILL EXPECT CLOSE TO 5200 LBS OF PAX/CARGO AT DESERT TRACK PLUS SIX SETS OF ~~NETS~~ AND POLES FOR EACH HELO. NUMBER EIGHT HELO WILL REQUIRE SIX ADDITIONAL NETS AND POLES. RECOMMEND BRINGING OLD ~~NETS~~ SINCE THERE ARE ONLY 42 SAND COLOR ~~NETS~~ AT YOUR LOCATION. HELO CREW KILL REMAIN FIVE, WITH TWO GUNNERS. ONLY 200 RDS AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND EIGHT HELO AS WELL AS 1500 RDS PLUS TWO .50 CAL GUNS BEING POSITIONED AT CNO [REDACTED] REFUEL POINT AT [REDACTED].
4. REQUEST DETAILS OF MC/EU 130 FLT ROUTES INBOUND DAY ONE.
HELO DATA BASED ON ESTIMATED WIND IS AS FOLLOWS:

POINT	LAT/LONG	TIME (ZULU)
SHIP		1503
COAST-IN		1534
TP 1	31 39	1544
TP 2	31 64	1616
TP 3	31 37	1711
TP 4	31 94	1739
DESERT 1	31 33	1933
DEPART DESERT 1	31 33	2033
TP 5	31 66	2038
TP 6	31 11	2237
TP 7	31 11	2244
DZ		2246
DEPART DZ		2251
HIDE		2306

5. CTF 70 HAS REQUESTED MOVING JTF SPECIAL COMM INTO FLAG BRIDGE AREA. INTEND TO RESPOND THAT COMM WILL REMAIN JTF DISCRETE UNTIL DISCOVERY OR ASSAULT TIME TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR PLAN UNNECESSARILY. HOWEVER, ALL OUR DATA RECEIVED VIA BREVITY CODE OR OTHER MEANS WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CTF 70, SO THAT HE MAY TRACK OUR PROGRESS. ONCE HIS FORCES ARE INVOLVED OR ABOUT TO BE INVOLVED, WE CAN REMOTE DIRECTLY TO HIS STAFF TO PROVIDE NECESSARY COORDINATION AND CONTROL. THIS REMOTING HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED.

6. LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

REML 21APR80

NNNN

-TCR | 0920
KCL |

A/C AJ
066 ✓

642

Classified by
DDONMC
12 Aug 92
Declassify on OA
Downgrade on DD
by

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORY CLEAR.

TOR 10587E
JB/MCN/062✓

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

(C) SSN 0007
0 220515Z APR 80
FM [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SOD/LT GEN GAST
JCS/OPG/COL [REDACTED] ICS
JTF/LTCOL [REDACTED]
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

E (C) SUEJ: [REDACTED] SITREP NUMBER 5
1.) HAVE USED 26,000 U.S. GALLONS
JET A-1 FROM 19-21 APRIL. TOTAL
COST IS \$37.924 AT \$1.46
PER U.S. GALLON.

E (C) MORALE OF TROOPS IS EXCELLENT.
PERSONNEL HAVE
COOPERATED FULLY AND CONTINUE
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR NEEDS.
BT

Classified By [REDACTED] DDO NMIC R
Declassify On [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NSC047
DTG: 220315Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REF: UR 212210Z APR 80, SAB

CHECK WITH [REDACTED] AND DIA FAILED TO CONFIRM YOUR IMPLICATION THAT [REDACTED] HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST:

A. SOVIET SURFACE UNITS OPERATING IN THE ARABIAN SEA HAVE NEVER [REDACTED]

B. THE LAST INCIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE.

C. SIGNIFICANCE TO POTENTIAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE PROBABLY MINIMUM AS THE BASIC PEACETIME PURPOSE OF [REDACTED]

D. UNABLE TO PREDICT ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE. NOMINALLY SPEAKING WHEN WORKING IN A CONFINED AREA SUCH AS THE NORTHERN [REDACTED] THE PERIOD WOULD BE MEASURED IN HOURS VICE DAYS.

E. THE KRIVAK UTILIZING ITS HEADNET RADAR WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN [REDACTED] OF THE [REDACTED] FLIGHT ROUTE TO DETECT A/C FLYING AT 500FT ASL AND BELOW.

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 04/16/2025
Comments: 12 Aug 91

DDO: 1000
NOMINATE QM: 12 Aug 91
FILE NUMBER: 12 Aug 91
FILE NUMBER: 12 Aug 91

CDR

FM 100/40-32
TO SITE ALMA 32
C 100 APR 82

~~SECRET~~

i-#649

SUBJECT: TOT PRIORITIES

REF: UR MSG 210754Z APR 82

1. RECOMMENDED TARGET PRIORITIES AND STRIKE TIMES ARE PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST

(A) TEHRAN AREA

- (1) KARIM KHAN E ZAND POWER SUB-STATION TRANSFORMER YARD. STRIKE TIME ASAP IN CONCERN WITH DETECTION OF GROUND ASSAULT.
- (2) SEPAH SQUARE PET. MICRO WAVE POWER COMPLEX. STRIKE TIME ASAP, AFTER FORCE INITIATES COMPOUND ASSAULT.
- (3) MEHRABAD ATC STATION ASSOCIATED F4 ALERT AIRCRAFT. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.
- (4) NATIONAL IRANIAN IYAM RADIO ANTENNA. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.

(B) MANZARIEH AREA

- (1) KUSHK-E-NOSRAT ATC RADAR, SHORTLY BEFORE ARRIVAL OF F4 AND HELICOPTERS.
- (2) KUSHK-E-NOSRAT MICROWAVE RELAY-TOWERS, SHORTLY BEFORE ATC RADAR.

2. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO EMBASSY WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] B) AIR THREAT FROM OUTSIDE TEHRAN

AREA WILL COME FROM [REDACTED]

3. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO MANZARIEH WILL COME FROM [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT

BUT AIRCRAFT REMAIN A THREAT TO [REDACTED] IF THE LOCATION BECOMES UNPOINTED.) BOTH F4 AND F14 CARRY 20MM CANNON. F-4 ALSO CARRIES SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW AAM.

REVH 21 APR 82

OPTIONAL FORM B-125
100-1000-1000
100-1000-1000
100-1000-1000

~~SECRET~~

MSG 846
DTG: 220235Z APR 90

G FM: JTF RC/
TO: JTF/J-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

- (U) 1. HIGH LEVEL INTEREST HERE IN STATUS OF EC-130 AIRCRAFT (GENERATED BY ENGINE CHANGE) AND STATUS OF EIGHT HELOS ABOARD CV. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE UPDATE BY 220400Z IF POSSIBLE.
- (U) 2. FROM CHANGE IN TANKER RQMTS FIRST NITE OPS, APPEARS SOME CHANGES IN FLOW/PROFILE HAVE BEEN MADE. REQUEST INFO ON ANY CHANGE, BE RELAYED TO THIS LOCATION TO UPDATE BRIEFING CHARTS.
- (U) 3. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM THAT ~~RECEIVED~~ HAS BEEN ERLEEFED ON OPERATION OF RPN-18 BEACON. METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT, AND RESULTS TO EXPECT I.E. NO COMMO REQUIRED BETWEEN A-6 ACFT AND GROUND UNIT.
- (U) 4. REF OUR 211842Z APRIL 80 MSG, SUJ: DELIVERY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE LETTERS. ~~THE USA~~ WILL COUPIER LETTERS VICE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, AS STATED IN REF MSG.
BT

~~Classified by JCS
Declassified on CADR~~

~~Declassified by DDNOC
12 Aug 90~~

END THAT IS ALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: 210511Z APR 87
FROM: JCS/DOD-1E
SUBJ: ALFA 3
INFO: C/NOW

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT REACTION
REF: UR SSN 0827 DTC 21-140
[REDACTED] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHT TO.

i-# 652

(1) EXAMINATION OF [REDACTED] INFORMATION
TEAM ANALYSIS OF [REDACTED]
OVER FLIGHT ROUTE INDICATES
PROPOSED ROUTE IS PEST FEASIBLE

[REDACTED]
RADIO SILENCE IS STILL
ESSENTIAL. RECOMMENDED
[REDACTED] EGRESS FOR
MC 130 IS ALONG LINE

[REDACTED]
THEN TURNING NORTH TO CIP.

(2) IF [REDACTED] WERE TO DETECT
KC 135/MC 130 DURING REFUELING
THEY WOULD (A) CHALLENGE, SCRAMBLE
TO INVESTIGATE, IDENTIFY AND UPON RECOGNITION
WOULD VOICE CHALLENGE THE USAF
AIRCRAFT AND DEPENDING
THE US EXPLANATION AND DIRECTION
FROM THE [REDACTED] FIGHTER CONTROLLER
WOULD DIRECT THE AIRCRAFT TO
A [REDACTED] AIR FIELD OR ESCORT
THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF [REDACTED]
AIRSPACE.

(3) IF [REDACTED] SUSPICIONS COULD BE [REDACTED]
IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT
THE [REDACTED] MAY ALLOW THE ACFT TO PASS.

ACFT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT
A FORCE DOWN FOR TO ENGAGE AN ACFT WHICH COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON 0 ADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOK 220136Z
MAY 05 ✓

MSG 241
DTG 212300Z APR 92
FM: JCS-RC ✓
TO: ALPHA, (RELAY TO USS NIMITZ)

G
[REDACTED]
FOR CDR
FM: LTC

REQUEST FOLLOWING

- UHF FREQUENCY FOR KC-135 TANKERS TO CONTACT USS NIKITZ ON NIGHT 1 AND 2.

- STATUS OF HELO WSC-3 AND FLIGHT TEST.

- HOW DO YOU CALL [REDACTED] FROM USS NIMITZ.
BT

NNNN

Classified By: ~~JES~~ DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified On: OADR

✓ # 653

Approved by:
[Signature]

12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 2340
VC

154 ✓

Delayed us
OSO 220313Z

-654

MSG036
STG 212200Z APR 03

FM JTF/RC
TO CDR JTF
SITE ALPHA (RELAY TO [REDACTED])

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: UPDATE REPORT

(U) 1. REACTIVATION CJCS WILL ACCOMPLISH BY PHONCON TO CINCPAC
LATER LATE 21 APR OUR TIME OR EARLY 22 APR OUR TIME. WILL ADVISE.

(U) 2. CJCS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR DOWN SLADDER BIRD. PLANNING
HERE IN PROGRESS TO GET YOU ANOTHER AIRCRAFT BUT DOUBTFUL.
ADVISE US IF YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THREE OPERATIONAL.

(U) 3. SENSITIVE LETTER WHILE CONTACT [REDACTED] TO HAVE
YOU REPORT TO [REDACTED] 0800Z 23 APR TO PICK UP A LETTER AT
[REDACTED] LOCATION.

(U) 4. JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTER
TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) 5. CJCS DIRECTS THAT ALL LETTERS BE COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED]

(U) 6. SENSITIVE LETTERS TO BE DELIVERED BY GEN GAST TO DELIVERER
MR COL KASPEROWICZ
BUT NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR DELIVERY.

(U) 7. CJCS DIRECTS THAT ALL LETTERS TO BE PLACED IN U.S. MAIL AND
NOT DELIVERED FOR DELIVERY TO U.S. AMBASSADOR'S OFFICES
BY COORDINATOR. SAME TIME NOTIFICATION OF DELIVERY TO
THE RECEIVING U.S. AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE ONLY ON THE DIRECTION OF
CJCS WHICH AUTHORIZE DELIVERY OF LETTERS AFTER SECURING
REMOVAL AND KNOWLEDGE THAT VALY HAS BEEN CROSSED.

(U) 8. REPEAT JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY
SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER
COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) 9. FOR GEN GAST HAVE RECEIVED ASSURANCE NAVY AWARE OF
BOTH GROUND FORCE

NEW 21 APR 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FNU: 44230 JLT/S-2(1)
59 5170-2
SUE: INTREP 02

~~SECRET~~

KRIVAK

1. FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 70 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST LOCATED VIC 21 53N 362 13E ON COURSE 190 T 10 KTS AT 1313Z.

AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE OF AMPHIB READY GROUP.

THIS ACTIVITY MAY BE RELATED TO MOVEMENT OF IVAN ROGOV TASK GROUP.

3. NO SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TODAY. USE BRUMBY NAD RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25 TN 057 46E AT 0650Z.

4. EXC ING 0800 HOURS
4.5. NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT MN KRIVAK 693. MEANWHILE, BELIEVE JTF SHOULD BE AWARE THAT HEADSET RADAR IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VI.

4.6. 693 TS TN THAT AREA.
5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 80.

FATHER BOB
BT:

NINT QSL GMM ANN D NEED ZDK DF YOUR LST K
BBMBAFJSA

2830/?\$

XHP1MKD
B YRNTHCQURDPCLN

Classified By: JES
Declassified On: 04/24/2024

658

DIG

212010Z

15B
NOTAPE

TDR 2215Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

847 ✓

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

JRGHP

NO EOM.

TORISCH
NIMITZ

659

FM NIMITZ/COL
TO JTF/J3

REF JTF/J3 201855Z APR 80

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(U) 1. ~~LTST~~ REF REQUESTED TX-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. ~~LTST~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 13 WHEN CALLED FOR BY CJTF RICEBOWL, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE [REDACTED] (WORST CASE) ARRIVING AT 1: PLUS 50 FOR 2 PLUS 45 (NEW FLIGHT AT :15; 2 ROCKEYE, 2 AIM-9, 1000 RDS 20MM PER AIRCRAFT) USING ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND 35589, 8, & 1 SET OF EXTERNAL TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COCKPIT ALERT POSTURE. SUBSEQUENT COVERAGE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

[REDACTED] 2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET)
- 3 ARTS/6 ALPHA (5/3 ARTS) STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET
UPON COMPROMISE OF RICE BOWL MISSION IN DAYLIGHT HOURS, CJTF WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BASKET EQUIPPED ARTS, AND COMPANION ALPHA TANKER FOR BUDDY REFUEL, FROM [REDACTED] DIRECT TO 24-40N, 56-00E. (ETE AT 480KTS - 2.8 HRS) TO MAXIMIZE AVAILABLE OFF LOAD TANKER SHOULD PLAN TO RECOVER WITH MINIMUM FUEL AT [REDACTED] FOLLOW-ON TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS. TF-70 CAN THEN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY ACTION AS REQUIRED. TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR

INSERT WORD

"JETTISONING"

VICINITY. TANKER SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED BY THE KC-135 RONALD REAGAN (KC-135-S) FROM [REDACTED] AT INTERVALS DURING DAY ONE. VULNERABILITY PERIOD, THUS MAINTAINING THE TANKER SIGNATURE PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE [REDACTED] AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN [REDACTED] ANCHOR POINT IN VICINITY OF 29-CON, 50-COE. KC-135 TANKERS WILL LAUNCH NOTIONALLY (INTERVAL DEPENDS ON ARTS/ALPHA MIX) FROM [REDACTED] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ASSAULT TIME. IF ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSION BUDDY REFUELING WILL GIVE EACH ARTS 3.5 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUS 50,000 LBS AN HR OFFLOAD CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE 40,000 LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER). AS KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14'S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN AND ESCORT THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER ON-STATION CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] RECOVERY.

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS BE USED BY CAP AIRCRAFT/GROUND FORCES TO FACILITATE LINK UPS:

E CAP ALFA (REFUEL AREA)

E CAP BRAVO (HELO HIDE)

E CAP CHARLIE

E CAP DELTA (EMBASSY)

E CAP ECHO

E CAP FOXTROT

E CAP GOLF

E CAP HOTEL

GROUND FORCES/AIR FORCES MUST HAVE UHF RADIO CONTACT ON 341.4 MHZ (PRIMARY), 240.5 MHZ (SECONDARY) BEFORE AIR FORCE CAN COMMIT.

GROUND FORCES SHOULD HAVE SMOKE OR SIMILAR MARKING DEVICE.

CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.

4. SUMMARY: IF RADIUS OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL, TF-70 AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT.

MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [REDACTED] ENHANCE OFFLOAD POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL PRACTICE SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE CONTINUED. 1 MISSION A DAY

AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY PREPOSITION TANKERS AT ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY MISSION ASSETS (A-6'S, KA56'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT ALL PHASES. TF-70 TACAIR PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING NEED.

PLANNED WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDES OF STRACTION C-141-S/AU, MC-130'S FROM TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO, WHILE DAY ONE IS A CONTINGENCY CONCEPT. DAY TWO F-14 CAP U CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION ACCESS.

VERY RESPECTFULLY, [REDACTED]

Classified By: DDON MCC
Declassified On: 12 Aug 92
by OADR

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by DDON MCC
12 Aug 92

-CONFIDENTIAL-

i-659

~~SECRET~~

1754

MSG 107
077 311407Z 407 07
FM: JOC/RG-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
REF ID: S217
1-SNW/S27

~~RECORDED~~
SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. ~~101~~ THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE
SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 243400Z/242401
TO 243400Z/240000Z

R1CN

046

660

Classified By:
Declassified On:

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDON/MC
EXCERPTED/DELETED BY SECRET
OASD-R
DIA P

~~SECRET~~

MSG #25
DTG 211245Z APR 80
FM JTF RC/
TO: [REDACTED]
INFO: ALPHA/[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS

1. YOUR ELEMENTS REQUEST THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE FORWARDED BY MOST
EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:

A. 1942 50TW SWITCH 2EA	
B. ZC 5898 NSN 6145-00-635-1536 COMMO CORD	500FT ROLL
C. PN USAU NSN 5935-00-553-9752 CONNECTOR	TEN EACH
D. PN HG 205004 ALTIMETER	ONE EACH
E. PM MS 3106A-145-5P IP CONNECTORS	TEN EACH
F. PN MS 3057-CL CONNECTOR	TEN EACH
G. 15 FOOT INTERCOM CORD ASSY FOR HJT POSITION	
H. PM HG 20328-A1 / PDI RELAY/56-PE	TWO EACH
I. TMS PROGRAMMER (PSP)	CNF EACH
J. POP RIVIT SET	ONE EACH
K. NSN 6665-00-633-7311 INDICATOR	THREE EACH
L. 6665-00-353-0512 HF COUPLER	TWENTY FIVE EACH
M. 5821-00-300-2000 HF HT UNIT	ONE EACH
N. METHYL ETHYL KETONE	TWENTY GALLONS
O. 5841-00-007-7240 DOPPLER FREQUENCY TRACKER	ONE EACH
P. YELLOW LOX ENGINE ANALYZER	
Q. TUBE INC. ASSORTED 3/8 OR 1/8 INCH	
R. F NUTS AND SLEEVES FOR TUBING	
S. HACK SAW FRAME AND BLADES	
T. #40 DRILL BITS	TWO EACH
U. TUBE FLARE CUTTER	ONE EACH
V. HYDRAULIC PACKING	
AA. STO PK 300-02 STO PK 300-JG	FIFTEEN EACH
AB. LS4634-2	FIFTEEN EACH
AC. LS4634-10	FIFTEEN EACH
AD. LS4634-12	FIFTEEN EACH
AE. SHEET METAL PATCH FLAP	
AF. 4TH SOLENOID 1650-00-723-8722 1650-00-723-8722	ONE EACH ONE EACH
AG. C-15 ENGINE OIL DIP STICK	
AH. CABLE 3/32 AND 5/16 10 FOOT CABLE FITTINGS FOR SHADE FOR EACH SIZE	
AI. RG 500 COAX CABLE ELEC	HUNDRED FOOT
AJ. OYLITITE 20R3 (FUEL)	ONE BOX
AK. WINE TOOTH BRUSHES FOR FUEL	ONE BOX
AL. ACID BRUSHES FOR FUEL	ONE BOX
AM. ERICK BATTERY CHARGER	ONE EACH
AN. ERICK BATTERY	TWO EACH

2. PLEASE ADVISE ON YOUR CAPABILITY TO MEET AND SHIP THIS
REQUIREMENT. ITEM II IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.

Classified By: *JCS*
Declassified On: *04/04/2024*
Declassified by: *DDO 100 C*
12 M/S

INT OML PLS MMUJP

1. RGR7 AND WSL 1716Z

MSG030
DTG 211600Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC//
TO: ALPHA//

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: LOG UPDATE

- (u) 1. CRITICAL RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART 1ST SQW LOCATION 221300Z TO ARRIVE 231400Z.
- (u) 2. C130 ENGINE REPAIR PARTS & GROUND EQUIPMENT WILL LAND YOUR LOCATION 1800Z TODAY.
- (u) 3. FULTON RTG FENDING LINES WILL ARRIVE FROM EUCOM TODAY AT 1800Z.
- (u) 4. 1ST SQW TASKED TO PROVIDE ITEMS REQUESTED IN MSG, DTG 211245Z APR 80 SUBJ RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS. PARTS SHOULD DEPART EGLIN AFB 221300Z ARRIVING 231400Z.
- (u) 5. REQUEST STATUS OF MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS.
- (u) 6. IF RADAR PARTS ARE FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED ACFT, RECOMMEND YOU CANNABALIZE FROM YOUR LOCATION (COMMENT FROM J-3).
- (u) 7. PLEASE FORWARD ANY UNRESOLVED LOG ACTIONS WITH DESIRED PRIORITIES.

REMV 21 APR 18

100-0000-0000
MCN013
669

Declassified
DD 01 M 12 Aug 92

G TO SMSGT [REDACTED]
FM MR [REDACTED]
BT
SECRET

2 24 70 : Col [REDACTED]
70K / 1519Z

R/C

SUBJ: PRE-PRODUCTION PARKHILL FAILURE.

AT 1519Z ON THE 19TH OF APRIL WE HAD A FAILURE OF A PRE-PRODUCTION PARKHILL SERIAL NUMBER 08037. THE SYMPTOMS OF THE PARKHILL FAILURE WERE GOOD PREAMBLE IN THE HANDSET PLAIN TEXT VOICE ON THE AIR AND A GOOD POSTAMBLE IN THE HANDSET. THE PROBLEM WAS NOTICED IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE WE WERE MONITORING THE TRANSMIT FREQUENCY. CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO, REPEAT NO COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE PARKHILL WAS TURNED OFF AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REKEY THE PARKHILL. THE PARKHILL WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE FILL AND CONSTANTLY ALARMED. IT WILL NOT DUPLICATE THE ORIGINAL SYMPTOMS. THIS MSG IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR COMMENTS PLEASE LET ME KNOW. THANKS.

G THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITTED WITH APPROVAL OF MR [REDACTED] THIS STATION.

NNNN 00000000000000000000000000000000

Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassified on [REDACTED]

JCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MCN

X38

E-#666

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

E P 211117Z APR 80
FM [REDACTED]
TO JCS/SOC (LTG GAST)
C1

~~(P)~~ SUBJECT SITREP #4

REF SITREP #3 DTG 210850Z APR 80

1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [REDACTED] WITH [REDACTED] OPERATIONS OFFICER HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [REDACTED] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

Classified By: [REDACTED] DDO NMIC 12 Aug 80
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMIC
12 Aug 80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45000
TO 200000Z

0000 1000
TO JT77A/NSC ✓

E [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: TO VISIT TO [REDACTED]

E WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR VISIT TO BE CANCELLED.

DDW 01 APR 12

AMN
4/27

NNNN

i # 667

Classified by MC 12 Aug
Declassify on DADP
Declassify on DDAMC
Declassify on DADP
Declassify on DADP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01: RECEIVED.

O 210925Z APR80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS REQUIREMENTS.
1. ACFT 62-1843 REQUIRES

- A. PUMP ASSY, FUEL P/N 6827283 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-17 1 EACH
- B. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N M59321-213 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-33 4 EACH
- C. PACKING, PERFORMED P/N MS 9020-04 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-25 2 EACH
- D. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N MS 9020-10 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX 28 2 EACH

2. ACFT 63-7785 REQUIRES

- A. VALVE, ANTI-ICING P/N 26130010 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 22 1 EACH
- B. GASKET P/N 750244-4 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 23 2 EACH

BT

NNNN

~~Classified By JCS
Declassified On OADR~~
Declassified by DDCMC 2005

ACFT 62-1843
#668

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOC 12105182
C8 935

E-670

TP 210500Z APR 80

FM [REDACTED]
TO JTF
JCS/SCD: (LIG GAST)

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

E-SUBJ: [REDACTED] SITREP #3

1. WE ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] AIRFIELD WILL BE VISITED BY A PARTY OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] DIGNITARIES ON THURSDAY 24 APRIL BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0300-1000 LOCAL. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY [REDACTED]

FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

AND

[REDACTED] WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [REDACTED] WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [REDACTED] NEWS

REPORTERS.

2. WE WERE QUERIED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF [REDACTED] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130 DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING AND THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [REDACTED] AIRFIELD. OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [REDACTED] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY 1980. REFERENCE IN REPORT THAT [REDACTED] BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LANDING AND TAKEOFFS, OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

MANN

Classified By:
Declassified On: DADK

DD NY
JADK
X
Approved by
DAMCA
BDA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

210033Z APR 97
FM: JTF RESPONSE CELL
TO: JTF CMDCM SITE "A"
BT

~~SECRET~~

E (C) LTG GAST ARRIVING BY KC-135; ETA YOUR LOCATION 211505Z. REQUEST
YOU CONSIDER HIS PLANNED DEPARTURE FOR [REDACTED] ON A LATER AIRCRAFT.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

Classified by
DDONMC
12 Aug 97
Downgraded by
CONUS
DDONMC
3 Dec 97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

MSG 1.
JTF 2100Z APR 98
FROM JTF RESPONSE CELL
TO ALPHA//CCU [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] S E G R E T

REF: YOUR MSG DTP 211500Z APR 98 (LTC RICHARDS)

1. SLEEPING EQUIPMENT & CANTEENS WILL ACCOMPANY
C-130 FROM [REDACTED] THAT DEPARTS 211500Z.
2. FENDING LINES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT [REDACTED]
1ST SOW [REDACTED] INDICATES LINES ACCCOMPANIED BASIC PIG. USAFE
HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE TWO SETS FOR CARGO
ON HC130 THAT DEPARTS R-M TOMORROW 0700Z. IS THIS
SUFFICIENT?
3. MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS ARE NOT AT RAMSTEIN.
IF AC UNITS ARE NOT YET AT YOUR LOCATION WE
WILL GO BACK & TRACE FROM ORIGINAL SOURCE.
PLS ADVISE.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE #7 RECEIVED.

#7478

Classified by *pls*
Declassified ON *DADR*
Declassified by *DDO NMC*
12 Aug 98

NO 100%

TOP-1 2020092

C-#678

MSG 17
07Z 2019 15 Z APR 98
FROM JTF RICE ECCL (REAF) [REDACTED]
TO ALPHA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REF YOUR MSG 201626Z APR 98

G 1. REF INDICATED NO MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS HAVE ARRIVED. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT THREE HAVE ARRIVED. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT A TOTAL OF FIVE ARE REQUIRED.

2. PLS INFORM US:
HOW MANY HAVE ARRIVED?
ARE THEY NEW?
HOW MANY MORE DO YOU REQUIRE?

3. BE INFORMED RAMSTEN HAS 14 PALLETS BACKLOGGED.
WE ARE WORKING TO EXPEDITE SHIPMENT.

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

~~Classified BY SCS
Declassified UN/ODA~~

*Declassified by
DD 8 NMC
12 Aug 98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP / 20 APR 73

25
#679

✓ RETRAN 20 APR 73

BMT JCS

U
CBMBIRMDRESHDE. FOXFIRE OMAYOU HAV
SAW YURCU4BU.2? NO TXPING 4.
8679-13

-- WILL SEJATWS
ZFEOCRON YU ESSAGE S H
CI ROEFIVER; 3MHGTEN IS EE
HE VOICE ..

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)

TO: JTF [REDACTED] (VAUGHT)

JCS (SOD) [REDACTED]

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (TS)

(U) 1. LTG TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL) BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST-IN WILL OCCUR ABOUT 25 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

2. LTG NON-RFI PINS, SERNOS: 007 AND 011 RETURNED TO [REDACTED] TODAY VIA MAC C-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH AFB AS FINAL DESTINATION.

BT

~~HQ SECRET~~

Classified by: JES
Declassified on: 1 APR 2000
Classified by: DDM
Declassified on: 12 Aug 1998
DDA
DDA
DDA
DDA
DDA
DDA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

G
023100Z APR 88
FM TALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER [REDACTED]
ET

S [REDACTED]
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS/MISSION STATUS

1. WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING PARTS FOR OUR AIRCRAFT.
IGNITION RELAY PN6792647 T/O BU-738-44 FIG 3 IND 14

NAVIGATION COMPUTER UNIT P/N 732320-1 T/O 1C-130(Y)-4 2 EA
FIG 50 IND 17

MEMORY MODULE UNIT P/N 732320-1 T.C. 1C-130(Y)-4 2EA
FIG. 50 IND. 22

RT /APN153 DOPPLER RCVR/TYMR 2 EA
F. 50 IND. 9

2. FLEW ONE SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION
BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified On: 0 APR
Declassified by [Signature]
DOD 100-1000
20 Aug 2009

G ->

1C1 TO N
1C1 VAU
1C1 TO C

C -680

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

0000 14
LTC 201001Z APR 00
FROM DEPSON JTF WASH DC
EOM TO COMJTF, [REDACTED]

~~EE ER~~ SUBJECT: [REDACTED] COMINT CT

I HAVE JUST TALKED TO CGN [REDACTED] HE WILL
DO WHAT HE CAN. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN
MON MORNING, YOUR TIME.
ET

MCN

003

681

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Declassified On: [REDACTED]

NNNN

Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassified by [REDACTED]
On [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ASC 1.
STC 221000Z APR 67
FROM JCC/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/JE

G SUBJECT: [REDACTED] REQUEST

- (1) WILL HAVE SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS TEAM IN BLDG TOMORROW (21 APRIL.)
(2) REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SPECIFIC MAC QUESTIONS VIA MESSAGE TO REDUCE CHANCE OF MISINTERPRETATION.
(3) WILL PROVIDE RESULTS AS OBTAINED.
ET

NNNN

Classified By *[Signature]* *682*
Declassified On *1 APR 1985*

ADR
Not to be released
DDO/NMC
12 APR 85



16A-15482
JPF
MCN
822

~~SECRET~~

TOK 11102

RC 22

#684

MSG 11
DTG 201445Z APR 80
FROM JCS/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: QUERY RESPONSE
REF: (A) UR DTG 201445Z APR 80
SUBJ: HOSTAGE UPDATE

(B) JCS/RC-J2/DTG 201330Z APR 80
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INFO

C
C (1) [REDACTED]
BT
REF B CAUTIONS AGAINST
ASSUMING ALL HOSTAGES ARE
BEING HELD IN CHANCERY.

NNNN

Classified BY JCS
Declassified ON 0 APR

CLASSIFICATION DETERMINED BY 1200Z
COMPLETED ON 12 APR 1985
DETERMINED BY DDCOMM
Secret

~~SECRET~~

DUCKHUNTER DE FOXFIRE RE TWO IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

(U) 023015Z APR 80
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
TO JTF [REDACTED] VAUGHT
ET

S E C U R E T H O U G H T D O N O T P A S S O N I N T E L B R O A D C A S T
SUBJ: ARRIVAL REPORT (TS).

E (U) 1. (TS) PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [REDACTED] 230600Z AND NIMITZ
203015Z.

(U) 2. (TS) AT [REDACTED] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING
SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED
HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. [REDACTED]. THE
HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY.
OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL EVENING FIGHT CARGO TO HIS
SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE
HE WOKE HIS OINC, [REDACTED] FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN.
LT. [REDACTED] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE ESCORTING
HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO UNUSUAL REACTION EXPECTED
WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.

(U) 3. (TS) REQUEST LATEST DATA ON EC-130 FUEL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY
USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 300 GALLONS
UNUSEABLE.

(U) 4. (TS) CURRENT HELO STATUS SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE
(HM-16 REPORT).

(U) 5. (TS) REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST
FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE
SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE
AND CITY.

(U) 6. (TS) REQUEST HELO LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX,
THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.

(U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER
RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT
F-1A, RA-6C COMPLETED LAST NIGHT. EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT
ALL TRAINING DONE. RADIO SILENCE ON SECURE VOICE.

BT

Classified by [REDACTED]
Declassified On [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

TCR 1200Z
KCL 12

X-689

~~TOP SECRET~~
VC

P 200300Z APR 90
FM WALNUT,
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ G
BT

~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERCIAL POWER WITH GENERATORS AS BACK UP.

EQUIPMENT STATUS

2 GENERATOR GREEN

1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FUEL BOWL.

1. TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.

1 UGC-129 GREEN

1 WSC-3 GREEN

1 KH-7 GREEN

2 TH-22'S GREEN

ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.

1 TT-76 KEYBOARD

1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES

C-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.

MISCELLANIOUS ITEMS NEEDED.

SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATE AND SOME JUNK FOOD.

MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US.

NNNN

✓ 692

Classified by JCS
Declassify on 0 APR
Declassify on 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PTC 152000Z APR 68
FM: JTF 102
TO: [REDACTED]

A3

SUBJ: MFA PCSTACES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1968 DOG/IWG RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOLLAND. TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MEMO: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. ERUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLDC.

REVN 16 APR 18

NNNNX

Classified by [initials]
30 Aug 12
Delivery on [initials]
DDA [initials]

TDR /16402

i - #696

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND MATE I QSL AT 1632 1632
GO TO AHEAD WITH UR TRAFFIC KKKKK

TUR / 1635

32

DTG 190001Z APR 80

FM JTF
TO USS NIMITZ

~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: INOPERATIVE PINS

1 REQUEST INOPERATIVE PINS SERNOS 011 AND 007
BE BROUGHT TO [REDACTED] COD/VOD FLT FOR RETROGRADE VIA
LANDING MSG LUL PITMAN AND PAX ON 28 APR.

2 REQUEST THAT NON OPERATIONAL PINS BE ADDRESSED.

30 MAR 80 AFPC/ALTF

G BARBERS POINT HNL BRAVO TWO
ATM 15TH AF/DOTD

DDW 19 APR 80

Classified by
DDO NMCG
12 Aug 80

Declassify
Downgrade to
by DDO NMCG
12 Aug 80

~~TOP SECRET~~

U.S. IS TRYING TO GET U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAN.
SOME OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THE U.S.
HAS PRESENTED THEM A PLAN ACCORDING WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS ALLIES
NATIONAL INTERESTS FOR RAISING CONSULTATION.

I-698
"2"

6. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S.
ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL
NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN.

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE.

18. WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST - 17 APRIL 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1002
KCA

MEMORY CLEAR.

MESSAGE 81 RECEIVED.

P. 200985Z APR 80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
INFO EUCOM
BT

~~RECEIVED~~
SUBJ:DREAM LIST

1. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT THIS LOCATION TO
IMPROVE MORALE.

C. STERNO FUEL 200 CANS
STERNO STOVES 100 EA

20' EXTENSION CORDS W/LIGHTS 12 EA
COLEMAN LANTERNS W/FUEL 12 EA/
COLEMAN STOVES W/FUEL 6 EA.

G-TIPS

BASEBALL CAPS (VARIOUS SIZES FROM 7 TO 7 5/8)

MILITARY MATTRESSES 60 EA

MORRONS 3 EA

MESS KITS 9 EA

LARGE POT 3 EA

BB-B-Q GRILL 3 EA & CINDER BLOCKS 12 EA

ICE MAKER

PLASTIC TRASH BAGS

SMALL COOKING POTS

COORDINATES FOR BOTH ENDS ACTIVE RUNWAY

KNOCKDOWN (MEDICINAL) DRINKING

PILLOWS 20 EA

QUILTS (ASSORTED) 10 LBS

KOOL AID

ALUMINUM FOIL

BREAD

FIELD REFRIGERATOR 3 EA

TOILET CHEMICALS

COFFEE 30 LBS

SUGAR 18 LBS

MEAT CREAMER 5 LBS

CANNED HAM

PORTABLE SHOWERS

Classified by JES
Declassified on 04/04/2023

Classified by DD or m
Declassify m: 04/04/2023
- made to DD or m
by DD or m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G
 JCS 101-074 APP 1
 FROM LTC [REDACTED]
 TO: "CC NIMITZ
 837 [REDACTED]

TOR | 1220
 KCL

JTF DEPLOYMENT JET 1 (14 APR 77)

1. (U) TEX 1 INDEX
 INDEX
 CALL SIGNS
 RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST
 TELEPHONE LISTINGS

(C) 1. LIST CALL SIGNS

JCS (SOD)
 JTF MAIN [REDACTED]
 JTF ALTERNATE [REDACTED]
 JTF (LEFT BRACC)
 MC-141
 MC-138
 MC-136
 MC-130
 NIMITZ
 HELD (ON BOARD NIMITZ)

ITEM NO
 1
 2
 3
 4

TOTHPICK
 CUCKHUNTER
 SKYLIVER
 TRANSFER
 WALNUT
 MOON GLOW
 TIDE RIP
 BROADWAY
 STARLIGHT
 FOXFIRE
 FLACKEARD
 CROWS NEST

TOT | 1407
 KCL | PMT 78
 P
 ONE COPY TAKEN
 BY TS97

MEN = 0008



(U) 1. BRIEFLY NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST

(U) 2. (P) ATLANTIC OCEAN NSC-3 UHF TACSAT NET SECURE
 VOICE OR TTY. JCS IS NCS.

(1) OPERATING STATION: JCS JTF MAIN JTF ALTERNATE
 (2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN AFSC-3 SECURE
 (3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMTR 295.075 MHZ, DOWNLINK
 261.475 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL USKA [REDACTED] DRESTES: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN
 INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN
 TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

(U) 3. INDIAN OCEAN NSC-3 TACSAT NET SECURE
 JTF MAIN IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATION: JTF MAIN JTF ALTERNATE
 NIMITZ

(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN AFSC-3 SECURE

(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMTR 295.675 MHZ, DOWNLINK
 262.075 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)

(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL USKA [REDACTED] DRESTES: USKA

(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN
 INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS

ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

DD 2003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) JTF MAIN

PARKHILL
TTY
AT 7...
AUTOCOMM

227-5212
227-5342
227-5370

(U) JTF MAIN [REDACTED]
AUTOCOMM NEST
PARKHILL
TTY
KY-7

(U) JTF ALTERNATE [REDACTED]
PARKHILL TTY

A/E (U) AUTOCOMM NEST
PARKHILL

PARKHILL
TTY

PARKHILL
TTY

(U) G. YUMA (HELOSI)
PARKHILL
TTY

895-2120
895-2130

NOTE: WHEN CALLING JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE SAT DILY "GO GREEN".
WHEN PARTY ANSWERS AND IMMEDIATELY GO PARKHILL
SECURE. JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES ONLY BY TELEPHONE
NUMBER. NOT NAMES OR LOCATION. PLAIN CONVERSATIONS EVEN OF
UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS WITH THESE TWO LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.
THESE RESTRICTIONS ALSO APPLY TO CALLS ORIGINATING AT THE
JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE.

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOT / 1600~~

~~VC~~

~~TOT / 1654~~

~~RC~~

MESSAGE S1 SELECTED.

DTG 0315

DIG 031515 APR 90
FM JTF/CS
TO: USS NIMITZ/ [REDACTED]

SUBJ: FORCE DEPLOY MENT RECALL

1. (U) REFERENCE: MSG 021500Z SUBJ: ARRIVAL ARRAGEMENT.

(U) 2. (U) THE ANNOUNCED DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINE ELEMENT TO THE
NIMITZ HAS BEEN DEFERRED INDEFINETLY.

(U) 3. (U) YOUR ADVANCE ELEMENT HAS DIRECTED BY A SEPERATE MESSAGE
TO RETURN TO CONUS.

4. (U) REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

BT

MANN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: 07 APR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Delivery date
20 NOV 90
20 NOV 90

~~TOP SECRET~~

BTG 311550Z MAR 80
FBI JTF/J-2/
TO1 500000Z MAR 80

STATION ALPHA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, MARCH 31 1980

WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JODY POWELL DENIED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SENT A LETTER TO IRAN SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. AT THE SAME TIME, POWELL SAID HE WOULD "NOT DISPUTE" A SWISS FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT SWITZERLAND'S CHARGE IN TEHRAN PASSED A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI AND PRESIDENT BANI-SADR FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER THIS WEEK.

2. TEHRAN RADIC'S DOMESTIC SERVICE THIS MORNING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO FEIS, THAT "JODY POWELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT CARTER SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN". THE EROAL-CAST SAID THE MESSAGE, RECEIVED LAST WEEK, WAS MEANT "TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN AMERICA AND IRAN AND EXPEDITE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES." POWELL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT REVEALING THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE "MIGHT ENDANGER FINDING A SOLUTION" TO THE CRISIS.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY WRITES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GHODZAIKH BELIEVES, THANKS TO "PRESIDENT CARTER'S NOW ADMITTING MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY," THAT HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE THIS MORNING CLAIMS IRANIAN OFFICIALS SEE THE U.S. MESSAGE AS THREATENING.

4. KHOMEINI IS NOW REPORTED BY AP AS SAYING HE WILL ALLOW A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE FIFTY HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE FILM CLIP ON WHICH THE REPORT IS BASED IS RECENT AND REPRESENTS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OR NOT. "IF THE POPL WANTS TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES, HE MAY SEND AN ENVOY TO COME AND SEE," KHOMEINI IS SHOWN TELLING THE PAPAL NUNCIO IN TEHRAN.

5. THE NINE COMMON MARKET-COUNTRIES SENT LETTERS OVER THE WEEKEND TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES URGING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. ACCORDING TO AP, BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAVE WRITTEN TO BANI-SADR, BUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR MESSAGES WERE NOT DISCLOSED.

6. FORMER IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SEAN MCPHIDE TOLD REUTER TODAY THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED A MCPHIDE PLAN FOR A NURNBURG-STYL INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OF THE DEPOSED SHAH. THE TRIAL WOULD BE CREATED UNDER U.N. SPONSORSHIP, ACCORDING TO MCPHIDE. THE U.N. WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE VERDICT WAS CARRIED OUT. HE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION FROM IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ENDORSED MCPHIDE'S PROPOSAL.

7. THE DOS MANAGED TO CONTACT GRUZE LAINGEN YESTERDAY. HE AND POLITICAL OFFICER TOMSETH INDICATED THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLEA IN IRAN OVER THE "PURPORTED" CARTER-KHOMEINI MESSAGE. TOMSETH FEELS THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED AFTER ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MINUTES.

8. A REPORT BY CBS CORRESPONDENT TO FENTON IN TEHRAN HAS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VOTING TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE CBS NEWS DESK, FENTON CLAIMS AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI KANI PROVIDED A CRUCIAL SWING VOTE. REPORTEDLY, OPPONENTS OF THE TRANSFER WILL TRY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS TO BLOCK THE MOVE. MAHDAVI KANI HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT REMINDING ALL CONCERNED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES ARE NOT PERMITTED, EXCEPT FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT THE HOSTAGES. HE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE

VC

MCH

4/17/80

121

CLASSIFICATION DETERMINED 12 AUG 93

DETERMINED 12 AUG 93

CONFIDENTIAL 12 AUG 93

DATA 12 AUG 93

MAILED 12 AUG 93

TOP SECRET

11. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ REMAIN COOL WITH BOTH NATIONS CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF HINDERING DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. IRAN ALSO REMAINS WARY OF IRACI MILITARY INTENTIONS

PERSIS, HOWEVER, INDICATED THAT THE FIGHTING IN WEST AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE HAS BEEN FAR MORE EXTENSIVE WITH SEVERAL LOCATIONS TO THE SOUTH OF TABRIZ INVOLVED (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

I-725

AN IRANIAN P-3 ORION CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE MISSION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 27 MARCH.

THE P-3 CIRCLED AT LEAST TWO OF THE SHIPS AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1,200 FEET, PASSING WITHIN 1,000 YARDS OF THE VESSELS.
BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(f) 132100Z APR 68

TO: [REDACTED]
JCS/LTC EAST/WASH DCT
~~TOP SECRET~~(U) J: DEPLOYMENT REPORT. NUMBER 1.
(U) [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] COOPERATION AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXCELLENT SO FAR.

(U) HOWEVER, AS SIZE OF FORCE GROWS, [REDACTED] OFFICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ABSENCE OF [REDACTED]

(G) [REDACTED] WHO HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY SINCE BEFORE WE ARRIVED AND HAS NOT BEEN IN ON THE PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING NORMALLY. [REDACTED] INVOLVES HIMSELF IN EVEN THE ROUTINE [REDACTED] DECISIONS AND THIS OPERATION IS OF GREATER MAGNITUDE THAN THAT TO WHICH [REDACTED] IS ACCUSTOMED.

(f) 3.) JET A-1 STORES AT [REDACTED] TOTAL

CCV
*AKC*PAGE 2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

OVER 1 MILLION [REDACTED] GALLONS. VERSUS EARLIER ESTIMATE OF 2.4 MILLION. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] INDICATES THIS IS NO PROBLEM.

REFUELING OPERATIONS ON 19 APR TOTALLED 12,000 [REDACTED] GALLONS. PROCEDURE OF TRUCKING FUEL FROM TANK FARM BY THE THREE AVAILABLE REFUELER HAS WORKED SATISFACTORILY. CONTRACTOR WILL PROVIDE AFTER-HOUR SERVICE IF NECESSARY. ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTIES WITH REFUELING.

(U) REPLENISHMENT OF [REDACTED] FUEL STORES SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 10 MAY, PRIOR TO MONSOON SEASON. JET A-1 PRICE IS APPROXIMATELY 50 CENTS PER GALLON.

(U) C-130 AND [REDACTED] MC-130 ARRIVED WITH MOST REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. WE DO NOT HAVE LATRINE CHEMICALS, GARBAGE BAGS, AND LIGHTS FOR

PAGE 3 ~~TOP SECRET~~

CAMP. REQUIRE C-RATIONS FOR 3 COMM PERSONNEL WHO ARRIVED WITHOUT. CHARCOAL WOULD BE A HELPFUL QUID TO GIVE TO THE [REDACTED] SINCE THERE IS NO FIRE WOOD ON THE [REDACTED]

(U) 6.) AIRCRAFT AND CAMP ARE CO-LOCATED AT EAST END OF DIRT RUNWAY, A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM BASE PROPER.

(U) 7.) WE ARE USING BASE ELECTRICAL POWER TO OPERATE W-3 SYSTEMS. [REDACTED] HAS SET UP TELEPHONE LAND LINE FROM CAMP TO TOWER AND SQUADRON OPERATIONS.

(U) 8.) TEMPERATURE TODAY WAS 103 DEGREES. PEOPLE ARE TAKING PRECAUTIONS. WOODEN TENT PEGS WON'T PENETRATE GROUND. WE PRECURED METAL STAKES IN LOCAL VILLAGE.

(U) 9.) ADVISE MAC THAT [REDACTED] HAS NO CAPABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING FLIGHT PLANS OR PROVIDING INROUTE WEATHER.

DDO NM
12
O APR



REF ID: A65145
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

i-735

THE JOINT STAFF

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAROLD L. MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND
LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Helicopter Maintenance Records

1. Maintenance records for the eight US Navy RH-53D aircraft used on the attempted hostage rescue in Iran are available for review as requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Please contact me, RADM Tom Cassidy (ext 52749), or LTC Stephen D. Olynyk (ext 74546) when arrangements have been made for the review.
2. Attached is a summary prepared on the basis of a careful review of both the helicopter maintenance records and the performance of the eight RH-53Ds on the rescue effort. It is intended that a copy be provided SASC personnel when they review the records.
3. This has been a major area of interest and we stand ready to assist with records review or answer questions as appropriate.
4. Note that the attached report is SECRET.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT
THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1980

~~SECRET~~

OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY

RH-53D HELICOPTER

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

~~NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND IS
NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JES
Declassified On: 04/04/2024~~

30A02

COPY 1 OF 10

~~SECRET~~
OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY
RH-53D MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

1. (U) PURPOSE. To determine the adequacy of maintenance performed on HM-16 RH-53D aircraft used on the rescue mission, to evaluate maintenance/ supply support procedures used to prepare the aircraft for the mission, and to assess the failures that occurred to helicopters in the mission.

2. (U) SCOPE. Effort expended and sources of information utilized were as follows:

- a. Review of CTF-70/NIMITZ message traffic
- b. Review of OPG point papers
- c. Review of mission aircraft logs and maintenance records.
- d. Personal interviews with:
 - (1) Mission flight crews
 - (2) Mission aircraft maintenance officer
 - (3) Selected passengers in mission aircraft
 - (4) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance officer
 - (5) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control officer
 - (6) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control chief.

3. (U) AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION

a. The single main rotor RH-53D helicopter is designed for both land and ship based operation. The helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft. It is powered by two General Electric T64-GE-415 turboshaft engines. The Automatic Flight Control System gives the helicopter an all weather capability. An auxiliary power plant (APP) gives the helicopter a self-starting capability. The helicopter has a fuel jettisoning system, rescue hoist, and seats for 37 passengers or 24 litters. It also has a rear ramp loading system and cargo tiedown facilities. There are provisions for external auxiliary fuel tanks, internal range extension tanks, air-to-air, and helicopter in flight refueling (HIFR) capabilities. It also has an external cargo hook and provisions for door guns. See TAB A for an aircraft illustration.

b. The primary mission of the RH-53D is airborne mine counter-measures (AMCM), which includes mine sweeping and ancillary tasks. The helicopter's secondary utility mission involves the movement of cargo and equipment and the transportation of passengers. The helicopter may be used for the rescue of personnel and the transportation of external cargo or inoperable aircraft.

c. The aircraft utilized for EVENING LIGHT were modified with commercial Omega navigation systems and provisions for the palletized inertial navigation system (PINS). Two internal fuel tanks and door mounted .50 caliber guns were also installed. Flight crewmembers were equipped with night vision goggles and aircraft landing lights were modified with infrared filters. Various items considered non-essential for this mission were removed for weight reduction. Items removed/added are contained in TAB B. Normal allowable gross weight for the RH-53D is 42,000 pounds. The Naval Air Systems Command provided a waiver to operate to 47,500 pounds for this mission.

~~4~~ ~~(b)~~ SUMMARY OF EVENTS

a. Pre-Mission Phase

(1) On 21 November 1979, six (6) RH-53D helicopters from HM-16 were air lifted from Norfolk to [REDACTED] by C-5, reassembled, and flown aboard KITTY HAWK on 28 November 1979.

(2) On 29 December 1979, two (2) additional RH-53Ds were transported by C-5 from Norfolk to [REDACTED]. The helos were reassembled and flown aboard NIMITZ at [REDACTED] on 2 January 1980.

(3) On 23 January, the six (6) RH-53Ds, HM-16 personnel, and equipment were cross-decked from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ making a total of eight (8) helicopters aboard NIMITZ. It was the determination of mission planners, based on past operational history, that eight RH-53D aircraft would support a launch of seven.

(4) During the period the RH-53Ds were deployed aboard KITTY HAWK and NIMITZ, they were flown at such a rate and in such a manner as to maintain maximum readiness and OPSEC. See TAB C for pre-mission flight-time and TAB D for pre-mission availability.

~~SECRET~~

(5) The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to mission execution to review maintenance records and personally inspect the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion (See TAB E). Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

(6) On 20 April, eight mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. The total team consisted of 50 personnel. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period and the engines were adjusted to provide maximum allowable power. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft.

(7) The loading of mission equipment commenced early evening of 23 April immediately upon completion of painting. All eight aircraft were turned up and those discrepancies noted were corrected (TAB F). Except for assistance specifically requested by mission maintenance crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted by HM-16 CO's direction from aircraft access. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded exclusively by mission crews.

(8) The engine air particle separators (EAPS), one for each engine, were designed to remove sand, dust, and other foreign particles entrained in the engine inlet air. The foreign particles are scavenged and exhausted overboard allowing clean air to enter the

~~SECRET~~

engine. The aircraft mission commander directed the removal of EAPS. There is no prohibition from removing the EAPS from the RH-53D. EAPS removal increases power available from each engine by 2% and reduces weight of each aircraft by approximately 200 lbs. A decrease in overall engine life was not a factor for the relatively short total time of this mission. Although sand and dust were anticipated, engine damage from FOD was not a consideration because of the conditions at the planned landing sites. Aircraft weight and power available from the engines were critical factors in mission planning.

(9) All eight RH-53D aircraft were full mission capable to perform the rescue mission at the time of execution. Aircrews were familiar and comfortable with their assigned aircraft. Mission pilots reported the material condition of their aircraft was excellent. All agreed that mission aircraft were in better material condition than either the CH-53s or the RH-53s in which they trained in CONUS.

(10) HM-16 troubleshooting teams were assigned to each aircraft for the mission launch with spare parts immediately available and were standing by on deck to provide assistance for the launch. Assistance requested was of a minor nature and was not related to navigational equipment.

b. Mission Execution Phase

(1) On 24 April, eight fully mission capable aircraft launched on the mission. Shortly after take off, aircraft #8 experienced an intermediate gearbox chip warning light. Since this gearbox had been recently replaced, this discrepancy was not considered aborting. Such occurrences are common during break-in of a new gearbox. The mission was continued uneventfully.

(2) Approximately two hours into the flight aircraft #6 experienced an in-cockpit redundant BIM (Blade Inspection Method) indication of impending main rotor blade failure and made an emergency landing in the desert. After rotor shutdown, the crewchief confirmed visually by checking the indicator on the blade that one main rotor blade had lost pressure, indicating a possible cracked spar. This was an aborting discrepancy since it cannot be determined

in the field if a crack has developed in the blade or if the indicator is faulty. Average flight time on all blades on this aircraft was 956 hours and the high time blade was 1546 hours. Main rotor blade established replacement life is 3000 hours. It is not known which blade failed. Aircraft #6 had experienced a second stage hydraulic system low pressure indication a short time earlier; however, hydraulic quantity was normal. This situation is not uncommon and could have been an indicator problem. The crew was in the process of changing the indicator in flight when the blade emergency occurred. Further, the crew suspected fuel was not transferring from one of the two internal range extension tanks. Manual transfer would have been possible. Neither the hydraulic pressure indication nor the perceived electric fuel transfer problem were causes for aborting the mission.

(3) Aircraft #8 landed and recovered the crew and classified material from aircraft #6. At this point seven RH-53Ds were proceeding with the mission.

(4) Shortly after departure from the NIMITZ, #5 experienced loss of the TACAN (ARN-52) and loss of yaw stabilization associated with the AFCS. The copilot, who was in control of the aircraft, was required to continuously make heading corrections with the rudder pedals. Since the copilot was wearing night vision goggles, the pilot was required to monitor the needle ball and continually advise the copilot of required rudder inputs. Once in the sand/dust storm, the situation became very vertigo-inducing. Because of the reduced visibility and an abrupt maneuver by the aircraft flying lead, flight integrity was lost. At this point the co-pilot notified the pilot that he had vertigo. The pilot took control of the aircraft, leveled the wings, and noticed that the RMI was frozen and there was a 15 degree bank error in his vertical gyro indicator. This was verified by checking the needle ball. By actuating the vertical gyro transfer switch, the pilot switched to the copilot's gyro. At this point the cockpit conditions were extremely difficult. The wet compass was required for heading information and navigation was limited to the PINS System, which the pilot reported had an approximate 5 NM error. With an inaccurate navigation system, lack of precise heading instrumentation, aircraft

stabilization problems, and no TACAN, the pilot considered mission continuation in instrument meteorological conditions at low level through the mountains which lay ahead to be impossible. Based on these factors, the decision was made to abort the mission and return to NIMITZ. Upon returning to NIMITZ, inspection revealed failure of the ASN-50 power supply by overheating due to failure of the power supply cooler blower. The ASN-50 powers the AHRS and AFCS. The TACAN blower motor, which is located in the nose electronics compartment, was also found inoperative. Although these failures caused an abort under the unexpected IMC flight conditions experienced, #5 could have continued the mission if forecast visual meteorological conditions had existed. On #5's recovery on NIMITZ, HM-16 maintenance personnel found one mission duffle bag wedged between a rib next to the left gunner station and the ASN-50 cooling intake. Overlapping the top of the air duct and the duffle bag were two mission flak jackets. The items were heavy enough and wedged in place securely enough to avoid movement under normal aircraft maneuvering. The positioning of these items severly restricted the airflow. A quantification of this restriction is not possible, however, it is the opinion of squadron maintenance personnel that the airflow intake was essentially secured by the mission equipment. Loading of mission equipment commenced on 23 April immediately after completion of painting. Except for assistance specifically requested by mission crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted from aircraft access and Marine guards were posted. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded by mission crews. It cannot be determined when the items were placed against the intake. The aircraft commander supervised placement of mission gear on 23 April 80 and stated that gear was not placed in the area of the ASN-50 intake. The aircraft commander further stated that in his personal estimation and direct observation that gear stored directly in front of the master internal fuel cell was moved by maintenance personnel to the vicinity of station 222 port side to gain access to the ASN-50 compartment (after landing). It is not possible to arrive at any firm conclusion regarding the possible obstruction of the cooling air intake.

(5) Six aircraft eventually landed at the refueling site. Arrivals were approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour and 25 minutes later than the planned estimated time of arrival. The delays were caused by weather and visibility problems experienced enroute that

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed. The aircraft was received from Sikorsky Aircraft by HM-12 on 1 Nov 73 and was transferred to HM-14 on 12 May 78. On 28 Dec 79 aircraft was disassembled for C-5A airlift to [REDACTED] and reassembled. It was flown aboard NIMITZ on 2 Jan 80. Aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 23 Jan 80.

The last major rework was completed at NARF North Island on 15 Dec 76. On 1 Feb 80, the aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A one hundred hour Phase D scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 1 Apr 80. No significant discrepancies were noted during this review. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 78.5 hours.

All maintenance records indicate the aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~AIRCRAFT SUMMARY

MISSION #4 BUNO: 158693 MODEX: 631
MISSION STATUS: Full mission capable
HOURS FLOWN: 19-23 Apr: 8.8
Total Apr: 9.1
Total Dec 79 - Apr 80: 83.1

MISSION EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

Aircraft was left at Desert One upon mission abort. No abort discrepancies existed at Desert One.

PRE-MISSION MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (19-24 Apr)

No significant maintenance discrepancies existed prior to the mission (TABS F and I).

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (Dec 79-Apr 80)

A review of all reported maintenance discrepancies and corrective actions revealed no outstanding, or significant discrepancies that would affect/degrade mission performance.

(c) AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Log and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 6 Feb 74. The aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. On 21 Nov 79, the aircraft was disassembled for airshipment via C-5A, and was reassembled at [REDACTED] on 25 Nov.

The last major rework was completed by NARF Pensacola on 25 Oct 77. On 1 Mar 80 this aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A 100-hour Phase "C" scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 18 Mar 80. No significant discrepancies were noted. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 85.3 hours.

All maintenance records indicate aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 20 Jul 73. Aircraft was subsequently transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. The aircraft completed scheduled depot level maintenance by NARF Pensacola on 14 December 1979. The aircraft was disassembled on 28 Dec 79 for transport aboard a C-5A and was received aboard NIMITZ 2 Jan 80. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 42.3 hours.

All records indicate this aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

~~SECRET~~

7. (S) SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES

a. Normal Support. When deployed, RH-53Ds are supported by a 90 day pack-up kit for support of 8 aircraft. The kit consists of 1289 line items including dynamic components. Historically, these pack-up kits have deployed with 85% range and depth. Follow-on support during deployment is as follows:

(1) Common items are obtained from nearest Naval Air Station.

(2) All requirements that cannot be satisfied at the operating site are passed to supply officer NSA, Norfolk via phone or message. He coordinates supply action with other supply activities and the inventory control point.

(3) Material is transported via Air Parcel Post, QUICK TRANS and MAC as appropriate.

b. EVENING LIGHT. The following actions constituted special, high priority treatment of support for the RH-53D mission:

(1) A 90 day pack-up of 1289 line items was deployed with 99.2% range and 98.8% depth.

(2) An additional pack-up of 169 line items augmented the normal 90 day pack-up. This additional pack-up increased the depth of some dynamic components by over 100%.

(3) Special logistics procedures to provide follow-on support were established on 27 Dec 1979. A special project code 807 was established for EVENING LIGHT. All support activities were directed to expedite all requirements identified to that project code. No reference was made as to what Project EVENING LIGHT entailed.

(4) Points of contact were established at NAS Cubi Point, COMNAVAIRLANT, and COMNAVAIRPAC.

(5) All requisitioning and expedite action was accomplished by phone or priority message. No reference to aircraft type was made in telephonic exchanges.

B

(6) All requisitions for RH-53D aircraft on KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ were processed through NAS Cubi Point. Cubi conducted an in-theater screen for assets. If not available in-theater, requirements were passed to NAS Norfolk. All actions were coordinated with points of contact established at various support activities.

(7) On 5 March 1980, NAVSUP initiated action to establish contact points at various transportation activities such as NAVMTO Norfolk, NATCO Travis AFB, and NATCO Clark AFB to coordinate the expeditious movement of material for EVENING LIGHT.

(8) In early March OP-51D was designated as CPNAV contact point to monitor movement of material. Daily phone contact with COMNAVAIRPAC provided a constant monitoring of material flow. Additional action was directed whenever material movement appeared stalled. This involved duplicate shipment of material in several instances.

(9) A daily SITSUM was provided both to OP-05 and the OPG in JCS.

c. Supply Support Summary. During the entire support phase of the RH-53D mission, supply support was considered excellent. The daily monitoring by OP-51D which began in March indicated that for the most part 7 aircraft had no unresolved material requirements and were reported in an up status.

8.(v)

(S) CONCLUSIONS

a. Maintenance performed on the eight mission RH-53Ds was adequate in all respects. Special maintenance procedures in the form of additional check lists, which included extensive inspection procedures, were accomplished to the satisfaction of the mission maintenance officer. Mission pilots felt the aircraft were in excellent material condition. The aircraft had been flown as necessary to exercise the dynamic components and to verify/evaluate maintenance actions. Special supply support was also provided. Eight mission ready RH-53Ds launched from NIMITZ on time for the rescue mission.

b. Transition from maintenance by HM-16 squadron personnel to mission preparation by mission flight crews was accomplished smoothly and professionally. Independent

~~SECRET~~
~~REF ID: A6512~~

SPECIAL PROCEDURES ACCOMPLISHED SPECIFIC TO MISSION PREPARATION
ONBOARD NIMITZ

ITEMS REMOVED FOR WEIGHT CONSIDERATION (WEIGHT INDICATED IN LBS)

Crew Chief Seat (11)	Cargo Hooks (42)
KB-18 (3)	MCM Cutter Supports (7)
MCM Mirrors (94)	IFR Probes (242)
Cargo Winches (94)	Heaters (86)
Cargo Pendants (3)	Rescue Hoists (Except for 2 ACFT) (4)
Cargo Straps (85)	Exposure Suit Blowers/Hoses (30)
Smoke Flares (25)	Upper Personnel Doors (15)
Stowage Container (21)	Passenger Seats/Fittings (121)
Tow Lines (5)	Tie Down Fittings (6)
Equipment Container Bags (8)	IFF and Control Box (21)
Heater Ducting (10)	Ky-28 (20)
Windshield Anti-Ice Control (2)	Ky-28 Control Panel (2)
EAPS and Control Panel (201)	Drip Pans (10)
#7 Tail Rotor Drive Shaft Cowl (10)	ICS Overhead Reels (11)
Emergency Exit Lights (3)	External ICS Phone (2)
Static Discharge/Excitor Box (56)	Tow Winch Guillotine Tester (14)

ITEMS ADDED FOR MISSION

PINS (101)	50 Cal Mounts (86)
OMEGA (61)	50 Cal Weapons (164)
Range Extension Tanks (Int) (700)	Armor Plating (Engine) (200)
Crew Night Vision Goggles (40)	IR Filters on Landing Lights (0)

ITEMS RECEIVING SPECIAL INSPECTION/ADJUSTMENT

- Engine topping increased
- Hydraulic lines/fittings checked for leakage
- Fuel lines checked for leakage
- Clocks synchronized (GMT)
- Dampeners checked for wear/limits
- Sleeve and spindles checked
- All rotor blades inspected
- Hydraulic pumps inspected for leakage
- Primary servos/AFCS servos
- Flight controls/linkages
- Hydraulic compartment control rods
- Rotor head control rods
- Tail rotor control rods
- Tail rotor control cables
- Thomas couplings
- APP drive shaft/couplings
- MGB oil cooler
- MGB oil cooler drive shaft/couplings
- MGB high speed drive shaft/couplings
- All lights
- Windscreens
- HF radios
- FM radios
- Rescue hoist (2 ACFT)
- Cockpit instruments
- Armor plating (Engine)

TOTAL REMOVED -1308
TOTAL ADDED -1352

~~SECRET~~

TAB C

AIRCRAFT PRE-MISSION FLIGHT HOURS (While Embarked)158744/632 (#1)

DEC 79	4.8
JAN 80	42.7
FEB 80	29.2
MAR 80	52.9
APR 80	32.7
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>162.3</u>

158753/634 (#2)

JAN 80	12.2
FEB 80	13.9
MAR 80	48.7
APR 80	17.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>91.9</u>

158761/637 (#3)

DEC 79	3.1
JAN 80	21.5
FEB 80	9.3
MAR 80	20.7
APR 80	24.0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>78.6</u>

158693/631 (#4)

DEC 79	10.7
JAN 80	29.2
FEB 80	17.9
MAR 80	16.2
APR	9.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>83.1</u>

158754/635 (#5)

DEC 79	5.7
JAN 80	24.6
FEB 80	56.0
MAR 80	25.7
APR 80	19.6
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>131.6</u>

158750/633 (#6)

JAN 80	6.0
FEB 80	0.0
MAR 80	8.6
APR 80	22.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>36.7</u>

158686/630 (#7)

DEC 79	6.8
JAN 80	19.6
FEB 80	54.0
MAR 80	27.2
APR 80	15.1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>122.7</u>

158758/636 (#8)

DEC 79	2.4
JAN 80	4.8
FEB 80	36.1
MAR 80	0.0
APR 80	1.2
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>44.5</u>

TOTAL FOR DET

DEC 79	33.5
JAN 80	160.6
FEB 80	216.4
MAR 80	200.0
APR 80	140.9
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>751.4</u>

TAB D

PRE-MISSION AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

<u>0800-0800</u> <u>DAY</u>	<u>UP/ASSIGNED</u> <u>STATUS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>
25 MAR 80	6/8	0	0.0
26 MAR 80	6/8	4	13.6
27 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
28 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
29 MAR 80	7/8	1	3.7
30 MAR 80	7/8	2	6.1
31 MAR 80	6/8	4	15.7
1 APR 80	6/8	2	7.0
2 APR 80	6/8	5	14.2
3 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
4 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
5 APR 80	7/8	1	3.5
6 APR 80	7/8	2	10.0
7 APR 80	7/8	1	0.1
8 APR 80	7/8	2	2.1
9 APR 80	6/8	2	3.6
10 APR 80	6/8	3	6.1
11 APR 80	6/8	2	6.2
12 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
13 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
14 APR 80	7/8	4	10.2
15 APR 80	7/8	1	1.5
16 APR 80	7/8	4	10.1
17 APR 80	7/8	2	7.5
18 APR 80	7/8	2	7.2
19 APR 80	7/8	3	5.6
20 APR 80	7/8	7	7.1
21 APR 80	7/8	6	13.2
22 APR 80	7/8	2	4.0
23 APR 80	8/8	0	0.0

~~SECRET~~

TAB F

MAINTENACE TURN-UP/DRESS REHEARSAL ON THE NIGHT OF 23 APRIL 80

The below listed discrepancies were noted by mission crews and squadron personnel during a maintenance turn-up/dress rehearsal on the night of 23 April:

MISSION #1

1. Upper rotating beacon needs more E/R paper.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: This discrepancy was repaired by the mission crew.

2. Install spot light panel and check operation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed spot light panel and functionally operated system.

3. Install rescue hoist and panel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed hoist and control panel, operationally checked good.

MISSION #2

1. TACAN inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operationally checked, TACAN worked as it should. The ships TACAN was not transmitting during this turn-up evolution.

MISSION #3

1. HF&FM inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced both receivers and transmitter.

2. Gunner's ICS inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repaired cannon plug and operationally checked system, it worked as it should.

3. Master caution light illuminated periodically during engine turn.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced master caution panel and checked same.

4. Tail rotor anti-collision light needs more paper.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Mission crew repaired this light.

MISSION #4

1. Lower anti-collision lite inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced lower anti-collision light.

~~SECRET~~

MISSION #5 CONTINUED

1. Pilot's 8 day clock in operative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced clock.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission #5 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #6

1. No UHF side tone.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. 8 day clock inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced 8 day clock.

MISSION #7

1. Pilot's spot rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to the absence of spare spot lights and with direction from Mission #7 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #8

1. UHF radio inoperative.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission # 8 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

3. #2 internal fuel tank will not transfer.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced tank and pressure refueled aircraft in order to check for leakage.

~~SECRET~~

TAB I

~~SECRET~~

MISSION AIRCRAFT #1

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
4 Dec	Rotor	#1 blade dampener bearing high limit	Removed and replaced
17 Dec	Fuselage	Pilot's windshield needs replacement	Removed and replaced
21 Dec	Airframe	Massive oil leak #2 nose gear box	Reseated "O" ring in filter
24 Dec	Flight Control	Lateral cyclic stick drive, both directions	remove and replace roll trim sensor
31 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's emergency exit window latch broken	Repaired latch
1 Jan	Rotor	Steady #2 BIM caution light	Found and repaired bad electrical connection
4 Jan	Rotary Wing	#1 high speed shaft Thomas coupling out of limits	Removed and replaced shaft/couplings
9 Jan	Electrical	#2 nose gear box pressure switch sticks	Removed and replaced
18 Jan	Rotary Wing Drive	Accessory gear box chip light	Cleaned and replaced chip plug, cleaned filter and did 30 min. penalty run
21 Jan	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged during move	Removed and replaced
30 Jan	Landing Gear	Port main mount tire bald	Replaced tire
3 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
4 Feb	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter failed	Removed and replaced
12 Feb	Rotor System	#3 Main rotor blade Pocket #18 bent down	Removed and replaced blade

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
14 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
15 Feb	Transmission	Intermediate gear box leaks	Removed and replaced
17 Feb	Transmission	Accessory gear box chip light	Replaced APP clutch
19 Feb	Flight	1st stage hydraulic filter button	Found bad pump; removed and replaced same
24 Feb	Flight Reference	Pilot's turn-rate needle inop	Replaced Pilot's turn rate gyro
1 Mar	Electrical	Cyclic trim inop	Found broken wire to roll servo, repaired same
3 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME Azimuth good	Removed and replaced
10 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME	Replaced TACAN. Checks O.K.
10 Mar	Flight Control	Pilots beeper trim intermittent	Replaced bad switch
11 Mar	Flight Control	Beeper trim still inop.	Replaced pilot's cyclic stick
15 Mar	Rotor	Solid #1 cockpit BIM	Found and repaired two broken wires
24 Mar	Engine	When motoring #1 engine, #2 engine would motor also	Replaced dual start valve
1 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator quit	Replaced #2 generator
2 Apr	Flight Ref	Pilot's turn rate gyro has full deflection	Replaced bad gyro
6 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN breaks lock-on	Removed and replaced

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
6 Apr	Radio Nav	Omega dropped off line five minutes	Replaced control box
11 Apr	Rotor	#4 Blade BIM check out of limits	Replaced main rotor blade
14 Apr	Radio Nav	Erratic TACAN Azimuth/ DME	Replaced TACAN
17 Apr	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter inop.	Replaced bad alt
20 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN stopped after one hour	Replaced TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #2SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	HM-16 Acceptance Inspection	Complied with acceptance inspection
3 Feb	Rotor Sys	A/C has medium freq in all flight regimes	Inspected all main rotor components. Found 3 bad dampers; removed and replaced. A/C checks good.
19 Feb	Flt Controls	2nd stage hyd sys overserviced	Deserviced
21 Feb	Radio Nav	DME portion of TACAN inoperative	Removed and Replaced TACAN
21 Feb	Instruments	Flickering BIM	Could not duplicate discrepancy 2 adel clamps replaced, cleane all cannon plugs.
21 Feb	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav wanders 150 miles west SW during flt	System checked good on ground power
28 Feb	Navigation	TACAN bearing inop DME good	Removed and replaced TACAN
1 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav inop all modes	Tech Rep check system - Checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	TACAN inop both DME and Azimuth	Found suppression pulse cables crossed. Corrected cables. System checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	BIM #2 flickers constantly in flight	Troubleshoot system. Found bad #1 harness; removed and replaced same.
6 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME or Azimuth any channel	Removed and replaced. Checked bad on ground power, no DME.
6 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega outputs unreliable	Removed and replaced Omega

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
9 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME Azimuth O.K.	Removed and replaced TACAN. Checks good on channel
15 Mar	Flt Control	2d stage hyd system between Yellow & Green on deck. Drops 1/4" into Yellow inflight. Suspect air in system.	Serviced 2d stage to proper level cockpit qty level chec good. Found no air in syste
21 Mar	Airframe	Inspect all rigid & flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd for chafing, proper routing and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
24 Mar	Navigation	Omega nav showed 75 mile error from known position.	Omega check good on next flight.
24 Mar	Airframe	2d stage hyd qty sys has mod leak. Dropped from full to top of yellow in 2.5 hrs. Suspect air.	Bled reservoir and serviced to proper level. No evidence of leakage.
24 Mar	Rotor	#2 blade BIM block cracked all the way through.	Potted crack in #2 BIM block.
26 Mar	Airframe	2nd stage hyd press filter button found popped on pre-flt insp.	Replaced 2nd stage pressure filter element.
9 Apr	Transmission	#1 NGB chip lite, 10 mins after T/O. Recycled ckt bkr...Lite stayed on.	Pulled chip detectors and oil filters, found no chips. Flushed NGB twice and reserviced. Checked good after 30 min penalty run.
11 Apr	Main Rotor Blade	#5 blade heavily scratched (to metal) 3rd pocket from inboard side.	Blended, cleaned and preserved.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
11 Apr	Main Rotor	#4 blade pocket dented, 2d pocket from tip	Inspected pocket, O.K.
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
MISSION AIRCRAFT #3SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
3 Jan	Airframe	Both wind screens scratched	Replaced same
5 Jan	Engine	#2 engine would not start	Replaced ignitor plugs
7 Jan	Ground Accident	Tail rotor gearbox Tail rotor hub assy Tail rotor pitch beam assy Tail rotor pitch link assy Tail rotor blades (3) Main rotor head Swashplate Main rotor blades (4) Pitch rod assy	Removed and replaced damaged components
20 Jan	Fuselage	Winch-engine start pump case cracked	Replaced pump
22 Jan	Electrical	#2 steady BIM light	Replaced electrical harness
29 Jan	Rotor	#1 and #6 main rotor blades damaged	Replaced blade
14 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
28 Feb	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic quantity low light pressure & quantity O.K.	Replaced caution panel
22 Mar	Radio Nav	Omega display frozen	Repaired by FSR
8 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator failed in flight	Replaced supervisory panel
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #4SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
<u>79</u>			
07 Dec	Main Rotor Blade	Bad BIM indication on #3 blade. Shows partly black	Removed and replaced #3 main rotor blade
23 Dec	Navigation	TACAN #2 needle would not search	Removed and replaced TACAN
<u>80</u>			
16 Jan	Flight Reference	Pilot's gyro has intermittent "OFF" flag	Troubleshooting pilots gyro using ASN-50 test set found power supply to be bad. Removed and replaced power supply.
16 Jan	Navigation	TACAN has no DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
18 Jan	Hydraulic	1st Stage manifold filter popped	Checked manifold for metal particles and replaced filter
26 Jan	BIM	Flickering #2 BIM in flt.	Cleaned #6 BIM block and harness. Checked Good.
11 Mar	T/Rotor Blade	T/R blade has 4 dents on leading edge	Removed and replaced T/R Blade.
20 Mar	Hydraulic	2nd stage hyd qty indicator fluctuates from center green to 1/8 inch from bottom of yellow in 3.1 hr Flt.	Serviced reservoir system checks good.
21 Mar	Hydraulic	Inspect all rigid and flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd area for chaffing proper routing, and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
29 Mar	BIM Sys	#1 MRB has 2 cracks in BIM block	Repaired BIM block

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #4SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
<u>80</u>			
08 Apr	Engine	#1 Engine experienced 3 loud pops, followed by another pop and torque decreased from 80% to 30%. Incident occurred after maint hover, when A/C trans- itioned to fwd flt.	Removed and replaced #1 eng:
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #5SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
17 Dec	Flight Reference	ASN-50 Power Supply missing from Acft	Installed ASN-50 Pwr supply
17 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's windshield hazy	Replaced windshield
27 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Roll trim inop all AFCS channels	Found disconnected cannon plug. Reconnected same.
01 Jan	Flight Reference	Compass card on BDHI frozen	Replaced ASN-50 Gyro
05 Jan	Fuel	Internal range extension tank control box inop	Removed, repaired and replaced
09 Jan	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
02 Feb	Radio Navigation	TACAN inop in Azimuth/DME	Removed and Replaced
06 Feb	Electrical	Lost #2 Generator	Replaced #2 Generator
08 Feb	Radio NAV	TACAN 40° lock-off	Replaced TACAN
11 Feb	UHF Comm	UHF failed after take-off	Removed and replaced UHF
15 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade bent	Replaced T/R blade
16 Feb	Rotor	#4 Main rotor blade has bad pocket	Replaced #4 MRB
16 Feb	Power Plant	Auxiliary power plant shaft sheared	Removed and replaced APP support/shaft
23 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW problems above 150' and 60 Kts	Replaced AFCS AMP and blown Fuse
27 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW hardover #2 AFCS	Repaired broken wire
28 Feb	Integrated Guidance	Stiff right pedal with #1 AFCS servo on	Replaced bad #2 dual input servo valve

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #5 (continued)~~SECRET~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
07 Mar	Integrated Guidance	AFCS and CoPilot Gyro problem in roll	1080Y Gyro found bad, replaced same.
12 Mar	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
01 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade has FOD damage	Replaced T/R blade
14 Apr	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS AMPS off got sharp yaw kick when switching servo from #1 to #2	Adjusted #2 Moog valve check good
14 Apr	Radio NAV	TACAN inop all channels Azimuth/DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
19 Apr	Rotor	Remove and Replace tail rotor blade due to bad balance	Completed same.
19 Apr	Radio NAV	#2 needle on TACAN will not rotate	Removed and replaced blower motor and TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #6SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
24 Jan	A/C	A/C acceptance inspection	Performed acceptance inspection
25 Jan	Main rotor blade	Removed #3 MRB for installation on A/C #3	Replaced on 28 Feb 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 31 Jan 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed winch engine start pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 25 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #1 MRB for A/C #4	Replaced blade 28 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #6 MRB for A/C #7	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
16 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #5 MRB for A/C #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
18 Feb	Intermed. gearbox	Removed IGB for A/C #1	Replaced on 19 Feb 80
20 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #4 MRB for #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
28 Feb	A/C	Ground incident involving T/R blade striking overhead	Replaced all dynamic components aft of main gear box during period from 28 Feb to 19 Mar 80
13 Mar	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #1	Replaced 18 Mar 80
16 Mar	Full system	Check all internal tanks	Complied with same

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #6SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Mar	Hydraulics	Insp all rigid and flex. hyd. lines in cabin ovhd. for chafing, proper routing and replacement, if needed	Complied with same
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None, aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
MISSION AIRCRAFT #7~~SECRET~~SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
06 Dec	Instruments	Pilots AFCS indicator erratic regardless of AFCS status	Removed and replaced
18 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Hardover to right in yaw with both feet off pedals	Repaired bad AFCS control panel
30 Jan	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has right hardover	Indicator out of adjustment. Repaired same.
12 Feb	Flight Control	Cyclic hunts and drives any configuration	Replaced bad roll sensor
13 Feb	HF Comm	Unable to transmit or receive on HF	Removed and replaced
14 Feb	Rotor	#6 Main rotor blade has cracked 3rd pocket	Replaced main rotor blade
16 Feb	Flight Controls	Cyclic hunts in roll	Replaced bad AFCS roll sensor
20 Feb	Integrated Guidance	#1 AFCS Amp on with #2 Amp off result in full right YAW	Replaced Lateral accelerometer
21 Feb	Flight Reference	Copilot turn Rate Gyro inop in norm position	Replaced Turn Rate Gyro
21 Feb	Navigator	OMEGA INOP	Replaced OMEGA Control Box
28 Feb	Flight Control	Excessive Force Required to move cyclic with Trim off	Replaced Roll Trim Valve
7 Mar	Navigation	OMEGA quit half way through flight	Replaced Power Supply
16 Mar	Integrated Guidance	Acft yaws right any AFCS Configuration	Adjusted Lateral accelerometer

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #7 (Continued)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
16 Mar	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro Precesses in flight	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
29 Mar	Engine	Unable to start Aux Power Plant	Replaced ignitor Plugs
29 Mar	Engine	Aux Power Plant pump cavitated	Replaced pump
30 Mar	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS 1 or AFCS 2 Servo on and AFCS #1 amp off, have outer loop drive	Replaced bad AFCS Roll Sensor
11 Apr	Flight Refererence	Pilot's Gyro shows extreme nose down	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
11 Apr	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has roll oscillations	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
11 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
19 Apr	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic pressure fluctuations	Replaced bad indicator
19 Apr	Integrated Guidance	#2 YAW indicator stays 1 mark to right of neutral	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
22 Apr	Nav	OMEGA Alert Lite intermittent	Replaced by FSR
23 Apr	Rotor	Tail Rotor Blade Abrasive Strip coming off	Replaced T/R Blade
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #8SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
10 Dec 79	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip-lite, recycled chip detector CKT-BKR lite went out.	Removed and cleaned chip-detector, No evidence of fuzz.
30 Dec 79	Transmission	#1 nose gear box chip lite.	Removed and cleaned chip detector, no evidence of fuzz. Penalty run conducted, system checks good.
8 Jan 80	Flight Reference	Pilot's attitude gyro warning flag stays on- Transfers to Co-pilot when VGI transfer switch activated.	ASN-50 power supply system bad. Removed and replaced.
8 Jan 80	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip lite illuminated stays on when CKT-BKR is reset.	Removed all chip detectors, no evidence of metallic chips. Electrical continuity checks performed. 30 Min penalty run. No lite.
28 Jan 80	Hydraulics	1st stage hyd system pressure did not come online.	Removed and replaced 1st stage hyd. Pump reservice Checks good.
5 Feb 80	AFCS	Heading hold hunts with feet off pedals.	Replaced yaw sensor.
11 Feb 80	AFCS	#2 amplifier has no dampening in roll mode. @ 140kts A/C has porpoise in pitch.	Removed and replaced roll-rate and pitch-rate gyros.
21 Feb 80	Hydraulics	Cannibalization of 1st stage hyd pump.	Replaced pump on 29 Feb 80
4 Mar 80	Intermed GB	Removed IGB for A/C #6	Replaced on 22 Mar 80

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~MISSION AIRCRAFT #8SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
21 Apr 80	Aircraft	Functional check flight flown with following discrepancies: - Dampners require ser- vicing. - FM squelch does not work. TACAN no lock- on.	All discrepancies re- paired prior to mission launch
24 Apr 80	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

~~SECRET~~

SEC

VOFORN

~~TOP SECRET~~

759


OpOrd

JTD Exercise

With this in bold

STORM CLOUD

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12355
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE OF BY DDO NMCC
 DDCR NMCC 2
REF ID: OADR
SOURCE: Mult. Sources



CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 15 NOVEMBER 2000
EXTENDED BY JCS, J-3
REASON 5200.1R, PAR 2-301c(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Situation
2. (U) Mission
3. (U) Execution
4. (U) Support
5. (U) Command Control, Communications

ANNEXES:

A. (U) Task Organization

B. (U) Intelligence

Appendix 1 (U) Weather

C. (U) Operations

Appendix 1 (C) Delta

Appendix 2 (C) Rangers

Appendix 3 (U) Helo Ops

Appendix 4 (C) [REDACTED]

Appendix 5 (U) MC/EC-130

Appendix 6 (U) [REDACTED]

Appendix 7 (U) Air Defense

Appendix 8 (U) C-5/C-141B

Appendix 9 (U) KC-135

Appendix 10 (U) [REDACTED]

Appendix 11 (U) Airfield Plans, Clamity Jane procedures

A

D. (U) Logistics

Appendix 1 (U) Medical

J. (U) Command Relationships

Appendix 1 (U) Command Structure Chart

K. (U) Communications

L. (U) Operations Security

X. (U) Flight routes, Flow Chart

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

1. (U) Situation:

(J)

a. (S) General: A wealthy, radical "third world" nation, Calivada, is in the final stages of becoming a nuclear power. Peaceful nuclear facilities purchased from European nations have helped this process. Recently this nation has decided to speed the process by kidnapping three US nuclear physicists and stealing components and plans for nuclear weapons. The self proclaimed President-for-Life of Calivada has clearly stated that he will attempt to use his future nuclear capability to coerce the US on a number of regional issues. The US has confirmed that Calivada was responsible for the kidnapping and theft. An exhaustive search has located the US physicists and the plans/components (hereafter collectively referred to as "critical cargo") in a large city within the country.

(U)

(S) The physicists are being held in a government research office, BACON, while the plans and components are being kept at a nearby reseach facility, LIMESTONE.

(U)

(S) The objective of JTD Exercise STORM CLOUD is to recover the critical cargo intact and the physicists alive and well.

(U)

b. (S) Enemy: The country of Calivada is extremely hostile to the US. The neighboring countries of Arizona and New Mexico, while hostile to both the US and Calivada, would nonetheless probably warn Calivada of any US attempt to recover the critical material. Although Calivada's armed forces are relatively inefficient, there are adequate military resources available to present a hostile environment to any US recovery attempt.

(U)

c. (S) Friendly: The countries east of the Mississippi are sympathetic to the US and have granted the US overflight rights and a few staging facilities. These facilities are in sufficiently remote areas to allow short-term use without drawing undue attention.

(U)

2. (S) Mission: JTD STORM CLOUD forces covertly penetrate the hostile territory of Calivada and conduct simultaneous air assault operations to recover the US assets being illegally held at locations LIMESTONE and BACON.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operation

A

(1) (S) Phase I. Pre-Deployment. At D-1, [REDACTED] and DELTA move to an isolated area of Ft Bragg to conduct day and night rehearsals. [REDACTED] conducts rehearsals at a site to be determined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) (U) Annex A - Task Organization
- (2) (U) Annex C - Operations
- (3) (U) Annex X - Execution Time Chart
- (4) (S) Location Designators:

CAMELOT (Edwards AFB)
RIVERSIDE (Desert Rock)
EVERGLADE (Indian Springs)
BACON (Jackass Flats)
LIMESTONE (MX Site)
BROOMCORN (Campbell)
CANVASBACK (Hurlburt)
HORSESHOE (Bragg)
REMINGTON (Hunter)
GARRISON (Pahute Mesa)

(5) (S) CPX to be conducted 19 Nov. Message to follow.

(6) (S) Alternate evacuation sites are RIVERSIDE and
CAMELOT in order.

(7) (U) Tasking:

(U) JTD:

(a) (U) Provide OPSEC/cover story.

(b) (U) Staff weather services.

(c) (U) Provide overall guidance/command.

A

(S) [REDACTED] (RGR) [REDACTED] Inf.

(a) (S) (U) Provide required forces for LIMESTONE, RIVERSIDE
and EVERGLADE.

(b) (S) (U) Provide OPFOR at exercise area. OPFOR to
deploy to GARRISON 20 Nov.

(c) (S) (U) Assist at CAMELOT as required.

(C) DELTA

(a) (S) (U) Provide required forces for LIMESTONE.

(b) (S) (U) Provide control of UH-60 assets during
assault phase.

A

(c) (C) Provide guidance/control of [REDACTED] assets
chopped to use in assault phase.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) [REDACTED]

- A
[REDACTED] (U)
(a) (U) Provide required forces for BACON.
(b) (U) Provide control of OPCON [REDACTED] assets during assault phase.

- [REDACTED] (U)
(c) (U) Verify headcount to DELTA at EVERGLADE.

- [REDACTED] (U)
(a) (U) Construct BACON/LIMESTONE objectives.

- [REDACTED] (U)
(b) (U) Provide control of their [REDACTED] during attack phase.

- [REDACTED] (U)
(c) (U) Provide OPSEC evaluation of exercise area at conclusion of trainex.

- [REDACTED] (U)
(d) (U) Provide focal point for coordination with DOE.

(U)
(e) 101st

- (a) (U) Provide required helo force. ?

- (b) (U) Provide admin recovery capability for downed helos.

- (c) (U)
(e) (U) Coordinate administrative backhaul from Edwards AFB.

- (d) (U)
(e) (U) Schedule assault force arrival at BROOMCORN to preclude standing time.

- (e) (U) Interface with [REDACTED]

A
(C) 1st SOW

- (a) (U) Provide required fixed wing support.

- (b) (U)
(e) (U) Provide CCT support as required.

- (c) (U)
(e) (U) Insure CCT conducts liaison with CAMELOT and EVERGLADE prior to 21 Nov 80.

- (d) (U)
(e) (U) Coordinate emergency abort plan and Calamity Jane procedures with ground commanders.

- (e) (U)
(e) (U) Develop helo ground refuel plan and provide OPCON of 101 Pathfinders for refuel operations at EVERGLADE.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
A [REDACTED] AWACW

(a) (U) Provide AWAC support as required.

(b) (U) Develop, coordinate and control under separate Frag Order: F-14 Cap, F-4 Aggressor package and associated tanker support.

(C) USA QM Unit

(a) (U) Support as required.

(b) (U) Establish FAR system at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE.

(8) (U) Debrief will be conducted at 1300 on 25 November 1980. Commanders and unit representatives should report to the Pentagon, Room 2C840.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~~~SECRET~~4. (U) Support.
Annex D - Logistics

5. (U) Command, Control, Communications

a. (S) Communications:

(1) (S) There will be three JTD Command Nets; SATCOM, ALPHA, SATCOM BRAVO, and HF CHARLIE. All will operate in the secure voice mode.

(2) (S) The mission element nets will operate in the categories of inter-air, air-ground, ground, and fire support. HF VHF-FM, VHF-AM, and UHF, both secure and non-secure, will be the modes of operation.

(3) (U) See C-E Annex K and the CEOI, published separately, for additional information.

b. (U) Command and Control:

(1) (S) JTD command communications will operate from eight locations; the JTD base (photography), two JTD relays (POCKETBOOK and RYE GRASS), the JTD forward command posts (CAMELOT and EVERGLADE), a JTD response cell (BRASS RING), the JTD airborne command posts (E-3A and AC-130), and the JTD Main (HAMMER).

(2) (U) All primary element commanders will report directly to the CDR, JTD.

(3) (U) The Main JTD command post will be located with the CDR, JTD at all times.

(4) (U) See Annex J for additional information.

ROBERT A. TURNER
Colonel, USA
Joint Test Director

ORFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DUTTON
Colonel, USAF
J-3(S) DISTRIBUTION

Unit	Cys
██████████	2
1 SOW	4
██████████	2
101st	4
DELTA	2
██████████	1
PWACCS	2
C-141/C-5	5
KC-135	2
JTD	6
██████████	6

ANNEXES:

- A. Task Organization
- B. Intelligence
- C. Operations
- D. Logistics
- J. Command Relationships
- K. Communications-Electronics
- L. OPSEC
- X. Time Chart

REDACTED
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
USA Qm Unit
GOM (Charleston)

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

(U) Task Organization

1. ~~(S)~~ Unit:

JTD HQ

[REDACTED] TF 79.1 (DELTA) [REDACTED]

101st AVN GP (-)
1st SOW (+)
AIR CAP (F-T4)
AWACS
QM Det
Ele JCSE
Ele ADA

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission Area:

LIMESTONE

BACON

RIVERSIDE

TF 79.1

CO,

Ele, 1st SOW

EVERGLADE

OTHER

FIRE SUPPORT

1st SOW (-)
Ele ADA
QM DET

JTD HQ
AWACS

AC-130
AIR CAP
AH-1G

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

(U)

a. (S) Strategic Setting: Joint Training Exercise STORM CLOUD will be held utilizing the following: Hurlburt Field, FL; Ft. Bragg, NC; Ft. Campbell, KY; Edwards AFB, CA; Indian Springs Aux, NV; Desert Rock Aux, NV; and Nevada Test Site. This is a JCS coordinated, JTD sponsored exercise. The setting is a representation of world-wide capabilities in a hostile environment.

(U)

b. (S) Setting Countries: In the exercise strategic setting, country Calivada is surrounded by countries inimical to its own as well as to US interests. In the region there are friendly countries which will allow US forces use of their territories as landing/staging sites, as long as the influx of forces are kept as inconspicuous as possible.

(U)

c. (S) Political Situations: Country Calivada has long been suspicious of US and European motives in the region. Despite Calivada's continuing attempts to rid the region of US and European influence, it has continued to do business and purchase arms from both. Calivada is also regarded by its neighbors as being a threat to the stability of the area. Its neighbors suspect Calivada of planning to develop a nuclear capability that will allow it not only to influence US actions, but to intimidate its neighbors as well. There is ample reason for this suspicion, as Calivada has had historical territorial designs on its neighbors as well as a history of irrational actions. Calivada's armed forces, while inefficient by Western standards, is one of the largest and best equipped in the area. Calivada has shown itself to be extremely security conscious and has attempted to arm itself with the best and latest military equipment.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APPENDIX 1 (WEATHER) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

Situation Climatic Brief
CAMELOT

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36F increasing to 66F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about three days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Daytime wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.
2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequent. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/31% of the time or less. Conditions less than 55/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85
MEAN MAXIMUM	66
MEAN MINIMUM	36
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16
NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION	3
SNOW	*
FOG	1
95% WORST DA	4800 Ft
95% WORD PA	2400 Ft

* = Less than 0.5 day

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

- (1) (U) Actions at downed aircraft: TAB C (Downed Aircraft)
- (2) (U) Aircraft load plans: TAB D (Load Plans)

4. (U) Service Support: SOP

5. (U) Command and Signal:

a. (U) Signal: TAB E (SIGNAL)

^(U)

b. (S) Command: The TF 79.1 Commander is in UH-60 #4 during the assault flight, in the vicinity of point GRANGE during the assault, in the vicinity of the SW corner of EZ WHISKEY after the evacuation to objective GOLD, and is UH-60 #6 during the exfil.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DELTA: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(c) EVENT	XMIT TO	BREVITY
1. ASSAULT FORCE ON GND, ASSAULT IN PROGRESS.	RGR BN CDR TO [REDACTED] ACCLAIM [REDACTED] DELTA CDR, DELTA CDR TO CDR, [REDACTED]	
2. # PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO EXFIL AIRFIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	ANTELOPE
3. FORCES DEPART OBJ, RGR BN CDR ASSUMES FSC.	DELTA CDR TO [REDACTED] RGR BN CDR,	BASKETBALL
4. FORCES CLOSED INTO FIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [REDACTED]	CITADEL
5. TM DELTA (-) ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	RGR BN CDR TO [REDACTED] CDR [REDACTED]	DENTIST
6. TM RANGER ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	UH-60 FLIGHT LDR TO CDR JTF,	FOOTNOTE

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET NOFORN~~

PHASE I

CAMELOT

(U) 1. OFF LOADING/BUILD UP

(U) 2. ASSEMBLY AREA

~~(U)~~ 3. T/O TIME

- | | |
|---------------|-------|
| A. 4 UH-60 | 0310Z |
| B. 8 AH-1S | 0320Z |
| C. [REDACTED] | 0321Z |
| D. 20 UH-60 | 0515Z |

(U) 4. ENROUTE MAP

~~(U)~~ 5. ARRIVAL AT RIVERSIDE

- | | |
|---------------|-------|
| A. 4 UH-60 | 0428Z |
| B. 8 AH-1S | 0438Z |
| C. [REDACTED] | 0508Z |
| D. 20 UH-60 | 0633Z |

~~(U)~~ 6. REFUELING TIME

- | | |
|---------------|------------|
| A. AH-1S | 0508Z |
| B. [REDACTED] | 0633Z (21) |
| | 0648Z (24) |

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~REF ID: A6591~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PHASE II

RIVERSIDE TO BACON & LIMESTONE

(C) 1. T/O TIME (RIVERSIDE)

- A. 16, [REDACTED] 1, AH-1S 0824Z
- B. 24, UH-60/2, AH-1S 0825Z
- C. 8, [REDACTED] 0826Z
- D. 3, AH-1S 0829Z
- E. 1, AH-1S 0832Z
- F. 1, AH-1S 0838Z

(U) 2. ENROUTE MAP

(U) 3. AH-1S TARGET MAP

(C) 4. EGRESS TIME

- A. 16, [REDACTED] 0900Z
- B. 8, [REDACTED] 0902Z
- C. 8, UH-60 0915Z
- D. 16, UH-60 0945Z
- E. 8, AH-1S 0945Z

~~REF ID: A6592~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

PHASE III

EVERGLADE:

(C) 1. ARRIVAL AT EVERGLADE

- A. 16, [REDACTED] 0932Z
- B. 8, UH-60 0939Z
- C. 16, UH-60 1009Z
- D. 8, AH-1S 1005Z

(U) 2. REFUEL/DEPARTURE

- A. 8, UH-60 1004Z
- B. 16, UH-60 (8) 1034Z
 (8) 1039Z
- C. 8, AH-1S 1139Z

RIVERSIDE:

- (C) 1. 5, [REDACTED] ARRIVE 0923Z
- 2. 5, [REDACTED] DEPART 1003Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

APPENDIX 5 (MC/EC-130) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Seven (7) Aircraft (5-MC's/2-EC's)
2. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Takeoff CANVASBACK - 0100Z to 0130Z (as required)
3. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Refueling Times: 0300Z - 3 aircraft
(at the ARIP) 0310Z - 2 aircraft
0320Z - 2 aircraft
4. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Low level entry times: 0430Z till 0455Z

Low level entry point: N35-07 W99-50
5. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ TOT's:
 - a. EVERGLADE - 0845/46/47/48/55Z
 - b. RIVERSIDE - 0855Z/0905Z
6. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Takeoff times: (Approx 2 hrs on ground)
1045Z till 1115Z
7. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Low level exit time: 1500Z till 1520Z (N35-07 W99-50)
8. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Refueling times: 1540/1550/1600Z
9. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ Land times CANVASBACK: 1820/1830/1840Z

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APPENDIX 8 (C-5, C-141B OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) TASKS:

(a) (U) Provide 8 C-5 and 3 C-141B aircraft to airlift JTD STORM CLOUD forces/equipment to required destinations.

(b) (U) Provide Combat Control Team as required to:

(1) (U) ~~Exercise~~ Exercise positive control of all fixed wing and rotary wing takeoffs and landings except for initial blacked out MC-130 landings at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE and initial helicopter landings at RIVERSIDE.

A (2) ~~Assist~~ Assist and plan with [REDACTED] for the safe transloading of passengers from helicopters to fixed wing assets.

(3) (U) ~~Coordinate~~ Coordinate emergency abort plan with the on-scene ground commander.

(4) (U) Develop helicopter ground refueling flow plan.

2. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: COMJTF exercises command and control of MAC forces through the COMALF.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) C-5: 8 C-5 aircraft will airlift helicopters and forces from BROOMCORN to CAMELOT.

#1	T/O BROOMCORN	212030
#2	"	212040
#3	"	212050
#4	"	212100
#5	"	212110
#6	"	212120
#7	"	212130
#8	"	212140
#1	ARV.CAMELOT	220130
#2	"	220140
#3	"	220150
#4	"	220200
#5	"	220210
#6	"	220220
#7	"	220230
#8	"	220240
#1-8	ON-LOAD CAMELOT	221800

b. (U) Depart times and arrival times at BROOMCORN to be determined.

~~CONFIDENTIAL//SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) c. (S) C-141B EVERGLADE 3 C-141B aircraft will airlift
fuel blivets.

#1	T/O HORSESHOE	220333
#2	"	220335
#3	"	220337
#1	ARCP	220500
#2	"	220500
#3	"	220500
#1	ARV. EVERGLADE	220908
#2	"	220913
#3	"	220918
#1	T/O EVERGLADE	221000
#2	"	221020
#1	ARCP	221330
#3	"	221350
#1	SVN/POB	221530
#3	"	221550

(U) d. (S) #2 C-141B will remain at EVERGLADE to admin airlift bivits
and load personnel to HORSESHOE. T/O time to be determined.

e. (U) LOAD/BACKHAUL PLAN:

See Charts

?

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOSCOP~~

APPENDIX 9 (KC-135 OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

(U) 1. (S) Concept of Operations: SAC will provide inbound and outbound refueling support for AC/MC/EC-130 and C-141B aircraft, as well as refueling for E-3A/F-14 fighter cap package. The 1SOW will coordinate special tracks for low altitude refueling. For high altitude operations, fighter cap package will use A/R 3E, while C-141Bs will use AR 112 W/E. All refueling operations will be conducted using only minimum essential communications.

(U) a. (S) E-3A/Fighter Support: A tanker task force at March AFB will support F-14 refuelings with drogue-equipped KC-135s. Specific mission details will be contained in E-3A air-to-air annex for STORM CLOUD.

(U) b. (S) C-141B Support: Altus AFB KC-135s will support both inbound and outbound refuelings in A/R 112, using point parallel procedures. The inbound ARCT will be a firm preplanned time; outbound ARCT will be adjusted based on the receiver's launch time. Tankers will be prepared to hold, awaiting C-141 late outbound arrival.

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	RATIO TNKR/RCVR	ARCT	ALTITUDE	OFFLOA
THEM 51	TBD	112W	1:3	220500Z	270	15m ea
THEM 52	TBD	112E	1:1	221330Z	270	25m
THEM 53	TBD	112E	1:1	221350Z	270	25m

c. (U) Communications/Rendezvous Plan is as published in FLIP.

(U) d. (S) AC/MC/EC-130 Support: A tanker task force at Grissom AFB will support all 1SOW refuelings, using overhead comm-out rendezvous for inbound refueling; modified point parallel for outbound A/R. Inbound ARCT (time at the RZ point) will be preplanned; outbound ARCTs will be adjusted based on receiver launch time. The 1SOW will coordinate the special low altitude refueling tracks to be used for this exercise.

(1) (U) (S) Planned A/R tracks:

TRACK	RZ POINT	ARCP	EAR
A	TXK 316/33	ADM 087/85	ADM 067/20
B	ADM 306/33	ADM 067/20	TXK 316/33
C	(Between Abilene, TX and Roswell, NM)		
D	(Between Prescott VORTAC and St Johns VORTAC)		

~~SECRET/NOSCOP~~
~~SECRET/NOSCOP~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Final determination of AR Tracks will depend upon 1SOW requirements and FAA constraints.

(u) (S) MC/EC-130 Support:

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	ARCT(Z)	ALT	RECVR ON-LOAD	A/A TACAN	KC-13 BEACC
BAR 11/12	TBD (3)	A	220300Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 13	TBD (2)	A	220310Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 14	TBD (2)	A	220320Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ	P.366.3	/BU	391.8				
BAR 15/16	TBD (3)	B	221540Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 17	TBD (2)	B	221550Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 18	TBD (2)	B	221600Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.366.3/B.U. 391.8						?

(u) (S) Support:

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	ARCT(Z)	ALT	RECVR ON-LOAD	A/A TACAN	KC-13 BEACO
BAR 21/22	TBD (2)	C	220455Z	10,000	32m	30/93	2-1-
BAR 25/26	TBD (2)	D	221140Z	11,000	38m	30/93	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.361.7/B.U. 350.7						

A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APPENDIX 10 (Det A Operations) TO ANNEX C (Operations)

A 1. (S) Mission: [REDACTED] conducts [REDACTED] assault of BACON at 220745Z Nov 80 to recover US assets.

2. (S) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations: The operation will be conducted in three phases.

(1) (S) Phase I: Unit will be moved from CANVASBACK to BROOMCORN on 21 Nov in time to onload on C-5s.

(2) (S) Phase II: Unit will conduct [REDACTED] assault of BACON to recover assets.


(3) (S) Phase III: Unit will exfiltrate [REDACTED] to EVERGLADE where they will transload to C-141 aircraft for return to CANVASBACK.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Everglade:

C-130 OFF-LOADING POSITIONS


MC-130 #1 LANDS AT H HOUR
MC-130 #2 LANDS AT H+1MIN
MC-130 #3 LANDS AT H+2
MC-130 #4 LANDS AT H+3
EC-130 #5 LANDS AT H+10



Everglade

C - 141B GROUND MARSHALLING PLAN

1 & 3 MAKE 180°
TURNS WHEN FINAL PARK
LOCATION IS REACHED



SECRET

Everglade


PARKING PLAn:

~~SECRET~~

UH-60 TRANSLOAD POINT

OH-6A LZs.


26



~~SECRET~~

Everglade

REFUEL / DEPARTURE OPERATIONS:



~~SECRET~~OPERATIONS: CLAMITY JANE PROCEDURES

CALAMITY JANE Procedures - ELEVATE. The "CALAMITY JANE" procedure is devised in the interest of safety and to insure orderly aircraft spacing in the event that any go around is required.

Format: "(Aircraft Flight) This is (Command Agency), ELEVATE XX at YY; acknowledge." Where (Aircraft Flight) is the string of aircraft to which the procedure applies, and (Command Agency) is the agency commanding the procedure.

XX is the number of minutes each aircraft will delay.
YY is the time in minutes at which the procedure will be initiated.

Procedure: If necessary to implement a "CALAMITY JANE" procedure, the ELEVATE call will be given early enough to allow each aircraft to receive and acknowledge the call prior to YY. After acknowledgement, all aircraft will fly their assigned route to the location corresponding to time YY. At YY, all aircraft will initiate a 180 degree standard rate turn to the right. Even suffixed aircraft will initiate a climb to base altitude plus 500 feet. Aircraft will fly a single holding pattern so as to arrive back at YY location at time YY plus XX. Even suffixed aircraft will descend to base altitude when reestablished on course.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~
ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

LOGISTICS (U)

1. (U) Concept. Initial logistics provisioning will be through normal Service channels to the extent possible. Equipment maintenance is a responsibility of the providing Service/ command. Minimum resupply is planned. Emergency requirements which cannot be satisfied in objective areas will be forwarded to JTD J-4.

a. (U) Supply:

(1) Class I. Operational rations will be used throughout. Each command is responsible to deploy into area with sufficient rations for consumption until return to home station.

(2) (U) Class III:

(a) (S) 101st will operate FARRP (2 points) at RIVERSIDE. POL, Blivit and pumps will be provided from JTD assets at Ft Bragg. 101st will coordinate pickup of material.

(b) (S) QM detachment will operate refuel point (8 points) at EVERGLADE.

(c) (S) Refuel of AH-1G [REDACTED] by UH-60 refuelers will be conducted by 101st at RIVERSIDE.

(d) (S) [REDACTED] will be refueled administratively at EVERGLADE after ENDEX either by QM detachment or base tanker truck in order of priority.

(e) (S) No other refueling except for air refueling of aircraft is planned.

(3) (U) Class V:

(a) (U) All deploy with sufficient Class V for conduct of operation.

(b) (S) Only resupply is at FARRP at RIVERSIDE for AH-15 [REDACTED]. Requirements to be determined by 101st. (Simulate carrying Class V into RIVERSIDE.)

(4) (U) Other Classes of Supply: No other resupply is scheduled.

b. (U) Medical. Tab 1.

c. (U) Transportation. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated between HQ JTD and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation will be forwarded to JTD-J4.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APPENDIX 1 (MEDICAL) TO ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. (U) Unit level medical support utilizing organic medical assets will be the responsibility of the organization commander.
2. (U) Medical support beyond the capability of unit level medical personnel will be planned, coordinated, and controlled by the designated JTD Surgeon.
3. (U) JTD level medical support for Exercise STORM CLOUD is as follows:
 - a. (S) CAMELOT Forces: Aboard C-5A #6, two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests. (101 Flight Surgeon to accompany UH-60 flight at the discretion of Helicopter Air Mission Commander.)
 - b. (S) EVERGLADE Forces: (MC-130) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard aircraft #5.
 - c. (S) EVERGLADE Forces: (C-141) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard C-141 # 1.
 - d. (U) RIVERSIDE Forces: Medical support to be provided by 1st SOW flight surgeon personnel.
4. (U) Evacuation procedures in the event of actual evacuation requirements during staging activities (Campbell, Pope, Hurlburt) casualties should be evacuated to local base medical facility. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around Edwards AFB should be directed to USAF Medical Clinic, Edwards - Main. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around DOE, Indian Springs, and Desert Rock should be directed to Nellis AFB Hospital. Air crews should be briefed on potential evacuation requests and routes.
5. (U) In the event of actual emergencies--evacuation procedures will be handled in accordance with normal SAR.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~~~SECRET~~

ANNEX J (COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (S) JTD Succession of Command:

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Location</u>
a. HAMMER	LANCER	JTD MAIN
b. STONE	ARCHER	[REDACTED]
c. SNUFFY	CYCLONE	SCORPION (AWACS)
d. BG SCHOLTES	OUTLAW	EVERGLADE
e. Col TURNER	COMANCHE	PHOTOGRAPH

2. (U) Command Relationships (See attached diagram Appendix 1):

a. (U) JTD CDR - Is in full, overall command of all forces, during all phases of the exercise. (See paragraph 1 above for Command Succession). All of the following commanders report directly to the JTD commander when appropriate and required. (See paragraph 3 for Command Concept).

b. [REDACTED] JTD Deputy Commander - Located [REDACTED]

(1) [REDACTED] Manages and directs [REDACTED] AH-1S assets in providing supporting fires in response to assault commander within pre-established priorities.

(2) (U) Manages and directs SAR assets and efforts.

(3) [REDACTED] Controls [REDACTED] assets upon their completion of initial objectives.

c. (C) Air Support Commander - Located AWACS.

(1) (U) Manages and directs the employment of E-3A and F-14 assets in provision of CAP.

(2) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.

(3) (U) Provides track information and firing recommendations on low altitude targets to the ADA controllers at designated ground sites.

(4) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.

d. (U) Air Mission Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE):

(1) (U) Command all fixed wing assets designated to support their respective objectives.

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL SECRET//NOFORN~~

(2) (U) Each is Dominant Authority while airborne on his in-bound and out-bound routes.

(3) (U) Responsive to Ground Commander while landed.

A

(4) (S) [REDACTED] assets chop to JTD Deputy Commander during on station time.

e. (U) Ground Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE).

A

(1) (S) Command all security (Rangers) forces, CTC personnel, and support elements at their respective locations.

(2) (U) Security forces include, under the subordinate command of the on-site Ranger Commander, the ALO, Fire Support Coordinator, and ADA elements.

(3) (U) Support elements include Medics and a substantial DACO effort at EVERGLADE, and a FARRP at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) (S) Is the Dominant Authority at their location while forces are on the ground. ♦

f. (U) LIMESTONE Assault Commander.

A

(1) (S) Commands LIMESTONE assault forces (Delta, [REDACTED])

(2) (U) Commands LIMESTONE UH-60 assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A

(4) (S) Determines time of final assault (H-Hour) within guidance provided by JTD Commander, and coordinates launches of BACON assault forces/helicopter assets, [REDACTED] helicopter assets, and attack helicopter assets at appropriate times.

g. (U) BACON Assault Commander.

(1) (U) Commands BACON assault forces (Detachment A).

(2) (S) Commands BACON [REDACTED] from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A

(3) (U) Dominant Authority (along with LIMESTONE Assault Commander who has priority) from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

h. (U) [REDACTED] Commander.

(1) (C) Commands [REDACTED]

A (2) (C) Commands designated [REDACTED] assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Upon completion of initial assigned mission chops to JTD Deputy Commander for employment in SAR and/or combat forces role.

i. (U) Helicopter Mission Commander.

(1) (U) Becomes the Ground Commander at CAMELOT on landing at that location.

A (2) (C) Commands all helicopter assets from CAMELOT take-off until RIVERSIDE landing. The Deputy Helicopter Mission Commander in the flight of four UH-60 refueling helicopters will in fact, for the HMC, command all [REDACTED] AW-15 assets from CAMELOT take-off to RIVERSIDE landing. DHMC during this period will report directly to JTD if required.

(3) (U) Chops all assets to appropriate mission commanders at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) Commands all UH-60 and AH-1S forces upon exfiltration take-off from EVERGLADE.

3. (U) JTD Command Concept:

a. (U) The Commander, JTD, is in full overall command of all forces, during all phases of each JTD operation. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative Activity/Dominant Authority Mode.

b. (U) Imperative Activity is defined as the portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to successful mission completion.

c. (U) The term Dominant Authority denotes the commander responsible, at that time, for execution of the Imperative Activity.

d. (U) The Dominant Authority concept implies temporary OPCON of one or more lateral elements; not a formal transfer of command. For example, during an airfield seizure phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Imperative Activity and, for that period, is the Dominant Authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just landed, would remain in the JTD command net, but would be prepared to execute, on order of the GFC (under the monitoring of the Commander, JTD), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the seizure phase of the operation.


- e. (U) At certain times during an operation, there may be more than one Dominant Authority. An example might be the Air Support Commander defending against an air attack over the target area at the same time the ground assault phase was in progress. In these instances the general situation and the nature of events will dictate which commanders respond to the requirements of the others. Priorities will be monitored and adjusted, and positive command guidance will be provided when required, by the Commander, JTD.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX 1 (JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE)
TO ANNEX J TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE
EXERCISE STORM CLOUD



CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Communication Doctrine.

a. (U) Radio listening silence is required for OPSEC reasons in certain situations prior to H-Hour.

(1)(U) (S) When Direction Finding (DF) or local monitoring of aircraft station transmissions would reveal movement towards or within a hostile country.

(2)(U) (S) When DF or local monitoring of ground station transmissions at in-country staging/refueling sites would reveal the in-country presence and possibly the exact location of such sites.

b. (U) Once the actual assault has begun there are few security limitations. [REDACTED]

A [REDACTED] should probably remain secure (on FM or UHF), but most other transmissions can be made in the clear, and as often as necessary.

2. (U) Procedures for EXERCISE STORM CLOUD.

a. (U) General: Except for JTD Base and relay stations operating in the Broadcast Mode;

(1)(U) (S) Radio listening silence to maximum degree practical.

(2)(U) (S) Minimum transmissions are at other times.

b. (U) Procedures by phase.

(1)(U) (S) Pre-deployment. For one week prior, establish patterns of base stations/relay stations broadcasting messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Each message acknowledged by at least one other base or relay station and broadcast back. Stations include unit admin stations at home bases, and JTD deployed base/relay stations.

(2)(U) Deployment. Same as pre-deployment.

(3)(U) (S) Insertion (includes all inbound fixed-wing flights, landing at Camelot, assembly, flights to Riverside, and staging at Riverside).

(a)(U) (S) Nominal radio listening silence by all aircraft and ground stations on all frequencies.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

- (b) (S) ^(U) Base stations periodically broadcast information messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Acknowledged (and repeated) only by other base or relay stations. These transmissions include weather updates, time checks, and aircraft progress reports (as observed by the AWACS).
- (c) (S) ^(U) Transmissions by aircraft/ground stations only when absolutely required to report difficulties. Use the ZEBRA channels in the clear, with the ZEBRA number code. The in-the-clear, numeric transmissions reduce the total time on the air, eliminate the give-away sounds of the PARKHILL, and eliminate the use of English spoken code words. The base stations will then initiate detailed questions, comments, and instructions, fully secured on the broadcast channels, with answers, if required, using in-the-clear numbers on the ZEBRA channels.
- (d) (S) ^(U) In cases of extreme difficulty approval may be given to use secure UHF between aircraft, if the situation permits.

(4) (U) Assault.

(a) (S) ^(U) Enroute is the same as the Insertion Phase until H-Hour, or until operation is detected, whichever comes first.

(b) (S) During assault [REDACTED]

A
[REDACTED]
should use secure FM and/or UHF. All other transmissions in extraction zone areas secure or in the clear if needed to facilitate operations. During this period, all the out-of-CALIVADA transmissions will use two-way secure SATCOM and HF radio (single channel), on the SATCOM ALPHA or BRAVO net as appropriate.

(5) (S) ^(U) Extraction (includes flights to Riverside, transloading, and outbound flights).

(a) (S) ^(U) Same as Assault through outbound flight Riverside.

(b) (S) ^(U) Absolutely minimum transmissions on outbound flights.

4. (U) For all other communications information, see CEOI.

~~SECRET~~~~REPORT//COMINT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX L TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

References:

a. (U) JCS Pub 18, "Doctrine for Operations Security."

b. (U) DODR 5200.1R

1. (U) GENERAL: This annex provides guidance for the secure planning and conduct of exercise STORM CLOUD (U).
2. (U) RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC: All participants in this exercise share responsibility for OPSEC. In order to efficiently manage this responsibility OPSEC points of contact (POC) will be appointed by each participating unit and cognizant higher headquarters. These POC's will work directly with JTD security to coordinate all security matters. JTD security will provide a specific hostile all source intelligence collection report at D-3. Updates will be provided as required.
3. (U) OPSEC THREAT: Because the STORM CLOUD exercise areas are normally associated with high priority science and technology, a potential OPSEC threat exists at both home bases and in the exercise areas.
 - a. (S) SIGINT - A variety of hostile spaceborne, seaborne, and land based stations pose a threat to this exercise. Among these will be: Soviet and Cuban land based HF DF stations; diplomatic missions in Washington, San Francisco, and Mexico [REDACTED] In addition, periodic overflights by Communist Bloc airlines pose a threat.
 - b. (S) The WSC-3/Parkhill communications signature which is identifiable with the JTD may be subject to hostile traffic analysis techniques. Pre and post exercise management of traffic levels will partially counter this threat. Specific guidance on desired traffic levels will be provided in separate message. Another partial counter to this traffic analysis threat will be the use of Parkhill secure phones. Outside of maintaining minimum acceptable traffic levels on the WSC-3, an effort should be made to use the PARKHILL secured phone lines for necessary coordination. The possibility of detecting phone conversations is less than radio-satellite communications.
 - c. (S) HUMINT. This threat is posed by both overt and covert means. Among these are hostile diplomatic travel, merchant seamen transiting the CONUS, students and cultural/scientific exchange personnel. The best counter to this

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

threat is good continuing unit OPSEC training and clear guidance concerning current activity. Specifically, unit personnel should, to the degree possible, act in a business as normal manner. While there is no desire to publically announce the exercise, it is recognized all necessary preparations cannot remain hidden. Therefore, unit personnel should understand that the unit will/did participate in a TRAINEX is unclassified.

(U)

- d. (S) Open sources. Media stories currently present an extremely great threat to STORM CLOUD security. The unusually large deployment/redeployment activity at Campbell may provoke media inquiries. The on-going exercise BRIGHT STAR, increases this possibility. Noise or accidents during the exercise may also result in media inquiries. The primary means of defusing this threat will be timely responses to inquiries. This will require a combination of contingency press releases and rapid cross tell between units and JTD HQ in the event of inquiries. FAA flight plans and communications frequency coordination are also potential open source threats. To the extent possible, frequency coordination will be done via secure means. While hostile intelligence will be able to note fixed wing flight plans to the Edwards and Nellis AFB areas, rotary wing aircraft operating between these points will attempt to file flight plans for general radii of action vice specific routes.
- (U)
- e. (S) PHOTINT: Soviet photo satellites may pose a threat to the deployment/redeployments and to the construction of exercise facilities. JTD security will provide satellite warnings and to the extent possible, daylight exercise related activities will be adjusted. Separate JTD message will provide further details on this threat.

4. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) JTD will provide:

- (1) Satellite warnings for home bases and all exercise locations beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (2) AGI, merchant ship, Communist Bloc airline warnings beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.
- (3) Notices of pertinent Soviet Bloc attache travel will be provided when available.
- (4) Liaison with OSD, JCS, and service public affairs officers as required.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(5) Numbered, accountable copies of this OPORD.

b. (U) All units will:

(1) (U) Make the maximum use of secure vice non-secure comms.

(2) (U) Immediately report to JTD HQ any incidents which have a potential security impact. Aircraft accidents or personnel injuries are prime examples.

(3) (U) Provide daily (NLT 2400 local) feedback on security situation. Reports should begin on D-3 and extend through D+3. Security situations requiring assistance/coordination with JTD should be reported ASAP.

(4) (U) Politely refer all media/public inquiries to public affairs channels and immediately alert JTD security. Inform the person who makes the inquiry that it is the function of the public affairs to provide the information they seek.

(5) (U) Instruct all personnel, that in the event of an accident/incident they should provide as necessary; name, rank, unit, and if necessary, admit to participating in a joint training exercise. Provocative actions or words (classified, sensitive, etc) should be avoided. Additional inquiries should be directed to public affairs.

(6) (U) Appoint a POC to liaison with INSCOM team performing counter-intelligence assessment. Note, INSCOM team will not be cleared for JTD information. Neither confirm or deny INSCOM findings; however, use their information to take corrective action. If necessary INSCOM reps can be asked for clarification of their findings or OPSEC recommendations.

(7) (U) Transmit INSCOM reports to JTD HQ in a timely fashion.

(8) (U) At the conclusion of the exercise each unit may retain one copy of OPORD STORM CLOUD. All other copies of the OPORD are to be collected and returned to JTD HQ.

(9) (U) Beginning on D-8, all units will insure that at least a minimum level of activity is established on the WSC-3. Details on this will be provided in separate message.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(10) (S) The use of Edwards AFB will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL information until arrival at Edwards AFB. As an exception to this pre-exercise coordination with MAC concerning airfields usage at Fort Campbell and Edwards will be For Official Use Only. To the extent possible this coordination information should be limited to as few personnel as required. After arrival of the main body of exercise forces at Edwards, the Edwards AFB location will no longer be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. All other locations will, however, be classified as CONFIDENTIAL prior to, during and after the exercise.

(11) (S) All unit personnel will be briefed that the fact that the unit participated in a TRAINEX is unclassified. Unit personnel should also be briefed to refer to all requests for specifics of the TRAINEX to their unit commander.

c. (U) Unit hosting exercise debrief:

(1) (U) Insure that normal security procedures contained in DODR 5200.1R and service supplements are followed. Among these are:

- (a) (U) Insure that adequate space is available for conducting TOP SECRET debriefings.
- (b) (U) Insure that access to debriefing is controlled.
- (c) (U) Double check the conference area at conclusion of the debrief.

(2) (U) 101st will:

- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid overflight of inhabited areas between exercise points.
- (b) (S) Act as primary security POC for Edwards AFB.
- (c) (S) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Edwards AFB.
- (d) (S) Coordinate directly with Delta and JTD HQ to insure that the cross load at Campbell is conducted in a low key, non-provocative manner.

(3) (U) Rangers will:

- (a) (S) Act as primary security POC for Indian Springs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECRET NOFORN~~

- (b) (U) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Indian Springs.

A

(b) (4) [REDACTED]

- (a) (U) Act as primary security POC for Desert Rock and exercise locations within the Department of Energy (DOE) area.

- (b) (U) Perform a sweep to insure that no classified information is left in above mentioned area.

(5) (U) ISOW will:

- (a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid low altitude flights of inhabited sections of the exercise area.

~~SECRET NOFORN CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO EXERCISE STORM CLOUD OPLAN ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

<u>Subject Requiring Protection</u>	<u>Plan Phase</u>	<u>Prep Phase</u>	<u>Exec Phase</u>	<u>Post Phase</u>
A Participation of DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
A Identities of Personnel attached to DELTA, [REDACTED]	X	X	X	X
Use of Edwards AFB range	X	X		
Use of NTS areas	X	X	X	X
Lessons learned	N/A	N/A	N/A	X
Identification of specialized equipment not normally a part of a units TA	X	X	X	X

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET//REF ID: A65226241~~



CONFIDENTIAL



JTD Service

STORM
CLOUD




CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)
ROUTE CHART

七
七

TIME, ZULU



ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)

TO OPLAN ST
FLOW CHART

十一

I-760

OPERATION POTENT CHARGE

(U)

(a) Purpose -

1. Train to deployability readiness a SNOWBIRD mission-capable force consisting of 4 CH-47's, 5 HH/CH-53C's, 5 CH-47C's (HICAP), 10 UH-60A's (HICAP).
2. Train a cadre of mission-ready crews for the purpose of conducting SNOWBIRD-oriented individual and unit training.
3. Articulate doctrine and procedures for the conduct of joint helicopter special operations missions, and document for the future.

(U)

(b) Concept -

1. 1 Aug 80 - Establish Joint Aviation Plans and Operations Directorate directly subordinate to JTF.
2. 6 to 8 Aug 80 - Conduct Joint Helicopter Operations Doctrine and Procedures Conference, sponsored by JTF. Attendees from HQ, JTF; HQ, 101 USAF GS; HQ, 1st Special Operations Wing; US Army Aviation Center; and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Determine, in conference, using HONEY BADGER evaluations as a basis, doctrine and procedures for conduct of future helicopter special missions. Document procedures.
3. 18 to 31 Aug 80 - Conduct operational training of a mission package to refine and test doctrine and procedures. Conduct a mission-oriented exercise over realistic distances, in a type mission environment. Evaluate special mission package potential to successfully conclude a SNOWBIRD mission.

(U)(S) Assets -

10 - UH60 HICAP

5 - CH47 HICAP

5 - HH53H

5 HH/CH53C/D

Select crew:

- 8 UH60, Army

- 4 CH47, Army

- 4 HH53H, Air Force

- 4 HH/CH53, Air Force/USMC

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: QADR
Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET//COMINT~~

(U) Doctrinal/Procedural Subject Areas -

1. Briefings:

- a. Briefing format/outline
- b. Pre-mission data distribution
- c. Map/chart/flight log preparation
- d. Formation briefs
- e. Emergency procedures briefs
- f. Cell standardization
- g. Tactical situation briefs
- h. Mission note cards

2. Mission profile, enroute phase -

- a. Ground abort procedures
- b. Communications plan
- c. Spare aircraft procedures
- d. Departure join-up
- e. Enroute link-up
- f. Lost lead link-up
- g. Formation visual signals
 - (1) lead change
 - (2) frequency change
 - (3) position change
 - (4) emergency
 - (5) break
- h. NVG navigation check points - route selection
- i. Lost comm
- j. Lost visual contact - signals and procedures
- k. Evasive maneuver battle drill
- l. Wing man abort
- m. Downed crew recovery
- n. Re-link procedures, enroute, holding area, LZ/PZ.
- o. IP procedures
- p. Holding area procedures
- q. Hides
- r. AR procedures
 - (1) timing
 - (2) missed AR
 - (3) cell procedures
 - (4) lighting

3. Mission profile, terminal phase

- a. Aircraft spotting in LZ/PZ/holding area
- b. ROE/LZ status/threat/security
- c. Rejoin by aircraft left in holding area
- d. RRP closeout procedures - signals and counts

~~SECRET//COMINT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- e. PZ closeout procedures - signals and counts
- f. Authentication procedures
- g. Evasive maneuver, re-link
- h. Pax onload/offload procedures
 - (1) count
 - (2) control
 - (3) conform
- i. Lost lead
- j. LZ lost comm
 - (1) visual signals
 - (2) withhold
- k. Rescue and recovery response procedures
- l. Signals - compromise/pickup/proceed
- m. Holding area communications -
 - (1) call forward plan
 - (2) re-link plan
 - (3) withhold plan
 - (4) NLT times
- n. Passenger instructions
- o. Transload area procedures.
 - (1) pax instructions
 - (2) pax marking
 - (3) pax accounting
 - (4) ingress/egress
 - (5) lighting
 - (6) communications plan
 - (7) lost comm plan - signals
 - (8) control points/holding areas
- p. RRP/LZ/PZ timing/traffic/holding
- q. RRP/LZ/PZ HA procedures
- r. Go around procedures
- s. CCT/Pathfinder coordination

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5 August 1980

JTD PROCEDURAL CONFERENCE
EXERCISE POTENT CHARGE - PHASE I

Following is a list of participants in POTENT CHARGE Joint Doctrine Conference:

<u>NAME/RANK</u>	<u>CLEARANCE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>SSN</u>
COLONEL [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	DA,ODCSOPS (JCS)	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	USAAVNC	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	USAAVNS	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	101 AVN GP	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	D/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-3 [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
CWO-4 [REDACTED]	S	A/159 AVN BN	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	AF/RDQL	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	S	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
CAPTAIN [REDACTED]	TS	1st SOW	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	437 MAW/CCT	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	MAWTS-1 Yuma AZ	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	HMX-1 Quantico	[REDACTED]
MAJOR [REDACTED]	TS	6510th Test Wg (JCS)	[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	
250	40MM [REDACTED]	Anniston	
400	[REDACTED]	Anniston	
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	
48	White SMOKE Grenade	Navy	
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	D
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Del
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[REDACTED]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[REDACTED]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC DECL LOW/NONE TOREV ON OADR~~SECRET~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OAPR

~~SECRET~~

I 761

EXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
250	40MM [REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
400	[REDACTED]	Anniston	Delta
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	Delta
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	Delta
48	White SMoke Grenade	Navy	Delta
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Delta
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[REDACTED]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[REDACTED]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC DEC DOWNGR ADJREVW ON OADR~~SECRET~~Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
*	M16 Repair Parts	Belvoir/Bragg	Delta
48	Batteries for goggles	Sacramento	Delta
4 (1)	Immersion heaters & cans	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
89	Distress Markers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
8	A2 Marking Lights	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
*	Various gear to rig loads for airdrop	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
60 (1)	Parachutes	82nd	JTF
*	Railroad ties	[REDACTED]	JTF
*	Demolitions	Navy	JTF
204	Shoulder Patches (American Flag)	Local Procurement	Delta
995	Ctg, Barrier Penetrating Model SGA-300	Local Procurement	Delta
400	Baseball grenades	Local Procurement	Delta
200 lbs	C-3	[REDACTED]	Delta
5	BAT Drones for Redeye Tng	Red River AD	Delta
54	[REDACTED]	Letterkenny AD	Helo/1st SOW
6 Boxes	Grenade Hand Smoke	Sierra AD	Helo
12	IR Filters	Anniston AD	[REDACTED]
60 sets	Air Force Fatigues (JTF)	JTF/Delta	DLA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
60 sets	Air Force Flight Suits (JTF)	DLA	JTF/Delta
12 sets	Air Force Fatigues [REDACTED]	DLA	[REDACTED]
50	Parkliners and sweat pants	DLA	JTF
100 pr	Boot Socks	DLA	JTF
6 pr	Combat Boots [REDACTED]	DLA	[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I 1b

NONEXPENDABLES

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>(S) PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>(S) PROVIDED</u>
8	TRK, M274A4 (mule)	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
6	TRK, M151A2 1/4T	"	[REDACTED]
66	Parachute T-10	"	JTF/Delta
29	" G-12D	"	A JTF
69	" G-11A	"	JTF
4	Mount Pedestal	"	[REDACTED]
90	Drum Fuel Collection	"	JTF
42	LSS	"	JTF
36	LSS Support	"	JTF
2	Pump 100 GPM	"	Helo
2	Nozzle	"	Helo
43	Parachute Ext 15'	"	JTF
32	" Pilot 68"	"	JTF
20	Container A22	"	JTF
8	Dirt Bikes	Intelligence Materiel Support Office (IMDSO)	[REDACTED]
120	Protective Masks	IMDSO	Delta
35	Kevlar Vests	Natick Labs	A Helo
12	Riot Guns	IMDSO	Delta
41	Evasion & Escape Kits	Langley	Delta
20	M16A1 Rifles	Anniston AD	Delta
8	Inerital Nav Sys	SOFD-D	A CV
6	Walkie Talkies	SFOD-D	Helo
8	Fares W/8-100GPM Pumps	2/Bragg & 6/Campbell	JTF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

COMPLETED ON 12 AUG 92INITIATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC REG DOWNLOADEDREV ON OADR~~SECRET~~Classified By: JC S
Declassified On: OADR

~~SECRET~~

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
1	350 GPM	Ft Campbell	JTF
7	AN/PAQ4 IR Aiming Light	Night Vision Labs	Delta }
9	T-MEG Beacons	Hurlburt	Delta }
1	Small Arms Repair Kit	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta }
72(40)	AN/PVS-5A Night Vision Goggles	Sacramento AD	Delta } 1 SOW/MAC
4	PSC-1	Ft Monmount	Delta }
75	Promethium Night Sight (M16)	IMDSO	Delta }
5	3000 Gal bladders & 10 pumps for airborne refueling system	MacDill (Harvest Eagle)	1st SOW,
2	R-144 Refuel system (100,000 Gal)	EUCOM	
10			
6	Omega Navigation Systems	CINCLANT	Helo
	Commo Equipment	JCSE	
9	PRC 90 Radios	Eglin AFB	
10	Search light set, infra-red AN/VSS-3A	Tobbyhanna AD	helo/1st SOW
2	R-9 Tankers	EUCOM	
2	Coleman Tugs	EUCOM	
1	Demineralization Trucks	EUCOM (SAC)	

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECRET~~

<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PROVIDED BY</u>	<u>PROVIDED TO</u>
2	100 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
2	350 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
8	Fuel Filter Separators	Tooele AD	1st SOW
144	Fuel Filters	Tooele AD	1st SOW
18	Shoulder Holsters	Red River AD	A [REDACTED]
50	45 Cal SMG AMMO pouches	DLA	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
40	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
70	[REDACTED] magazines	JFK Center	[REDACTED]
10	[REDACTED]	Rangers	[REDACTED]
3	Daytime Filters for PVS-5's	Ft Rucker	A [REDACTED] 1st SOW
10	Motorola PT-25-A Radios	CERCOM	Delta
24	MX360 Motorola Radios plus components	Local Procurement	[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

I 763

ARMY AIR SUPPORT FOR JTF

Aircraft used were U-21/C-12

<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
APG, MD	Langley	Protective Mas
Simmons AF	Langley	AMMO
Anniston	Langley	AMMO
Davidson	Pat Henry Airport	Pax
Davidson	Ft Stewart	FTX Plan
Elizabeth City	Cherry Point	Pax
Davidson	Pope	Pax
Elizabeth City	Pope	Pax
Pope	Elizabeth City	Pax
Davidson (NOTE)	Pope	Pax
Pope	Davidson	Pax

NOTE: Numerous trips between JTF HQ and POPE have been conducted to include return flights.

~~JCS
Classified By: QADR~~~~Declassified ON: 12 AUG 92
Declassified by: DDO NMCC~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I-764

MAC MISSIONS FOR JTF

I

<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
2101-01	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo's & Pax
2101-02	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Crane & Pax
2101-03	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-04	C-5	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo & Pax
2101-05	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-06	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-07	C-141	Norfolk	[REDACTED]	Helo Spt Equi
2101-08	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Fuel Tanks
2101-09	C-141	Cherry Point	[REDACTED]	Wpn, Ammo & P
1092-01	C-130	Maxwell/Pope	Langley	Ammo, vehicle bladders
1092-02	C-130	Hanscon	Cherry Point	Protective ve
1092-03	C-130	Pope/Andrews/Maxwell	[REDACTED]	Jeeps, Bikes, explosives
1092-04	C-130	Langley	N/A	Air Drop
1092-05	C-130	Bergstrom	Langley	Radios
1092-06	C-130	Maxwell	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
1092-07	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Helo Pilots
1092-08	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Helo Pilots
1092-09	C-141	McDill	Laguna	JCSE
1092-10	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Delta & Equip
1092-11	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equip

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: *JES DDO NMCC*
 Declassified ON: *OADR*
 Downgraded by: *DDO NMC*
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD (6)</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1092-12	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equi
1092-13	C-141	Delta /Pope A	Yuma	Equip & Pax
1092-14	C-141	Pope	Davis Monthan	Fuel Blivets
1092-15		Cancelled		
1092-16	C-141	Pope/Andrews	Yuma/Monthan	Fuel Blivets Commo
1092-17	C-141	Yuma	Langley	Delta
1092-18	C-141	Yuma	Langley	Delta
1092-19	C-130	Langley	Farm	Delta](shutt)
1092-20	C-141	Monthan	Pope	Fuel Blivets
1092-21	C-141	Yuma	Pope	Cargo & Pax
1092-22	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Wpns
1092-23	C-130	Farm	Langley/Phillips	Delta & Palle
1092-24	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Pax
1092-25	C-141	Pope	Norton	Fuel Blivets
1092-26	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Ammo
1092-27	C-130	Farm	Pope	Delta & Equip
1092-28	C-141	Laguna	Pope/Charleston	Pax & Equip
1092-29	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt/Norfolk	Pax & Equip
1092-30	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-31	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-32		Cancelled		
1092-33	C-130	Travis	McDill	Trucks & Pax
1092-34	C-130	Morton	Pope	Blivets, Pax

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>MSN</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>ONLOAD</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>CARGO</u>
1092-35	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blives, Pax
1093-01	C-141	Norfolk	Yuma	Pax
1093-02	C-130	Pope	Yuma	Pax, Nets
1093-03	C-130	Yuma/RR	Pope	Nets, Bats
1093-04	C-130	Pope	Eglin	Jeep
1093-05	C-130	Pope/Warminister	Yuma	Qrt, Searchl
1093-06	C-141	Hurlburt	Yuma	
1093-07	C-130	McChord	Yuma	Wpns
1093-08	C-130	Yuma		Pax & Wpns
1093-09	C-130	Andrews/HAAF	Nellis	Model, Pax,
1093-10	C-141		Hurlburt	Equip
1093-11	C-141		Hurlburt	Equip
1142-01	C-141	Hurlburt		Equip
1142-02	C-141	Hurlburt		Equip
1142-03	C-141	Nellis		Truck
1142-04	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt, Norfolk Andrews/McDill	Helo Pax, JCS

II In addition to above flights, fourteen T-38/T-43 flights provided to JTF for passengers and intelligence material movements.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL